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ABSTRACT
Temporary housing after disasters is the outcome cf a complex process that
merits attention in its own right; it is distinct from, yet interreiated with, the
process ot reconstruction. Some forms of temporary housing projects have been
instigated after most major disasters in the past 40 years, but many projects
have experienced similar problems, such as high cost, Iack cf cuitural suitability,
unsatisfactory locations and permanence, ail of which translate into their being a
burden on the communities they were intended to help recover. Many cf these
problems can be attributed to a lack of planning, especially at the strategic levei,
before the disaster occurs.
This research explores how temporary housing projects are detined, how they
are organized and managed, and what their later impacts are on urban
development. These factors are used as a basis for defining issues to be
addressed in strategic pianning. The research is comprised cf four articles,
which have been published in scholarly journals and also includes sections on
previcus research and on methodoiogy, and provides a synthesis cf the overali
findings. The overarching methodclogy used is that of the qualitative case study,
coupled ta the systems approach. The logical tramework s used ta define the
project processes and ta evaluate the project impacts.
The temporary housing programme after the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey is the
main case study, in which the government and NGO5 buiit almost 42,000
tempcrary housing units to house the affected families tram two major
earthquakes which affected the industrial region to the east of Istanbul. In order
to deveiop a comparative tramework, this research also draws on other case
histories cf recent temporary housing programmes, such as those in Mexica,
ltaly, Colambia, Japan, Greece and the United States.
III
The research brings to light new ideas: 1) temporary housing projects are
strongly influenced by the organizational and building culture cf the countries in
which they are implemented; 2) timely and well-organized procurement s a key
step, in which finding satisfactory sites for temporary housing remains one cf the
largest problems; 3) after temporary housing has served its initial purpose, it
does net need te become a burden but can instead be a valuable resource cf
low-cost housing in a place where housing is in short supply. Overail this
research proposes a strategic planning framework and effets guidance about
organizational design, technical design and project processes that need te be
incorporated into the strategic planning for temporary housing projects.
Keywords: disasters, temporary housing, reconstruction, strategic planning,
project managemenI, systems approach, logical framework.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les logements temporaires après les catastrophes naturelles résultent d’un
processus très complexe qui, malgré leur singularité, exigent une intégration
dans le processus de reconstruction. Les projets de logements temporaires
construits après presque tous les désastres dans les 40 dernières années
présentent tous les mêmes inconvénients: coûts trop élevés, designs inadaptés
à la situation socioculturelle, emplacements peu convenables et, surtout,
permanence. Il en résulte que les projets sont devenus des fardeaux pour les
communautés. Plusieurs de ces problèmes peuvent être attribués au manque
de planification stratégique avant les catastrophes.
Cette recherche vise à définir ce que représente le logement temporaire,
comment les projets sont organisés et gérés, et quels sont leurs impacts sur le
processus de développement urbain. Ces informations sont utilisées comme
référence de base pour définir les paramètres les plus importants pour la
planification stratégique du logement temporaire. Cette recherche inclut quatre
articles, publiés dans des revues scientifiques, une revue de la littérature, une
description de la méthodologie utilisée et une synthèse qui comprend une
discussion générale des résultats obtenus. La méthodologie employée est
basée sur des études de cas qualitatives reliées à une approche systémique. La
définition du processus du projet et l’évaluation de ses impacts reposent sur la
technique dite du «cadre logique».
Le programme de logement temporaire après les tremblements de terre qui ont
eu lieu en Turquie en 1999 sert de cadre à cette recherche. Dans ce cas
particulier, le gouvernement de Turquie et les ONGs ont construit environ
42 000 unités de logement temporaire pour reloger les familles frappées par
deux tremblements de terre majeurs situés dans des régions industrielles à l’est
Vd’istanbul. Pour étabiir des comparaisons, d’autres études de cas au Mexique,
en Italie, en Colombie, au Japon, en Grèce et aux États-unis ont été étudiées.
Cette recherche permet de souligner que : 1) les projets de logements
temporaires sont grandement infiuencés par la culture organisationneiie et par
l’industrie du bâtiment dans les pays où ils sont implantés; 2) un
approvisionnement au moment adéquat et une bonne organisation sont des
étapes-clés pour assurer le succès d’un projet; cependant le plus grand
problème est de trouver l’emplacement le plus approprié; 3) en effet, les unités
de logement temporaires peuvent devenir une source importante de logements
abordables pendant plusieurs années, même s’ils ont déjà servi à d’autres
victimes de catastrophe. D’une façon générale, cette recherche propose un
cadre de planification stratégique et offre des suggestions pour le design
organisationnel et le design technique, et pour le déroulement des processus du
projet qui doivent être inclus dans la planification stratégique des logements
temporaires.
Mots clés catastrophes naturelles, logements temporaires, reconstruction,
planification stratégique, gestion de projets, approche systémique, cadre
logique.
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1CHAPTER 7: INTRODUCTION
What exactly are the issues surrounding planning and management of post
disaster temporary housing projects? Why is this subject so important,
particularly today?
By way cf an introduction to answering these questions, let us take a look at
an extraordinary case cf a haphazard approach to post-disaster temporary
housing, with consequent waste cf resources in a supposedly rich and
efficient country.
7.1 The example of FEMA mobile homes at Hope Arkansas
The temporary housing programme for last year’s hurricane Katrina in the
United States provides an apt example of why and how strategic planning is
needed for temporary housing:
As is well known, Hurricane Katrina wiped out large areas of New Orleans
and the Louisiana coastline in August 2005, devastating the region and
forcing residents to flee from their destroyed homes for public shelters. As
had been the practice in past disasters on American soU, the U.S. Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) made the decision to buy, from
private suppliers, mobile and modular homes to temporarily house the
affected families close to their communities during the rebuilding process.
FEMA reports on their website, that one year after the hurricane, 950,000
families have applied for disaster housing assistance and it has distributed
over 100,000 temporary housing units to affected families.
However, an internai review by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(2006), about the mobile and modular homes to be distributed from two
2storage sites at Hope (Arkansas) and Red River (Texas), states that FEMA
purchased 24967 manufactured houses and 1 295 modular homes at a cost
ot about US$35,000 each, totalling just under US$900 million. The private
manufacturers supplied the homes to the sites in a timeiy manner; however
FEMA only distributed hait the homes to disaster-affected familles and aimost
one year after the hurricane, half the units remain in the Arkansas and Texas
storage facilities. The costs to maintain the storage facility, inciuding the land
lease, road maintenance and security are US$2 million per year, or
US$167,000 a month. (Incidentally, due to the vast numbers of houses
there—more than 1 0,000—the storage faciiity at Hope Arkansas has become
a local tourist attraction).
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2006), stated that “FEMA did not
have a plan for how the homes would be used before they purchased them,”
and cited several reasons why the homes had not been distributed to
awaiting families:
• Most ot the area affected by the hurricane is in a flood zone and
federal regulations prohibit placing these types of homes in floodplains,
which is where many of the evacuees would like to have them. FEMA
could have supplied travel trailers, which are smaller mobile homes
that can be towed by normal vehicles and are allowed on the
floodplains, however, FEMA did not purchase these types ot homes in
this case.
• FEMA did not have a specific number of how many homes would be
necessary; consequently they may have purchased many more homes
than were needed, at a considerabie cost to the disaster relief effort.
• Many local officiais did not want manufactured homes in their
communities, thus refused to make land available for them.
• Many of the homes would flot be accepted in typical mobile home
parks because they were too large and they aiso required a special
3permit to be hauled. The size was actually larger than FEMA’s own
guidelines for such homes.
The U.S. Department of Hometand Security’s states cecommendations for
FEMA: “for future disasters, develop written policies, procedures, and plans to
govern the acquisition and use cf mobile and modular homes.. .also, FEMA
should work with state and local governments te identify prearranged sites
that could be used for mobile homes. FEMA should flot wait until a disaster
strikes te identify possible sites for the homes”
This brief case history illustrates a revealing fact—that even FEMA, a national
organisation dedicated te disaster management, which has decades cf
experience in emergency housing provision—appears te lack some basic
strategic planning procedures for temporary housing.
1.2 The “problématique” for temporary housing
The delivery of safe and affordable housing remains one cf the most
challenging aspects cf any post-disaster recovery programme, and temporary
housing is a distinct and complex component cf housing reconstruction,
requiring attention in its own right. Similar problems are recurring across
different cases cf temporary housing, which point to an unmistakeable need
for u p-front strategic planning to tackle the process cf temporary housing.
In a disaster situation, such as an earthquake, hurricane, tsunami or flood,
where large stocks cf housing are damaged or destroyed by the event, it is
most often the poor who are most vulnerable. The poor are more likely te live
in precarious locations, such as on alluvial soils, in ravines or on flood planes,
and often their housing is less durable and more susceptible to the disaster’s
impacts (Davis, 1978). AIse, it is the poor who wilI be more severely affected
by a disaster because they have Iess access te cash, insu rance, jobs or other
4resources that are needed for them to rebuild their lives (Anderson and
Woodrow, 1989; Biaikie et aI., 1994). While higher income people are able to
rebuild their houses more quickly, it is the poor (especially renters) who are
left out cf housing programmes—or have no choice but to wait years before a
suitable arrangement can be found (Comerio, 1998).
In the immediate aftermath cf the disaster there are basic needs that must be
met: rescuing survivors, burying the deceased, the providing water, food,
shelter, sanitation, and medical attention. To meet these basic needs, the
military, aid organisations such as the Red Cross, Oxfam, Médecins sans
frontières and local groups spring into action providing within days—in the
best-case scenario—the necessary supplies and services to sustain lite. in
terms of sheltering, this usually means building tent camps in the aftected
area, or evacuating people to tent camps erected in accessible areas. Also,
where possible, public buildings will be commandeered as shelters, housing
families collectively in often-overcrowded facilities. However, if possible,
people will avoid these kinds of shelters if they are able to make other
arrangements (Quarantelli, 1982; Drabek, 1986).
Once these basic needs have been met and the danger has subsided, clean
up and recovery can begin in earnest. If the area is inaccessible due to
weather or topography, as in Kashmir in 2005, it may take several months
before clean up and recovery can even begin.
However, the situation described above begs the question: In terms cf
housing, what are the steps to recovery? Most people agree that recovery
should occur as quickly as possible, steps should be taken to reduce the
vulnerability to future disasters, and it should ail be an egalitarian process
(Cuny, 1983). Most experts would also agree that rebuilding permanent
housing as quickly and as efficiently as possible is the best way to achieve
housing recovery (Davis, 1978; UNDRO, 1982). Although enabling, or
5actually physically building, permanent housing is the goal of governments
and communities after most disaster situations (unless there is a political
motivation to remove the population), there is often a need for an interim
housing solution to house people in the—often-lengthy—time between
immediate sheltering and permanent housing.
The living situation in collective centres (camps or public facilities) is such that
families are, respectively, crowded into a small tent, which can be cold in
winter, or must share a large room with dozens of other familles where there
s a general lack of privacy (Harada, 2000). While tolerable for a short period
of time, it is found that the dependency relationship that is fostered in these
collective centres will negatively impact on the recovery of familles if they
must stay there over a long period of time.
Therefore, the difficulty of living in camps or in collective centers, coupled with
the length time needed for permanent reconstruction makes some type of
interim housing solution, or temporary housing, necessary after most
disasters. In physical form, temporary housing can mean staying with family
or Ïriends, renting an apartment, building a shelter near the destroyed home,
having access to a mobile home or to a housing unit provided by a competent
authority. Whatever the physical type, in temporary housing, familles have a
chance to restart their daily domestic activities and regular routines of school
and work. According to Quarantelli (1 982) the stage of temporary housing
promotes the reestablishment of daily household routines but with the
understanding that permanent quarters will be eventually obtained.
While there are advantages of temporary housing for recovery, there are
many criticisms about how temporary housing programmes have been
executed, especially programmes in which the government or NGOs provide
families with a temporary house expressly provided as part of a temporary
6housing-building programme. Some of the main criticisms with temporary
housing are:
• Cost of temporary housing, and the services that necessarily
accompany it, is very high in relation to the cost of permanent housing,
meaning that building temporary housing amounts to building twice
over;
• Temporary housing usually takes much longer than expected to
procure. This can mean that people find other housing in the
meantime, or that permanent housing is delayed;
• Unit designs are insensitive to the way people live;
• Locations for temporary housing are often very inconvenient or
transportation to and from them is inadequate;
• Temporary housing becomes permanent and a perceived as blight on
the city.
The disfavour of temporary housing as part of the recovery strategy is
understandable due to the recurring problems faced by temporary housing
programmes. However, despite these well-known problems, temporary
housing programmes continue to be implemented after most recent large
scale disasters (for example, in Japan, Mexico, USA, Turkey, Indonesia,
India, Sri Lanka, Italy, Greece). When the time comes to be making a
decision about whether to engage in accelerated reconstruction or to build
temporary housing followed by permanent housing, governments and
affected people inevitably feel that temporary housing is necessary for
recovery, but as this research will show, the accompanying decisions are
most often made in the absence of proper information and in a situation of
disorganisation and chaos.
This research does not accept that the criticisms of temporary housing are
inherent in the phenomenon, but rather that better planning and design can
increase the likelihood of successful temporary housing programmes. This
7research therefore takes a critical look at the problems in temporary housing,
offering the systems approach to strategic planning as a method to avoid
many of the problems and to increase the efflciency and sustainability of
temporary housing.
1.3 The Rationale of the study and its parts
This dissertation is composed of five chapters, which, including the present
introduction, consists of a review of previous research, an outline of the
methods, a presentation of four published scholarly articles on the subject,
and a general discussion that synthesizes the main findings.
Chapter 2, Previous Research, is an overview of research findings on the
subjects of: (1) current practices regarding housïng in developing countries,
(2) concepts concerning the social studies of disasters, such as vulnerability,
mitigation and preparedness, and recovery, (3) post-disaster reconstruction,
especially aspects relating to planning and managing projects and (4) the
knowledge about practices of temporary housing and a discussion of the
related problems.
Chapter 3, Methods, presents the overali research design, a description of
the case study method, and details of the data collection. As well, this section
outlines, in detail, the methods used for data analysis in the articles. The
approach of systems thinking is used throughout the research as a tool to
understand the complexity of factors in temporary housing. Other methods
explained are: Typology building, used to categorise different types of
temporary housing, and the Logical Framework Approach and impact
evaluation employed to understand the processes of temporary housing
projects and their outcomes.
8Chapter 4 contains four articles, which make up the body of this dissertation.
Each of the articles bas been published in a reputable scholarly journal, or
has been accepted for publication, except for Article l—which is a peer
reviewed conference paper, published in the conference proceedings.
Article I discusses the different physical types of temporary housing used
after the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey, including some examples of other
types of temporary housing from other disasters. It also tocuses on the
implications of these types for planning and for their impacts on urban form.
Titled, “Types ot temporary accommodation after disasters: example of the
1999 Turkish earthquake,” this paper was presented at The International
Emergency Management Society fTIEMS) conference at the University of
Waterloo in Waterloo, Canada, which was held from May 14-17, 2002.
Article Il presents a strategic planning framework for temporary housing.
Based on empirical data from six case histories, including the 1999
earthquakes in Turkey, this paper defines several issues that must be taken
into account when planning for temporary housing. The paper, titled,
“Strategic planning for temporary housing,” is accepted for publication in the
journal, Disasters.
Article III is focussed on the organisational design of temporary housing
projects, and is based on two projects, one after the 1 999 earthquakes in
Turkey and another after the 1 999 earthquake in Colombia. The paper shows
how organisational design coupled with the appropriate housing technology
impacts on the project. This paper, titled, “A Systems View of Temporary
Housing Projects in Post-Disaster Reconstruction” was co-authored with
Gonzalo Lizarralde and Colin Davidson and has been published in
Construction Management & Economics.
9Article IV is about the outcomes of temporary housing projects a few years
later, once they have fulfiiied their initiai purpose as temporary housïng. This
paper takes a longitudinal look at four different temporary housing projects
built in Turkey after the 1 999 earthquakes to understand what becomes of the
housing and the impacts this has on the cities, the municipal government and
the residents. This paper, titled, “Impacts of prefabricated temporary housing
atter disasters: 1999 earthquakes in Turkey,” has been accepted and
published online by Habitat International, and is awaiting formai publication in
the journal.
Chapter 5, General Discussion, is a structured discussion of the main aspects
of this research, synthesised into 13 points. Aiso presented is a table offering
recommendations for planning temporary housing at each of the project
stages, f rom pre-disaster strategic planning to dismantiing.
The example presented at the beginning of this chapter about the FEMA
temporary housing exemplifies the need for good planning for temporary
housing to increase the efficiency and sustainability of reconstruction
processes. This study specifically tocussed on temporary housing, and
endeavours, in the following chapters, to identify the main concerns of
planning and management that can improve the application of temporary
housing.
10
CHAPTER 2: PREVIOUS RESEARCH
2.1 Housing in developing countries
Many approaches have been impiemented in the search for good strategies
about how to effectiveiy manage the wiid spread of siums in most developing
country cities. Nonetheiess, the probiems stili persist. In 2006, UN Habitat
announced that for the first time ever the world has more urban inhabitants
than rural—a trend that wiIl continue to increase in coming years. The
reasons for this trend are largely political and economic and therefore outside
the scope ot this study. However the consequent probiems 0f sium
proliferation, in terms of urban housing and infrastructure, and the vuinerable
buiit environment it creates is of central interest to this study. 0f similar
interest to this study, are these many approaches, developed by researchers,
international organisations, governments and local communities, to address
the urban housing problems.
Early international development initiatives into housing sought to alleviate
siums by building large scale public housing projects. These projects flot only
failed to house the poorest people, but the style of housing did not suit local
living customs. In the 1970s, John Turner, and other researchers of the day,
found that the key to alleviating housing problems was to understand how
sium dweliers or the poor were building their own housing, and to use that as
a modeI (Turner, 1972, 1976; Abrams, 1966; Drakakis-Smith, 1981). Turner
saw housing built in developing countries as a graduai process of
construction whereby housing would be improved over time as the
househoids had resources to put into it. The role of the government or outside
agencies was to help people have access to land, to offer tinancing and to
help to provide some of the infrastructure (Tipple and Willis, 1991). The
eventual outcome of these observations became known as the “enabling
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approach to self-help to housing,” which has been adopted by many
governments and international lenders such as the World Bank (1993b).
Different schemes have been appropriated under this approach to self-help
housing, such as:
o Sites and services projects—where families are given a plot of
serviced land that they then build upon gradually;
o Core housing—a very basic house (of one or two rooms) is provided,
usually unfinished, to be completed by the family.
o Sium up-grading—squatters achieve some long-term tenure rights and
organise (often with government or outside agencies) the installation of
necessary infrastructure.
Land tenure is one of the most pervasive issues in the development of
sustainable housing in developing countries and those who criticise the
enabling approach have said that ‘enabling’ does little to help those people in
informai land markets who are essentially squatting (Payne, 2001). In urban
areas throughout the developing world, forced evictions continue to the
present day. Millions of peopie live on land that they do flot hold title to and
can be forced off at any time. One aspect of this, which is pertinent here, is
that insecure land tenure leads to littie investment in house upgrading,
leaving communities persistently more vuinerable to natural disasters. If a
disaster does strike, families have little recourse but to rebuild where they
once were, that is to say, with the same levei of vulnerability. The difficuities
of these landless families have implications for temporary housing and for
post-disaster housing reconstruction in general.
2.2 Disasters
The study of disasters is a multi-disciplinary subject that builds on a wide
range of substantive areas such as physical sciences, engineering, social
sciences and business administration. However, the previous research in
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disasters that i5 of interest here is that dealing with the social aspects of the
built environment, which cornes mainly from social sciences, such as
planning, geography, sociology, political science and economics as well as
f rom architecture.
Research on disaster management has identified different phases of activity
after a disaster (Haas, 1977; UNDRO, 1982); the five main phases ot disaster
management are:
1) Relief in the immediate aftermath of a disaster including search and
rescue, meeting survivors’ basic needs for water, food, medical care
and shelter, and mitigating the impact of further hazard events.
2) Rehabilitation, which takes place in the later stages of relief,
attempts to re-establish the community to its former living conditions
or at least to a stable condition.
3) Reconstruction is focussed on permanency and sustainability and
tackles longer-term problems such as adequacy of housing,
infrastructure, utilities and the economy.
4) Mitigation is long-term reduction of vulnerabilities and can actually
take place before a disaster; however it is often spurred on by a
recent disaster in a region;
5) Preparedness also takes place before the disaster and includes
activities and actions to minimise damage and losses in case a
disaster does strike.
Pertinent research—available f rom a small group of important texts, a few
journals dedicated to the issues related to disasters, and from conference
proceedings—leads to the specification of important themes of research on
the social issues of Disasters. While these themes overlap in many ways,
they are organised in the following manner in this section: Vulnerabiity,
Mitigation and Preparedness, and Recovery. Subsequently, the overarching
theme of this research, Post-disaster Reconstruction, is presented with the
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following sub-themes: Strategic Planning, Approaches, Stages and
Strategies, and Project Planning and Management. The last section deals
with the central theme ot the research, which is Temporary Housing.
2.2.1 Vulnerabilïty
The concept of vulnerability
Vulnerability, as a widely studied concept, emerged as a response to the
narrowly defined hazards paradigm. The hazards paradigm saw disasters as
physical agents (in the natural or artificial environment) that pose threats to
the human environment (Hewitt, 1997). It was concerned with the nature of
those threats and the extent of the damage that they may cause.
In the 1980s, the idea 0f vulnerability was introduced as a way to incorporate
the political economy into the idea cf disaster risk; thus, vulnerability was put
forth as a consequence cf particular social, economic and political processes
(Maskrey; 1989). The vulnerability approach, or as Hewitt (1997) called it, the
‘human ecology of endangerment’ emphasized how communities are
exposed to danger or become unsafe because 0f the social geography 0f
settiements and land uses, and the distribution 0f a community’s power
structures. Thus, disaster risk is seen to depend upon on-going societal
conditions; society, rather than nature decides who is more Iikely to be
exposed.
The idea of vulnerability allowed new, more concise definitions cf disaster. In
his book, Shelter After Disaster (1 978), lan Davis pointed out that disasters
are in fact not caused by natural phenomena alone, but only when natural
phenomena strike a vuinerable bulit environment. Maskrey (1989) points out
that natural disaster is the coincidence between a hazard (or physical agent
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such as an earthquake, flood, drought, bombing) and conditions cf
vulnerability; he offers the following equation:
Disaster risk = vulnerability + hazard.
More precisely, Blaikie, Cannon, Davis and Wisner (1994) suggest that a
disaster occurs when a significant number cf vuinerable people experience a
hazard and suffer severe damage and/or disruption cf their Iivelihood system
in such a way that recovery is unlikely without external aid. Characteristics cf
a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and
recover from the impact cf a natural hazard can render them more or Iess
vulnerable (Blaikie et aI., 1 994).
Along with the concept of vulnerability comes the idea that disasters do net
affect everyone equally, but are more like to affect certain groups cf the
population; depending on class, ethnicity, gender, disability, and age.
Maskrey (1 989) points outs that:
Large numbers cf people on the social and territorial periphery cf the
global economic and political system are seen to be disabled by
unequal economic relationships which do net allow them te access te
the basic resources such as land, focd and shelter, necessary te stay
alive. The empirical evidence from a large number cf case studies,
points to the fact that it is these groups who most often suffer disaster
(3).
In the same vein, Hewitt (1997) suggests that power structures, or rather
powerlessness, have a large impact on vulnerability—those who are more
politically vuinerable wiII fare worse in a disaster.
Sources of vulnerability
Vulnerability can be understood in different ways because it arises from
varicus circumstances cf everyday life. Hewitt (1997) defines six basic forms
cf vulnerability:
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1. Exposure to dangerous agents and environments
2. Weaknesses: predisposition of persons, buildings, communities or
activities to greater harm
3. Lack of Protection: against dangerous agents particularly for weaker
persons and items
4. Disadvantage: lack of the resources and attributes to affect risks or
respond to danger.
5. Lack of resilience: limited or no capacity to avoid, withstand or offset
and recover f rom disaster
6. Powerlessness: inability to influence safety conditions, or acquire
means of protection and relief.
These forms of vulnerability have an impact on the level of risk the person,
building or community has to being affected by a hazard, and also can help
determine to what extent they will be incapacitated by the hazard—whether
they can bounce back quickly or be completely devastated. Blaikie, and co
authors (1994) offer an interesting model for vulnerability by defining that the
ability of people to deal with the impact of hazards is directly related to a
given househoId’s access to resources (see figure 1). The idea is that the
more that a household has access to resources such as information, cash,
means of production, tools, equipment, and social networks, the more likely
they will be able to successfully recover f rom the impact of a hazard. This
points out that disenfranchised households, who have little chances to find
employment, are devoid of landownership, and political power will be less
able to amass, themselves, the resources necessary for recovery—whether
before the disaster occurs or atter.
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1994, p. 50)
Links between vulnerability and development
The link between vulnerability and development s a complicated yet
important one. Development carnes with it the idea that more development or
better development reduces vulnerability. Development indicators show that
access to education, health care, land and adequate housing can reduce
people’s vulnerability and therefore increase their ability to cope with
disasters. In this light, Anderson and Woodrow (1989) see vulnerability is the
opposite of ‘security or ‘capability—the ability to protect one’s community,
homes and family and to re-establish one’s livelihood, and development as
the process by which vuinerabilities are reduced and capabilities are
increased (see figure 2).
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Figure 2 Capacities and vulnerabilities analysis matrix (source: Anderson and
Woodrow, 1989, P. 12)
However, development does flot aiways reduce vulnerability, and can in
some cases, actually increase the degree of disaster risk in a community.
Blaikie, and co-authors (1994) show how development processes that limit
access to power and resources, or are governed by political and economic
systems that do flot favour equality, resuit in a progression of vulnerability.
They cali this the Disaster Pressure and Release Model, in which root
causes, such as ideologies and power structures, lead to dynamic pressures
in society, such as rapid urbanisation with lack of local institutions, that in turn
cause unsafe or vulnerable conditions in the physical environment, economy,
society and state (see figure 3). A disaster is created when the hazard strikes
these vulnerable conditions. The release of these pressures is done by
THE PROGRESSION 0F VULNERABICIfl’
2 3
Figure 3 Pressures that create vulnerability and ultirnately disasters (source:
Blaikie et al., 1994, p. 23).
Current approaches to vulnerability
Following from the conceptual work on vulnerability in the 1980s and 1990s,
vulnerability has corne to take its place in applications of developrnent
projects and disaster mitigation programmes. A recent publication, titled,
“Mapping Vulnerability,” edited by Bankoff, and co-authors (2004) offers
several exarnples of atternpts toward incorporating vulnerability and
vulnerability assessment in recent projects. In fact, vulnerability is one way of
working towards cornrnunity-based or empowering methods. They state:
Working with vulnerability requires a conceptual shift that is already
beginning to find rnethodological application in cornmunity-based disaster
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addressing the vulnerabilities through mitigation and corrective measures at
the level of dynamic pressures, or if possible, the root causes.
1
Cimited
accese ta
• PQWfl
• Pesoercos
dealagies
• Peliticcri cyfrnc
• Fcûtrnrn t —n
“p
•
LU
Lack of
• tond nrptutrnq,
• Trairno
• Apzenprnrto nLiff,
• tncxl flnosIrnents
* locsF rnorketo
• Prens freodom
• Fh,conf tiandords
nuL, rç
Macro-forces
Rnprd pop. ticrr,
f rowtf
• Rrpid urboornotion
• Arn,s expo, diloro
Deht repcryxort
• Deforeotutioi
• Decf ne n 5cr
prndxjinity
DISASTER
RISK e
Hasard +
Vulnerability
R s H +V
UNSAfE
CONDITIONS
Fragile
physical
enviroflment
Donyer005
omalirons
• lJnprntxc’nd
burfdinfs and
xF,o,rruciure
Fragile local
ec000my
• tydboodr or iok
• fox interne fends
Vulnerable
£ociety
• Specinif proupo
et ri,k
lock oF Fond
institution,
Public actions
• teck 0F disonrer
preporodress
• Preoc,oqce cf
eudurnic disuoso
HAZARDS
Eertloquukc
[Fiph wirdo
cyclone/
fturricune/
Iyphnonl
PFocding
Vofcunic
onI)ption
Funrinlide
Drouff ht
Virus rond
19
management programs and multi-stakeholder platforms. Such paradigms
do more justice to the complex nature of vulnerability and step away from
simplistic notions of intervention in which science is juxtaposed with a
homogenous local body cf knowledge (8).
One interesting perspective that bas emerged is the idea that vulnerability is a
concept cf western discourse, as per Edward Said’s (1 979) Orientalism’, and
that labelling people ‘vulnerable’ is a political act. Bankoff (2001) argues that
“development and vulnerability form part cf one and the same [...J
generalizing cultural discourse that denigrates large regions of the world as
disease-ridden, poverty-stricken and disaster-prone” (p. 1 9).
The conceptual strength cf vulnerability resides in its ability ta clearly identify
the relationship between factors that create risk and expose people te
hazards. However, Lavell (2004) explains that vulnerability and risk are net
heterogeneous and must be specifically understood in every local context. As
is shown here, the creation and identification cf vulnerability is a matter cf
great complexity and Wisner (2004) warns that we will fail te get to the heart
of the matter cf risk unless we create ways cf analyzing the vulnerability
implicit in everyday life.
2.2.2 Mitigation and preparedness
As the concept of vulnerability points out, disasters are not unforeseen events
and techniques exist te predict when and where a hazard may strike and
what kind of damage it may create. With these concepts in mmd, it is possible
to plan how ta reduce the impact cf a disaster. Planning may be defined as
the process of preparing a set cf decisions for action in the future directed at
achieving goals by optimal means (Krimgcld, 1974). Pre-disaster planning is
a term used ta describe a comprehensive range cf efforts made to reduce the
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destructive and disruptive effects of a disaster before it occurs. It consists ot
two main activities: mitigation and preparedness.
Mitigation
Disaster mitigation focuses on measures that can be taken to minimise the
effect of a hazard and thus lessen the impacts ot a disaster. Cuny (1983)
identifies three steps in mitigation:
1) Reduce physical vulnerability
2) Reduce economic vulnerability
3) Reduce vulnerability ot social structure
Specifically, physical vulnerability is addressed through a process ot 1) risk
mapping and micro zoning of risks; 2) identification ot populated areas and
identification of communities at risk; and then 3) addressing the risks through
vulnerability reduction techniques. This third part is a political process
whereby governments and communities must take action. Mitigation activities
for addressing physical vulnerabilities can take the form ot: tlood defences,
safe building design, legislation and public awareness; it can take place
before a disaster occurs, during a disaster or during recovery and
reconstruction.
Writing about earthquake mitigation, Comerio (2004) suggests that there are
basically four categories for aIl earthquake hazard mitigation activities. These
are:
• Land use regulations
• Building codes
• Insurance
• Public awareness campaigns
21
Land use regulation is when the government provides information on risks
and hazards and encourages the use ol planning practices to mitigate the
impact ot natural hazards. The information about hazard risks is usually given
on a national scale and then t is up to local governments to implement the
land use regulations. This is especially useful to discourage development on
floodplains and on areas that are prone ta landslide or liquefaction during
earthquakes. However, local governments otten find it difficuit to enforce
these kinds of regulations if it means foregoing needed property tax revenue.
Building codes try to improve design and construction techniques so that the
built environment can withstand natural hazards. The correct design and
implementation of building codes has a great capability to reduce the impact
ot earthquakes and other hazards. However, while designing a sufficient
building code seems possible, enforcement ot this building code can be a
major problem in some countries; building codes in many developing
countries have become too complicated and difficuit ta administer, and have
lead to a breakdown in their functioning (Spence, 2004). In Turkey, it was
found that the majority of the building stocks destroyed in the earthquake
were new apartment buildings built within the last 20 years, but these
buildings did not meet the code requirements. In many of the small towns, the
municipality lacked adequately trained staff ta interpret and apply the building
regulations and nobody was hable for the safety of the buildings (GOIkan,
2001).
Natural hazards insurance tries ta spread the burden ot paying for post
disaster recovery ta a wider group so it is not only the government or property
owners that pay for damages to property. This s a pre-event precaution that
provides repair funding by private insurers in the event that damage occurs ta
insured property, and therefore it spreads the burden 0f disaster recovery
between the property owner, the insurer and the government. Insurance is
widely used in developed countries were mortgage systems are also
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widespread since banks demand that property owners have full insurance
coverage. However in developing countries where mortgages are less
common, property owners find it too expensive and have little motivation to
purchase insurance.
Public in formation is a crucial mitigation tool because it creates a culture of
mitigation that everybody is involved in—from aIl levels of government to
institutions, private business and families. It essentially implies getting the
word out’ about preparedness activities such as safe building, emergency or
contingency planning and the need for insurance. Often, governments will
provide assistance to members of the community (businesses, institutions
and families) to develop mitigation strategies.
Both Maskrey (1989) and Cuny (1983) point out that most mitigation
activities, such as those that are described above, are top-down processes
that are almost impossible to implement in a developing country context.
Zoning and building codes are, lot the most part, not enforceable and little
headway has been made with costly retrofitting of non-engineered structures
that make up the majority of their housing stock. Maskrey (1989) advocates a
community-based approach to disaster mitigation in developing countries,
which includes motivating or establishing organisations at the community
level for meeting social needs; then through these community-based
organisations (CBOs), building up awareness and consciousness of risks and
educating people about safe building practices. Activities, which require
substantial financial support, such as reinlorcement of tenement buildings,
can then be lorced through with political pressure from the community, thanks
to the clout cf their CBOs.
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Preparedness
“The underlying assumption cf preparedness s that disasters are no time te
be trying te decide what to de” (Cuny, 1983, p.205). Preparedness focuses on
developing plans te respond te a disaster while t is occurring, or once t has
eccurred. In ifs simplest ferm preparedness is an estimation of emergency
needs and the resources required te respond te these needs. In a more
sephisticated sense, it is a plan te structure the entire post-disaster respense
including the following objectives: a) Te get maximum benefit from relief
activities and make a quick transition frem emergency assistance te
rehabilitatien and reconstruction and b) te make sure ail activities make a
contribution te ongoing develepment (Cuny 1983).
Te be a successful implementing instrument, Cuny (1983) suggests that an
emergency preparedness plan must meet the following requirements:
1) It must present the sequence et activities in a logical and clear manner
2) It must be comprehensive and balanced
3) It must assign specific tasks and respensibilities for each
4) It must link appropriate organisations and establish mechanisms te
bring people and organisations together at the critical peints
5) It must retlect the pelicies cf the implementing agencies or national
gevernment in a disaster.
Typical activities include emergency peried necessities such as: warnings,
evacuatien, stockpiling, emergency plans fer hospitals, emergency cemmand
centrol and communication systems, training for search and rescue and first
aid. Hewever, preparedness can aise extend inte thinking about and planning
fer disaster recovery and establishing reconstruction standards and policies.
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2.2.3 Recovery
Recovery after disasters is a complex social process that, as stated by Cuny
(1 983), includes three distinct aspects:
• Emotional recovery,
• Economic recovery: replacement of income, restoration of jobs/means
of production, markets; and
• Replacement cf physical losses: personal belongings, home, and
possibly land.
In addition to this, Bolin (1982) also includes a category 0f recovery called
quallty of life. In his studies on family recovery after disasters in the United
States and Latin America, Bolin distinguishes between two components 0f
family recovery: one labeled housing recovery, refers to whether a family
establishes housing equivalent to that occupied prior to the disaster; the other
labeled famlly recovery, which references a family’s evaluation cf its overail
post-disaster situation. Among other things, he finds that economic recovery
s a precondition for emotional recovery but that the greatest key to affecting
recovery is the ability cf the household to access housing aid (Bolin, 1 993).
Caporale (1989) has argued that problems of recovery and reconstruction
reflect not just the nature 0f damage, but the entire complex 0f socio-cultural
and political-economic characteristics of the social order, especially the
historical trends in an area. Other researchers echo this comment; Bolin
(1993) finding that some households recover more quickly in some
dimensions that others; Peacock and co-authors (1987) determined that
social class s a factor, having an important impact on the type of housing and
aid received and subsequently on the levels of reccvery obtained.
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While ail forms of recovery are Iinked to one another, it is possible to single
out housing recovery as an important, if not the most important, factor in the
recovery of a family after a disaster. Some researchers use the term ‘housing
recovery’ as a synonym for ‘reconstruction’; however it is possible to make a
distinction between these terms since housing recovery is actually the
outcome of the activity of housing reconstruction. Once housing
reconstruction has taken place, it is hoped that a family will achieve housing
recovery.
2.3 Reconstruction
Housing reconstruction atter disasters is a complex process that received a
lot of attention in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but since then has had less
attention in programming than other aspects of relief and recovery (Barakat,
2003). Conferences organised by i-Rec (see i-Rec 2002; i-Rec 2004; i-Rec
2006) have tried to address this issue, bringing housing and reconstruction
once again to the forefront of discussions between researchers and
practitioners. The following section outlines the main issues in reconstruction
of primary importance to study of strategic planning for temporary housing.
2.3.1 Strategic planning
Checkoway (1986), in the introduction to his book, Strategic Perspectives on
Planning Practice, calis for a change in city planning practices that pushes
policies to be more weli-defined and specifically directed regarding methods
of impiementation. He states:
Strategic planning is a process that includes skills to set objectives,
develop plans, build support and mobilize resources toward goals. It
involves choice and sequence, staging and timing and a combination
of roles and styles. It shows a commitment to think ahead, anticipate
alternatives, and consider what may result from current decisions. It
thus deals with the future of the present and represents an effort to act
in accordance with images of the future and implementation in mmd
(3).
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Strategic planning, like any other type 0f planning, takes time and careful
consideration to be thought out thoroughly and implemented etfectively. This
s especially true in the bureaucratic context such as a large organisation or a
government agency. Research on public sector planning in the United States
shows that those responsible for planning consistently act as technicians and
avoid political thinking or action. They see the environment ot planning in
terms of information and sources cf information that may assist them in
rational problem solving (Baum 1986). However, this is a somewhat naïve
perspective and unfortunately renders less useful the applicability ot public
sector planning. Checkoway (1986) addresses this in the introduction to his
book, saying that “planning operates in a political context and planners must
think and act strategically to be effective” (p.2).
The housing recovery that is needed quickly after disasters leaves little time
to plan for the programs and for future development. Therefore strategic
planning for housing recovery entails planning with objectives and specific
methods for implementation before the disaster strikes. This means knowing
1) the risk for certain areas of potential hazards; 2) what is the damage that
might be incurred; 3) which families are most vulnerable.
Based on this information, it is possible to prepare and hopefully implement a
plan at the strategic level to help reduce the risk of damage to the built
environment before the disaster strikes and to plan what steps will be taken
after the disaster to aid in recovery and reconstruction. Fox, Johnson and
Lizarralde (2003) outline a framework for improving resilience in the built
environment and for improving the practice of housing recovery after a
disaster: The framework includes ten basic steps:
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Before the disaster
1. Vulnerability assessment and risk mapping: Deciphering how
communities are vulnerable to particular disasters.
2. Review of traditional and modem construction technologies:
Optimizing the use of already well-adapted local housing solutions to
help with the reactivation of the local economy.
3. Evaluation of coping mechanisms: Evaluations of the plans,
relationships and resources that families, organisations and
governments have to help them cope with a disaster or the threat of
a disaster, such as: km and social networks, community
organisations, insurance policies, and evacuation procedures.
4. Education and training: Training and education programs must
include the identification ot areas of vulnerability, measures (social,
physical and organizational) that can be employed to reduce
vulnerability and awareness ot plans developed to manage post
disaster reconstruction activities.
5. Strengthening of inter-organisational arrangements: Due to the
complexity of the tasks required for community recovery, a single
institution can rarely develop reconstruction projects. An inter
organizational system is therefore required to develop
complementary —and parallel—tasks.
During or after the disaster
6. Needs assessment and damage evaluation: Assessment of whom
and what have been affected and determination if people’s basic
needs are being met. Reconstruction and inter-institutional
arrangements will need to be re-assessed to make sure they
correspond to the particular disaster situation.
7. Development of community participation methods: Participation must
be tailored to suit the local conditions and traditions of the
community. A distinction can be drawn between systems where the
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community is merely involved with the process and systems where
the community participates with full decision-making powers.
8. Environmental monitoring: AIl toc often the response to a disaster
overlooks this fact and, as a result, reconstruction programs often
lead to increased environmental degradation, increased vulnerability
and a reduction in sustainable livelihcods.
After reconstruction
9. Performance evaluation: The analysis cf the reconstruction
programme or project, including different levels in time (inputs,
cutputs, results, objectives) is an efficient method to evaluate
development initiatives embracing the evaluation of the strategy, the
results and the impacts obtained.
1O.Knowledge development and dissemination: It is important te
guarantee that knowledge gained is knowledge applied. InformaI
discussions and conferences that link organisations, researchers and
practitioners are extremely helpful for knowledge development and
dissemination of evaluation resuits.
The multi-disciplinary and cross-sector nature cf this tramework points to the
necessity cf ccmmunity-wide strategic planning. The ability to draw across
networks is one cf the main strengths cf strategic planning for the public
sector, according to Bryson and co-authors (1986):
It provides a counter-balance for the tendency cf the public sector to be
crganized into specific pclicy networks that cut vertically acrcss
genera! purpose governments at the federal, regional and local levels.
Strategic planning provides gcvernments with an opportunity to make
connections and changes across programs—and therefore to make
more cf a whcle eut of disparate parts cf public pclicies and programs
(p. 66).
For disaster reccvery and within the strategic planning paradigm, the ability te
draw acrcss government departments and to develcp programs that include
bcth the non-profit and public sector is a major factor in the success cf a
29
program (Lewis 1999). As suggested by the framework outlined above,
reconstruction programs do flot only include building houses, but also
programs for education, training, job creation, social networks, bans and
other services.
2.3.2 Approaches, stages and strategies in post-dïsaster
reconstruction
Comerio (1998) shows how governments in both developing and deveboped
countries will respond ditferently to the need for new housing caused by a
disaster. She identifies four different economic approaches to housing
reconstruction after disasters:
1) Complete redevelopment (including housing, infrastructure, and services)
of devastated city by a national government. This is most common in
states with a centralized government, such as socialist states. The
Chinese government used this approach after the Tangshan earthquake
in 1976 and the Soviet government in Armenia in 1988.
2) Infusion of outside alU targeted to low-income housing provided by
governments or charities. This is the most common approach in
deveboping countries, where the government has littie money to invest in
reconstruction and household insurance is virtually non-existent. Outside
expertise and money is brought in to help with devebopment plans and
reconstruction.
3) Limited intervention approach, which assumes that priva te insurance wiII
cover some Iosses, property prices wiII adjust to the new circumstance
and government will pro vide some supplemen ta! assistance for the poor.
This is most common in deveboped countries where bosses to disasters
have been less intense and outside aid for housing reconstruction is flot
needed since homeowners are protected through private insurance. Such
was the case in Ptaly after the Friuli earthquake and in USA after various
hurricanes and earthquakes. However, the approach assumes that private
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insurance s available and affordable to ail property owners and
completely overlooks those people who are renters.
4) A complete reliance on market forces to adjust and adapt after a disaster.
This is when the federal government or outside agencies will provide
assistance to restore local infrastructure but individuals and property
owners must cope with their own personal losses through their own
financial resources. Has happened in Japan where there is little
homeowner insurance, yet government bas only funded public
infrastructure.
Approach no. 2, infusion ot outside aid has been the subject of the largest
amount of research, that is, outside the insurance sectors. In the early years
of this approach, reconstruction paid for and managed by foreign agencies
was quick and large-scale Western-style construction was prevalent. This
approach came under strong criticism by housing advocates and social
scientists because of lack of consideration for local ways of life and local
capacity building (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989; Aysan and Davis, 1992;
Cuny, 1983; Oliver-Smith, 1990). It was established that there was a need for
a link between reconstruction and economic development and that there
needed to be careful evaluation of what is needed and how t s delivered.
These opinions echoed the enabling approaches of the World Bank. Less
intense intervention is now the accepted norm, infusions of outside cash are
made to work with local communities in housing reconstruction partnerships.
However, despite its obvious merits, the self-help approach to rebuilding after
disasters bas been difficult to fully implement because the need for immediate
shelter, that is to say, the need for speed, is often overwhelming. What has
evolved is a mix of methods whereby some houses are built using Western
methods and some are produced locally, built through NGOs offering
materials and training.
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In disaster research the terms “housing” and “sheliering” are often used
interchangeably, with little distinction between the terms, however, Quarantelli
(1 995) defines four stages which may pass through after a disaster:
1. Emergency sheltering
2. Temporary sheltering
3. Temporary housing
4. Permanent housing
The distinction between housing and sheltering is made on the basis that
housing involves the resumption of household responsibilities and activities in
the new living quarters, whereas during sheltering, normal daily activities are
put on hold. Actual or potential populations seeking quarters outside cf their
own permanent homes for short periods utilize emergency sheltering.
Emergency shelters are typically used for a few hours or possibly for a one
night stay. This does flot require the provision or means for food preparation
since the stay is so short. Temporary sheltering refers to the populations’
temporary dispiacement into other quarters with an expected short stay. This
could take the form of a tent, a second home, a family member’s!friend’s
house, a motel, or a public facility where people will stay for more time than
just the height of an emergency. There is no attempt to re-establish
household routines; however, there must be an arrangement for food
provision.
Temporary housing can take the form of tents, prefabricated housing, mobile
homes or apartments. Permanent housing implies that the affected
population returns te their repaired or rebuilt houses, or moving into new
quarters in the community. In most disaster situations in developed countries
there s a sharp distinction between temporary and permanent housing.
However, in less developed countries this distinction can be blurred: what is
initially intended as temporary housing can become permanent housing over
the long-term if no formaI permanent housing s constructed.
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After the onset of a disaster, the affected population, governments, and relief
agencies must choose from a range of shelter or housing possibilities. For
the affected population, the decision may be based on immediate factors
such as the current condition of their housing or amount of money they have
to repair t. Government and relief agency policies for shelter provision or
compensation may or may not influence this decision. For governments and
relief agencies there is a range of options for programs and policies. Yet each
option is not without its own set of benefits and drawbacks. Davis (1978)
outlines three basic strategies about shelter following a disaster:
• Strategy 1: Housing survival
• Strategy 2: Filling the gap
• Strategy 3: Accelerated reconstruction
In Strategy 1 (housing survival), the existent housing survives the disaster 50
there is no need for temporary housing provision. This strategy is considered
to be the ideal, where aIl housing is built to a structural standard that will
survive any hazard. Strategy 2 (filling the gap) is required when normal
housing is damaged or destroyed by a hazard, thus there s a gap in living
accommodation caused by the destruction. This gap is filled by the provision
of temporary shelter, and if the gap exists long enough, by the provision of
temporary housing. Strategy 3 (accelerated reconstruction) negates the need
for agency-provided temporary accommodation because the reconstruction is
started in the very early stages after the disaster. Disaster victims can stay in
tents, with family/friends, in hotels or in makeshift shelters. This strategy is
considered to be better than Strategy 2 (filling the gap) because t minimizes
the overall impact of the disaster on the affected population. However, it
supposes that the reconstruction can really be accelerated, by some technical
or organisational process.
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UNDRO, like Davis, advocates accelerated reconstruction as the best shelter
strategy since it accelerates full recovery and makes optimal use of local
labour and material resources. ‘in the past, some agencies have undertaken
a 1 -2-3 strategy, i.e. they provide emergency shelter, temporary housing then
permanent housing. Some agencies have taken the shorter but stili costly
routes of 1-3 or 2-3. These routes can be wasteful unless the materials and
skills contributed in the tirst instance contribute significantly to the final stage
0f reconstruction” (United Nations 1982, 34).
Housing reconstruction can follow ditterent methods, some of which are
similar ta the enabling methods 0f housing provision found in international
development projects, such as core housing, or sites and services. Barakat
(2003) outlines four methods for housing reconstruction:
1) Repairing damaged housing
2) Building new housing
3) ‘Building yard’ approach whereby communities do the rebuilding
but outside agencies make the materials and skills available
and affordable
4) Finance facilitation approach whereby communities do the
rebuilding, with financial help from outside agencies.
Repairing damaged housing is often the quickest and least expensive
approach if housing is not severely damaged. However, if new housing must
be built, Barakat (2003) suggests that certain considerations must be taken
into account, such as:
• The choice of location and site selection: This is a very time
consuming and sometimes politically difficult aspect of reconstruction.
New housing can be built on sites that tamilies choose or on land that
they have inhabited before; in bath scenarios, however legality of
settlement and eventually purchasing land must be negotiated.
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The choice of construction methods and materials: The use of local
materials, industries and construction knowledge s desirable and often
disaster resistant building techniques can be incorporated into local
methods. Generally, radically different methods cf construction will not
be incorporated past the initial project. Prefabricated housing can be
quick to supply but often it does not last long enough and it can be
culturally unsuitable and do little to promote the local economy.
The choice of design: The most important factor is to start the design
process with the local community and to use forms and room
proportions that rellect the users needs’. When prototype houses are
developed that are not locally adapted they may do little to address
specific needs requirements, e.g. of rural families with the needs of
their livestock or large families.
2.3.3 Project planning and management for reconstruction
Planning and managing projects or programmes in the post-disaster scenario
pose extra challenges over and above those faced in the average project
because of the chaos of the environ ment, the scarce supply cf resources and
the pressing need to get things accomplished as soon as possible. Lizarralde
and co-authors (2003) outline some particular aspects 0f the post-disaster
project environment:
• Extremely complex needs that require multiple products and services.
Since a single institution can rarely provide these products and
services, cooperation between various local, national and international
organisations (with their varying objectives) is necessary.
u A highly competitive market cf international funding where
organisations must demonstrate their competence. Projects must fit
within the ideologies or the criteria of funding bodies such as donor
governments and international development agencies. For example
the World Bank outlines that post-disaster housing projects must be
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completed within two years of the disaster, putting pressure on
impiementing organisations to carry Dut projects within the time allotted
(Gilbert, 2001).
• Turbulent political and economic contexts that may be difficuit to
predict or which pose problems for carrying out the work (Anderson
and Woodrow, 1989).
• Funding resources are scarce and organisations may compete for
access to finds to do projects.
To respond to these particularly difficult aspects of the environment, t is
important to establish an inter-organisational design prior to the disaster. This
means cataloguing the capacities of various organisations (local, regional,
national or international) and setting out agreements for cooperation
(Lizarralde, et al., 2003). This also inciudes having on board organisations
that have direct relations with local communities; it is flot important if these
organisations are development or relief related, only that they have positive
ties with the commuflity they serve. Jigyasu (2002), Jayaraj (2002), and Sivaji
(2002) show how in India, the pre-disaster relations of organisations with the
local community contributed to the success cf post-disaster projects.
There are a number of principle stakeholders involved in post-disaster
housing projects—multiple levels cf government, NGO5, community groups,
affected families, building suppliers and contractors (Barakat, 2003). Since
there are many projects occurring simultaneously, a coordinating agency,
usualiy part of the government, is set up especially for the recovery and
reconstruction period to manage ail the activities and administer the
government and multi-lateral donor budgets. Housing projects are planned
and managed by various groups such as government (local, regional,
national), international NGOs, or local NGO5, community groups and other
civil society organisations; different groups will be acting at the same time on
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different projects and there is often cooperation between these groups on any
single project.
Post-disaster projects in relief and reconstruction can strengthen civil society
organisations in a country, especially filling in gaps where governments fail.
Ozerdem and Jacoby (2006) shows how in Turkey the failure of the
government to respond to citizens’ needs in the immediate aftermath of the
disaster eaU to the empowerment of civil groups who responded with many
relief and housing reconstruction projects. Many of these groups have
continued to retain power even once the reconstruction phase is over.
Once an organisation has decided that it will intervene in a disaster situation,
it needs to understand what the greatest needs are and to match these needs
with its capacities. An accurate post-Uisaster needs assessment is an
important factor in this. Cuny (1983) discusses how organisations must
clearly establish a framework for their policies, objectives and goals to guide
their decisions as to which projects to get involved in and what approaches
should be taken for the selected projects.
Contractors, self-building or some intermediate approach may be used for the
actual construction. Barakat (2003) outlines some 0f the factors that can
guide the decision as to who will undertake building:
• The scale and spread of destruction and the size 0f the settlement.
The larger the project, the greater the like)ihood of employing
contractors.
• Building methods in the target region and the technical complexity of
construction; the more complex the scheme, the more likelihood 0f
employing contractors.
• Whether housing prior to the disaster was generally provided through
self-help construction, and whether basic construction techniques are
widely known.
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• Capacities of the stakeholders (technical, economic, organisational),
particularly when t cornes to introducing rnitigation measures.
The amount of time and effort the target population is willing to invest
in the reconstruction.
• The timeframe of the project.
Contractor built housing has the advantage that t can be implemented more
quickly and the tirnefrarne s easier to adhere to. Sometimes in the post
disaster situation, local contractors may be overly burdened therefore
contractors must be brought in from afar.
It is generally understood that the greater the role the beneficiaries or aftected
families play in housing reconstruction projects, the more adapted the
responses will be to the local situation. Also employing a local workforce and
labour is better for stimulating the local econorny and capacity building (Cuny,
1983). However, in practice, it appears that the roles that local communities
play in reconstruction projects are more often focused on manual labour
rather than decision-making roles—especially if the projects are instigated by
international NGOs. If individual farnilies are expected to make decisions
regarding house design and contractors, they may need some support to
guide them through this process (Davidson et al. 2006).
2.4lemporary housing
Past research and experience have deterrnined certain problems with the
application of temporary housing schemes and consequently there are many
who generally advise against it. Nonetheless, experiences show that there
are specific situations that necessitate temporary housing:
• When the damage to housing is considerably widespread and there is an
acute shortage of interim housing possibilities (Quarantelli, 1995,
Comerio, 1998).
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• To keep people from migrating away from the area (United Nations,
1982).
• When there are flot enough resources to build permanent housing,
especially right away (United Nations, 1 982).
• When relief organisations want to show donors in the home countries that
something s happening (Davis 1978). A house is a tangible product that
can be photographed; people everywhere understand its importance as a
basic necessity of life.
The following discussion offers some of the main drawbacks with temporary
housing, organised around the following headings: cost, locations, land
acquisition, demands for units, vacating housing, and social and cultural
suitability.
Cost
Temporary housing is an expensive solution to housing shortages after a
disaster. Obviously the dwellings range in price depending on the type of
materials used, the quality, and the method of construction but the cost
aiways mounts up to become a significant percentage of the cost of the
typical permanent dwellings n a given area (United Nations, 1982).
Temporary housing provided after the Iranian earthquakes in 1997 was
reported to cost up to one-third the price of a normal dwelling (Ghafory
Ashtiany, 1999). The acquisition of land plus the provision of infrastructure
and services add to the expense.
Often, t is argued that funds to build temporary housing would be of better
use for the construction of permanent housing (Quarantelli 1995; United
Nations 1982, Davis 1978). Western industrialized countries tend to make a
sharp distinction between ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ housing, but this
distinction cannot be applied with the same amount cf regularity to aIl
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countries, especially those were people are building and adding to their
homes on an on-going basis (United Nations, 1982). In countries with a mild
climate, a permanent dwelling can be built cheaper and more quickly than a
prefabricated temporary house.
Locations
Temporary housing is located on the outskirts of urban areas, on vacant
tracts of land within the city, in city squares or parks, or on private land next to
damaged houses (Bologna, 2006; Johnson, 2000; Comerio, 1998; Cuny,
1983; Geipel 1982; Davis 1978). In many cases, agricultural land or
untouched land is cleared to make way for tracts of temporary housing. This
changes the patterns of development in the city. “Land invasions following
earthquakes have effected the make-up of peripheral settiements around
large cities and have, in many cases, affected the pattern of land ownership
and tenure, not only in the immediate area of the invasion but also in
surrounding communities” (Cuny 1982, 12)
The eventual outcome is that the city limits are extended in such a way that it
leads to an increase in urban sprawl and the need for extended transportation
and infrastructure systems. Using agricultural land for housing instead of its
intended use pushes agricultural practices further into the hinterland thus
forcing the consumption of previously untouched land (Cam, 2000).
Land acquisition
The easiest way to acquire land for temporary housing is to either locate it on
public land, on public rights of way or to place the houses on the aftected
families’ property, nextto their damaged house (Comerio, 1998). Deciding on
satisfactory locations for temporary housing tends to eat up lots of time after
the disaster, especially when land must be acquired from private land
holdings, either through a lease or by expropriation (Johnson, 2000;
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Dandoulaki, 1992). In Greece, after the 1986 Kalamata City earthquakes, the
procedure of land acquisition delayed the temporary housing program by
several months. Since there were inadequacies in the pre-existing legislation
for emergency situations, the municipality had to opt for alternative solutions
to land expropriation, which involved leasing land from private landowners
(Dandoulaki, 1992).
Land acquisition has proven to be simplified in countries where there s state
ownership of the land. For example, after the 1963 earthquake in Skopje,
Macedonia, the government procured farmland to make t available for the
reconstruction. Displaced farmers had to make the best of the situation and
take up work in the factories of Skopje (Davis, 1 975).
Demands for units
The assessment of the needs of the affected population is aiways a difficult
yet very important part 0f any relief program. At best, t involves extensive
data collection and sophisticated collaboration between relief organizations
and governments (Anderson and Woodrow, 1987; Cuny, 1983). Most
commonly, programs tend to overestimate the required number of temporary
units (Dandoulaki, 1992; United Nations, 1982; Davis, 1978). Delays in
project completion mean that many familles are without necessary
accommodation for several months, during which time they often relocate to
another region or find themselves adequate accommodation in the area
(Dandoulaki, 1992; Geipel, 1982). Consequently, when the temporary
housing units are completed, the families that were supposed to move into
them no longer need them. Also, many families find a place to stay with
friends or relatives and would prefer to stay there rather than move into a
temporary housing unit (Bolin, 1982). The assessment of needs must be an
ongoing process to monitor how many familles are actually in need or want of
housing at any given time (Cuny 1983). For example, this overestimation of
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needs was found to be true atter the Kalamata City earthquakes (Dandoulaki
1992).
Vacating temporary housing
In past cases ot temporary housing provision, t has proven difficuit to remove
people from the temporary units when the time cornes to dismantle the
housing (United Nations 1982; Davis 1978; Cuny 1983; Quarantelli 1995;
Chalinder 1998; Dandoulaki 1992). Even though the inhabitants have moved
out and are occupying permanent housing, they use the temporary house for
storage, for housing tamily members or friends, or as an income generating
sublet (Dandoulaki, 1992; Geipel, 1991). In order for people to completely
vacate the temporary housing, there must be ample affordable permanent
housing available, thus the level ot development must reach beyond the pre
earthquake conditions.
Governments may purchase temporary housing with the idea that it will be
useful again at a later date. If t used by rural populations atter a disaster, the
units can be recycled for storage or used as outbuildings on the property
(Ghafory-Ashtiany 1999). If the temporary units are situated in an urban
environment, they can be dismantled and stored for future housing shortages.
However, if the units are used for an extended period of time, most of them
will not be in good enough condition for reuse, and parts needed for
refurbishment can be difficuit or expensive to obtain. Also, considering the
expense of storing the units over what can become a long period of time,
pending the next disaster, it may not be economical to reuse the units
(Dandoulaki, 1992).
Social and cultural suitability
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There is strong evidence to support the statement that temporary housing
lacks social and cultural suitability (United Nations, 1982; Davis, 1978;
Ghafory-Ashtiany, 1999; Dandoulaki, 1992, Aysan, 1984). The unit’s size,
shape, layout, the materials used, as well as the site conditions are factors in
determining or limiting suitability. Length ot tenure and types of alterations
made to the dwellings are good measures of suitability. Most often, if the
housing is drastically inappropriate, people will refuse to move into them or
they wili vacate them very quickly. Households will try to make the dwelling
more liveable by adding rooms. In some extreme cases, temporary housing
has been found to be detrimental to the rehabilitation of the population
because its cramped conditions causes tension in familles; since
reconstruction generally takes longer when temporary housing is provided,
families are forced live longer in unsatisfactory dwellings (Ghafory-Ashtiany,
1999).
Temporary units built after the 1975 earthquake in Lice, Turkey was found to
be unsuitable culturally. Familles objected to the two-room single storey box
dwelling, as well as to the close grid-pattern layout of the settlements. In this
case, if familles had more participation in what was provided some of these
problems could have been alleviated (United Nations, 1982).
The distinction between rural or urban situation is also a tactor regarding
suitability. In urban areas, temporary housing can be supplied with
infrastructure and services that make the housing more acceptable. In rural
areas, temporary housing has been found to be less acceptable because of
family requirements; this is especially true when households have a practice
of keeping farm animais in the house (Ghafory-Ashtiany, 1999; Aysan, 1984).
Due to the cultural and social limitations (as well as limited physical space) of
temporary units, room for personalization and additions to the dwellings is
imperative. Families who lack living or storage space are able to increase
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their satisfaction if they can build additions to the house. Space for outdoor
seating, a garden, or outbuilding on the plot reinforce personalization and
definition of space (Ellis and Barakat, 1 996; Aysan, 1984).
Planning for temporary housing
Temporary housing settlements, like any human settlement, are flot just
made up of houses, but also of the people who live in them. Therefore, as is
implied in the discussion above, a temporary house has importance not just
as a shelter from the elements but also as a shelter for social, spiritual and
psychological needs. In order ta respond ta these needs, temporary housing
needs ta receive detailed holistic planning, looked at from a systems view, or
it will continue ta have negative effects on rehabilitation, reconstruction and
development (Ellis and Barakat 1996)
Chalinder (1 998) points out that focusing on human needs can be considered
planning for temporary housing, while the engineering, planning 0f specific
layouts, roads, blacks for shelters, water points and latrines are considered
planning of temporary settlements. Planning for temporary settiements
means examining whom the response is aimed at. Planning teams are
needed that consist of land-use planners, socio-economists, health
specialists, engineers, architects, sociologists, community service specialists
and program managers.
Cuny (1983) points out that a crisis, such as that brought on by a disaster,
can reinforce local coping mechanisms and can bring local organisations ta
function better than during normal periods. Collecting social and
anthropological data can identify local coping mechanisms before or at the
onset cf a disaster. If aid programs ignore these local coping mechanisms
they can disrupt the latter’s ability ta function properly and even damage them
by undermining their credibility within the community. Aid that is intended ta
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help may actually be provided in such a way that it impedes recovery, causes
economic hardship, and renders the society less able to cope with the next
disaster.
The actual needs of the population can differ widely f rom the needs that the
aid organisations perceive. For example, Ellis and Barakat (1996) found that
a needs assessment of a displaced population in Croatia would have shown
the overwhelming majority ot retugees could be accommodated privately and
that temporary settlements (which had already been provided) were not
actually necessary. They also tound that private accommodation would have
been the best-fit solution since it would have been more culturally sensitive,
socially acceptable, integrated, participatory and appropriate.
2.5 Conclusions
In order to look at the issues of strategic planning for temporary housing after
disasters, this section on previous research has highlighted the major ideas in
the subject of housing in developing countries, in disaster research and in
post-disaster reconstruction. Issues cf housing in developing countries
explain that today’s most favoured approach is to enable families to look after
their own housing needs by allowing them access to land and financing
systems. The study cf disasters and the practice cf disaster management is
an expanding subject, in which vulnerability plays a key role te understanding
how to reduce the impacts cf natural hazards. Activities cf preparedness and
mitigation are essentially strategic planning activities that help communities to
be more resilient ta disasters.
The subject of post-disaster reconstruction is closely related to housing
issues in developing countries because cf the similar problems cf financing,
tenure, and need for community-based approaches. However, in post
disaster reconstruction, and especially in temporary housing, the need for a
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speedy recovery compiicates matters further, putting more pressure on
governments and outside agencies to react quickly.
Previous research about temporary housing provides a wealth of information
about the many issues in temporary housing. Rowever, it is found that most
of the literature compartmentalises the steps ot temporary housing and
permanent housing into separate programmes because, in reality, these
programmes are otten run by compietely different agencies. A temporary
housing programme can imply different things; it can mean the physical
supply of a temporary house, the financial support and aid to help find an
existing house to live in temporarily or a combination of these solutions. To
move beyond an analysis of temporary housing that views temporary housing
programmes as essentially either ‘bad’ or ‘good’, we need to examine the
problem of temporary housing through a system’s approach, which sees
temporary housing as a part of the whole system of post-disaster recovery
(System, 2006) defines a system as a group of interdependent parts. These
parts are generally systems themselves and are composed of other parts, just
as systems are generaliy parts or components of other systems. The system
of post-disaster recovery includes ail the stages of housing, infrastructure and
community repairs plus aH services that are available to familles. Therefore,
the research presented in the following chapters comes from the perspective
that the way to offer a better understanding of temporary housing is through
systems thinking. A detailed expianation cf the systems addressed is offered
in section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3, Methods.
46
CHAPTER 3: METHODS
3.1 Case study method
The overarching methodological approach adopted for this research is the
case study method looking at the bounded system of a temporary housing
programme after a disaster. According to Creswell (1998) a case is an
exploration of a ‘bounded system’—bounded by place and time—that studies
a programme, event, activity or individuals.
The case study method can be both qualitative and quantitative; it is a
comprehensive research strategy including research design, data collection
techniques and approaches to data analysis. Yin (2003) describes a research
design as a ‘blueprint’ of the research that deals with: 1) what questions to
study 2) what data are relevant 3) what data to collect 4) how to analyse the
results. The following section will outline the research design of the doctoral
work including subsections detailing the methods applied for each of the four
articles, the methods of data collection used and the approaches to data
analysis.
There are four common commitments in case study research: to bring expert
knowledge to bear upon the phenomena studied, to round up aIl the relevant
data, to examine rival interpretations, and to ponder and probe the degree to
which the findings have implications elsewhere (Yin, 1994). The case study
method is useful when the research seeks to understand complex social
phenomena or a set of events over which the investigator has little or no
control. The case study method is most often employed to illuminate a
decision or set of decisions to understand why they were taken, how they
were implemented and with what result (Yin 2003). It can also be useful to
study an organisation, a process, a programme or an event.
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Yin (2003) offers a technical definition of a case study:
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that:
• Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context,
especially when
• The boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are flot
clearly evident
The case study inquiry
• Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be
many more variables of interest than data points, and as one resuit
relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge
in a triangulating fashion, and as another result,
• Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide
data collection and analysis’ (p.1 3).
3.1.7 Research design
Research design deals with logical problems, rather than logistical ones; the
goal is to match rational research questions with the right evidence that will
allow the researcher to draw analytical generalisations—that is
generalizations to the theoretical propositions rather than to populations or
universes (Yin, 2003).
Case studies can either be intrinsic or instrumental in type; ‘intrinsic’ case
studies focus on the case because of its uniqueness or to have a better
understanding of that particular case, whereas an ‘instrumental’ case study s
examined mainly to provide insight into an issue and to draw out
generalisations about that issue (Stake 2005; 1995). This research uses an
instrumental type of case study to build a better understanding of temporary
housing programmes after disasters. The main case, along with the other
cases, is used to generalise about the major issues in temporary housing
programmes.
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Case study research usually starts with ‘how’ or why’ questions about a set
0f events. The research questions posed in this research are:
1. Why do temporary housing programmes continually suffer from
recurring problems (such as being overly expensive in relation to their
lifespan, unplanned permanence, late delivery, unsuitable designs for
the climate, culture and family size, or unsuitable locations)?
2. What must be understood in the process of temporary housing to lead
to innovation as to how to improve temporary housing programmes?
3. How could strategic planning address these recurring problems in
temporary housing programmes?
Based on these research questions, a number of theoretical propositions are
established to guide the research design:
1. Temporary housing programmes continue to suffer from the above
mentioned recurring problems because, in the post-disaster situation,
decisions about temporary housing must be made very quickly, leaving
little time to plan and assess various strategies.
2. Organisational and technical systems for temporary housing
programmes differ from country to country and can impact on the
outcomes of the programmes.
3. Pre-disaster strategic planning for temporary housing needs to account
for organisational arrangements, availability 0f land and suitability 0f
designs.
4. Temporary housing programmes can reduce costs and unwanted
permanence by planning for later productive use 0f the units/materials.
These theoretical propositions, or theory developments, are informed by the
review 0f literature and form the basis of the research, and are used to define
the specific subjects for research included in this dissertation.
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Yin (2003) explains how the case study method is constructed. As shown in
figure 4, theory development forms the basis for selecting the cases and for
the design of the data collection protocol. The case studies are conducted
(which may re-inform the theory) and the case reports are written individually
before drawing cross-case conclusions. These conclusions then Iead to the
modification of the theory, or what Yin describes as analytical generalizations,
which, as has been stated, means that generalisations are made to theory
rather than to populations or universes.
The case study method defined by Yin, above, is complimented by Stake’s
(2005) discussion on theory development, or as he calls t, ‘issue evolution.’
This includes: 1) defining the topical issue of the research, 2) posing
foreshadowed problems that concentrate on issue-related observations, 3)
stating issues under development that the research will focus on, and 4) once
the research has been completed, delining the assertions.
Figure 5 is a sketch of the method used in this research and combines both
Stake’s ideas of issue evolution and Yin’s case study method. The topical
issue, planning for post disaster temporary housing, emerged out of research
ANALm &
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Figure 4 The case study method (source: Yin, 2003, p. 50)
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conducted at the Masters level, which included a study cf the different
temporary housing projects built after the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey
(Johnson, 2000). This research, conducted ten months after the earthquakes,
found that many people had been temporarily housed in settiements on the
outskirts of cities, which resembled new suburbs containing many services
and amenities. The question remained, however, what would become of
these settiements after people had settled in permanent housing? Was this
money weII-spent? How could this process be improved?
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Figure 5 Sketch of the research design
3.7.2 Case selection
The case study selected for this doctoral research is the aftermath cf the
1999 earthquakes in Turkey. Stake (2005) writes about the rational for
1 OPICAL ISSUE
Planning for post-disaster
temporary housing
V
choosing case studies, stating, “The researcher examines various interests in
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the phenomenon, selecting a case cf some typicality but leaning toward those
cases that seem te effet the opportunity to Iearn. My choice would be to
choose that case from which we feei we can learn the most” (p. 451). The
case study cf the 1 999 earthquakes in Turkey was selected because:
1) Over 40,000 units cf temporary housing were built in the region,
costing upwards of US$122 million. Therefore, the phenomenon
cccurred on great numbers, offering good possibilities for research;
2) The Turkish government has a wealth cf experience in building
temporary housing after disasters, yet there appeared be many
criticisms cf its approach. Understanding areas for improvement
could be helpful te the country, as this wiIl most likely not be last
programme for temporary housing in Turkey;
3) There was a large presence of international and local NGOs
building temporary housing, which allowed learning about both
government and NGO practices.
4) The earthquake happened recently enough that is was possible
to observe the morphology cf the temporary housing programme.
5) Since the author had completed prier research in Turkey, it was
possible te draw on this earlier data for a more complete
understanding cf the programme.
3.1.3 Theory development
Based on prior kncwledge of the Turkish earthquake and on desk research cf
other cases cf temporary housing programmes in different countries an issue
under development emerged: Temporary housing has many different forms,
which need to be clearly defined. What are the different physical forms 0f
temporary housing?
A foreshadowed problem aise emerged: The construction cf temporary
housing is systematically criticised as being problematic and ultimately
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experts suggest that it should be avoided. However, it was noticed that
temporary housing was supplied after every large-scale disaster, by
governments or NGOs who were most probably responding to a dire need for
interim housing.
From this, came another issue under development: What are the main
problems with temporary housing and how can these problems be addressed
through planning? The above two issues under development became the
basis for the Article 1 and Article 2. The inferences drawn from the
foreshadowed problem and these two articles leaU to the development of two
more specitic issues under development. It was suspected that the
organisational structures implementing temporary housing were very different
in different countries, and that the types of temporary housing built would
change depending on a country’s economy and culture of building. The
question posed was: How are different organisational and technical systems
implemented in temporary housing projects? As well, it has been pointed Dut
in previous literature that temporary housing projects tend to become
permanent, an unwanted by-product of the programme. To address this
issue, the next question posed was: What are the long-term outcomes 0f
temporary housing and how can these outcomes be made more positive for
the stakeholders? Atter following the case study method of data collection
and case reports, these two issues under development became the basis for
Article 3 and Article 4.
3.7.4 Design of case studies
Case studies can either be designed using a single case or using two or more
cases, which s then called multiple or collective case study (Yin, 2003; Stake
2005). Cases can also have a holistic design, which means the study
examines the global nature of a programme or it can have an embedded
design, meaning that the case looks at elements within the programme, or at
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selected projects that comprise the larger programme. Figure 6 is a matrix
showing Yin’s (2005) basic types of designs for case studies.
holistic
(single
unit of
analysis)
CONTEXT
Case
embedded Embedded
Unitof
_________ _________
(multiple Analysis 1
unltsof
analysis) Embedded
Unitof
Analysis 2
Figure 6 Basic types 0f designs for case studies (source: Yin, 2003, p.40)
Figure 7 outlines the types of case study designs used for each article
included in this dissertation; as is apparent trom the figure, this research
employs single and multiple case studies as well as holistic and embedded
units of analysis, as most appropriate on each instance.
The scope of the overail research described in this dissertation is focussed on
the single-case design/holistic unit of analysis of the temporary housing
programme in Turkey after the 1999 earthquakes. It looks at the entire
programme including, among others, the different stakeholders involved, the
physical houses, the cities t was located in, and its place within the overall
reconstruction programme.
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Article 1: Types of post-disaster temporary housing, also employs a single
case design/holistic unit of analysis, describing the difterent types of
temporary housing used in Turkey after the 1999 earthquakes.
Article 2: Strategic planning for temporary housing uses a multiple case
design/holistic unit of analysis as it examines elements of six cases of
temporary housing programmes in different countries.
Article 3: Organisational design of temporary housing is also a multiple case
design/holistic unit of analysis looking at the temporary housing programme in
Turkey as well as the temporary housing programme in Colombia after the
1999 earthquake.
Article 4: Outcomes of temporary housing projects is a single case design
however it uses embedded or multiple units of analysis. The overali
programme of temporary housing is examined for its outcomes, and as well
four different temporary housing projects are studies, which are part of the
large r programme.
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Figure 7 Case study designs 0f the overall research and the four articles
3.2 Data collection
Based on the research questions and theoretical propositions, which were
outlined in the section above, operational questions were created to bring to
light the data to be collected.
Multiple sources of evidence, obtained during field visits to Turkey, form the
TURKEY 1999 EARTHQUAKES
Temporary Housing Programme
project pro]ect
project project
backbone of the data collection procedures for the research. Three different
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sources of evidence: documents, interviews and direct observations allowed
triangulation of the data, which is important to address issues of construct
validity (Yin, 2003; Patton, 1987).
As defined by Yin (2003), a database of information is important to organise
and document the case study. The database created for this research
included MSExcel® forms with information, typed case study notes and
transcripts of interviews.
3.2.7 FieId visits
Data collection occurred over three separate field visits to Turkey after the
August and November 1999 earthquakes. During each field visit I was based
in Istanbul and made multiple trips to the affected region for a few days at a
time. This allowed me to collect data and then, in Istanbul, to sort through the
information obtained before heading back to the field. The f irst visit was for
three weeks in May-June 2000, where I volunteered with a local NGO,
Human Settlements Association, helping them to evatuate the different
temporary house designs employed in the region. The second visit was for
tive weeks in November 2003, approximately four years after the disaster,
when I collected documents, made contacts and visited several temporary
housing projects in the region. The third visit was four months from May to
August 2004, during which time I conducted interviews in Istanbul and
Ankara, made numerous trips to affected towns to observe the temporary
housing projects and to interview people, and collected many documents. In
August of that year, I also worked with a team of other Turkish and foreign
student researchers to collect information on the temporary housing projects
in Dûzce City.
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3.2.2 Sources of evidence
Documents included government publications, scientific articles, theses, and
other data. Government publications obtained from the municipality of D(zce
included master plans cf the urban area before and after the disaster, plans
of the temporary housing projects and photographs of the construction
process. From the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs in Ankara I obtained
a document about the reconstruction policies and the Auditor General’s
evaluation cf the reconstruction processes. Aiso helpful were two documents
published by the World Bank for the Marmara Earthquake Emergency
Rehabilitation Program (MEER). Documents also included two recently
completed theses, articles published by Professor Polat GCilkan, as welI as
survey data provided by a group of student researchers. Many of the
documents were available in English, but two important documents were only
available in Turkish. With the help ot Turkish friends, we translated these
documents into English for the purposes of this research.
Interviews with stakeholders were guided by questions prepared in advance
of the interview, however the discussions were generally open-ended and
there were many extra questions posed and tangents followed where
possible. Interviews were either conducted directly by me in Engiish or were
conducted through the help of a translator. AIl interviews were tape recorded
and later transcribed and translated if necessary.
Interviews were conducted with:
• Residents in permanent and temporary housing = 11 interviews
• Government officiais from the Ministry in Ankara = 3 interviews
• Municipal authorities in DLzce City = 2 interviews
• Local community leaders (muhtars) = 6 interviews
• NGO representatives = 3 interviews
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In order to triangulate data with respect to the temporary housing process,
interviews posed the same questions to different people.
Direct Observations were obtained from visits to the temporary housing and
permanent housing settlements, and also more informally from spending time
in the towns and communities. Annex 1 contains a list of the temporary
housing settlements I visited. In each temporary housing settiement, I
photographed the site, noted information about the type of housing, condition
of houses and site, location, services, size of settlement and name of
sponsoring organisation. In most cases I spoke with a few residents asking
them about their experiences in the houses, if they Iived there since the
earthquake, how they got around and their future plans for housing. I often
visited a home at each site and was invited for tea numerous times. If
possible, I interviewed the muhtar (community leader), sometimes only
informally, asking him questions about who was living on the site (affected
families or new familles), about management of the site and future plans for
the settiement. I also visited the storage and refurbishment facility for
temporary housing at the Ministry of Public Works and Settlements in Ankara
where the government used to manufacture temporary housing. Annex 2
contains photos of this facility.
3.3 Data analysis
Procedures for analysing the data followed three different kinds of analysis
generally used in qualitative-type case studies: systems thinking, typology
building, and logical framework approach. The systems thinking approach is
used in aIl of the research, while typology building is employed in article 1 and
logical framework is explicitly used in article 4. The following section wiII
outline the details of each of these data analysis methods.
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3.3.7 Systems thinking
Systems thinking is employed throughout the research as a general approach
to the problem of temporary housing after disasters. In recent years, the field
cf systems thinking has been deveioped to provide techniques for studying
systems in holistic ways to suppiement more traditionai methods of science.
in systems thinking, we gain insights into the whole by understanding the
linkages and interactions between the elements that comprise the whole
system. We see a subject as a series cf conceptuai systems and from
multiple viewpoints.
Systems thinking sees ail human activity systems as open systems, therefore
the environment within which they exist affects them and vice versa. The
heart of a system is interaction between a number of systemic elements
separated f rom an external environment by some boundary. A system is
typically linked to its externai environment by a number of inputs and outputs
(Olsson and Sjôstedt, 2004). Hall (1962) defines a system as: a group of
elements with relations between them, and relations between them and their
environment. He states that the environment of a system is: a) ail the
elements outside the system that affect the system when they are changed
and b) affected by a change in the system. Wikipedia (System, 2006) defines
a system as: any set (group) of interdependent parts; parts are generaiiy
systems themseives and are composed cf other parts, just as systems are
generaliy parts or components of other systems.
This research examines two kinds of systems that can be observed in
temporary housing. The first system is at the level of the programme for
temporary housing. Any programme for temporary housing occurs within the
larger system of the reconstruction programme (of which it s, therefore, a
sub-system) and s accompanied by other sub-systems such as the
permanent housing programme or the emergency shelter programme (see
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figure 8). The reconstruction programme exits within an even larger system of
the overail recovery programme, which also exists within the economic,
political and cultural systems of the country in question. Each of these
systems wiII have an impact on other systems, i.e. the programme for job
creation in a certain area wilI have an impact on the success of a housing
programme—if there are no jobs available in the area, no one wiIl move
th e re.
Economic and Political System
7 Recovery Programme
Reconstruction Programme ‘1Y
q D
Figure 8 The temporary housing programme s a system that s
interdependent with other programmes
The second system s at the level of the temporary housing project. Each
temporary housing project is a resuit of the marnage between subsystems of
the project that are interrelated: organisational design, the project process
and the technical design of the unit (Figure 9). In the examination of a
temporary housing project, this research looks at each of these systems and
the interdependence between them.
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SYSTEM 0F A PROJECT
SYSTEM 0F
TECHNICAL DESIGN
Figure 9 The system of a temporary housing project is made up 0f systems
of organisational design, project process and technical design.
3.3.2 Typology building
The primary purpose 0f typologies is to describe a subject. Typologies are a
kind 0f classification system; a way to create categories by dividing some
aspect of the world into parts (Patton, 1 980). Richardson (1 990) explains that
the purpose of a typology is not the creation of an exhaustive classificatory
scheme but rather to:
ta) Find something in your material noteworthy 0f classification, and
(b) To provide some of the categories.
To develop category systems, Patton (1980) advises looking for patterns 0f
convergence, that is, continuing regularities in the data. Patterns of internai
homogeneity can de defined as the extent to which the data that belong in a
certain category hold together. Also patterns 0f external heterogeneity can be
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found which show the extent to which differences among the categories are
bold and clear.
Article I on Types of Temporary Accommodation builds a typology ot
temporary housing based primarily on the Turkish case study. When doing
the initial exploratory study in Turkey in 2000, I noticed families occupying
many different kinds of structures that Quarantelli (1995) defines as the
‘temporary housing’ stage: shelters families built themselves next to the
roadway; rather sturdy prefabricated structures with full kitchens bathrooms
and bedrooms; small shacks offered by NGOs and aid organisations, and
many different variations of these. The study examined the different
materials, construction methods and suppliers of the houses to define
categories of temporary housing. To represent the typology more thoroughly,
the research also included some types that were not observed in Turkey, but
have been observed elsewhere.
The information from this study was used to inform later parts of the study (as
was described above in the research design. This follows Patton’s (1980)
suggestions that ‘Typologies can later be used to make interpretations about
the nature of a program, but the tirst purpose is description based on an
analysis of the patterns that appear in the data” (p. 311).
3.3.3 Logical framework approach and impact evaluation
The logical framework approach, initially introduced to the international
development sector in 1969 by USAID, is a useful tool for analyzing the
performance of development projects. It employs a matrix of indicators to
draw cause-effect relationships between different stages of the projects. The
stages into which a project is subdivided have received different names and
interpretations. However, as a constant, the logical framework considers at
least four or f ive stages placed in a time-sequence of cause-effect:
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In the first stage, which s usually called inputs, the resources,
and/or the activities that exploit the resources are considered.
ii. The second stage, which s usually called outputs, includes the
results of those activities; it involves describing the products and
services delivered, taking into account the consumption of
resources.
iii. In the third stage, intermediate resuits are explained. Those resuits
correspond to the immediate effects of the products and services
offered; their effects can be measured as the transfer of
technology—this stage is usually called resuits or outcomes.
iv. In the fourth stage, the Iong-term effects are explained. This usually
corresponds to the final goal of the project. In some cases, an
intermediate stage can be considered to distinguish between the
medium-term objectives and the Iong-term effects or impacts.
In addition to measuring the variables that are directly implicated in the
project, it is necessary to include environmental factors that may influence the
project—even if they are not directly related to the project. Aubry (1 994)
distinguishes between two kinds of environmental factors: ‘internaI factors’
within the project and ‘external factors’ those that happen outside the
influence of the project (see figure 10). Wiggins and Shields (1995) make
reference to ‘important assumptions’, which are defined as “conditions which
could affect the progress or success of the project but over which the project
manager has no control.” Such factors could be an economic downturn, or a
political event, which affects the project but which the project can do little to
control.
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One cf the criticisms cf the logical framework is its tendency te draw attention
only to whether expected impacts of the project where achieved or flot, and
therefore ignore any unexpected impacts cf the project (Gasper 2000).
Unexpected or unforeseen impacts, which are flot previously described as
indicators in the project, do flot become part cf the model at ail. Therefore, for
research that is focused on the impacts cf projects, it is necessary to look to
another type cf evaluation methcd, that cf impact evaluation.
Impact evaluation is the systematic identification cf the effects—positive or
negative, intended or flot—on individuais, hcuseholds, institutions and the
environment caused by a given development project. Impact evaluation
helps to better understand the extent to which activities actually reach and
help beneficiaries. Cracknell (2000) and Baker (2000) explain that it is useful
for:
Internai factnrs
iwithin tha projenti
Figure 10 The classic Iogical framework including internai and externat
factors.
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Measuring outcomes and impacts cf an activity and distinguishing
these from the influence cf other, external factors;
ii. Helping ta clarify whether the ccsts of an activity are justified;
informing decisions on whether ta expand, modify of eliminate
projects, programs or policies;
iii. Designing lessons for improving the design and management of
future activities.
Impact evaluation is not oniy concerned with the project’s effects on
participants but also how the construction cf new housing impacts on urban
management, on operating budgets, on the rentai housing market and SO on.
Indeed, one of the key functions of impact studies is to throw light on
unexpected impacts that were flot foreseen in the project appraisal, so they
can be taken into account more effectively in future projects.
The World Bank (1993a) suggests four steps for an impact evaluation:
1. Identification: noting whatever changes and impacts have taken
place that can be attributed to the project. The impacts may be:
i. Intended;
ii. Associated, i.e. linked in some way ta the project, but
only indirectly—these are often unintended impacts;
iii. Accessory i.e. impacts for which the project was only
partiy responsible;
iv. Unrelated i.e. no obvious Iink with the project is
apparent, but one needs to check.
2. Measurement: Trying to quantify or assess the significance of the
impacts.
3. Attribution: Trying to establish the causes cf the changes,
especially the extent te which they can be attributed to the prcject.
The logicai tramework can help ta establish the cause—effect
sequence of attribution.
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4. Assessment: drawing together ail the threads, and forming a
judgement on the impacts in relation to the aid input. Making
recommendations for future projects of a similar kind.
In order to look at the impacts of the temporary housing projects, the subject
of Article IV, a method of analysis was defined to bring together the analysis
of the project process used in the logical framework with an analysis of the
impacts, as defined in impact evaluation (figure 11). This method constructs
the logicai framework from the top-down —looking first at the long-term
impacts of the projects and comparing them to the project objectives. Then
the short-term resuits are traced back, as well as the project outputs and
inputs/activities to understand the project process. Through this, the analysis
is abie to pinpoint the factors internai to the project that affect the impacts as
weil as those that are external to the project.
Figure 11 Logical framework modified for evaluating the impacts of
temporary housing projects.
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3.4 Summary
In summary, this research adopts a case study methodology to look at the
problem of temporary housing after disasters. The case study of the 1999
earthquakes in Turkey provides evidence for understanding some of the
major issues in the temporary housing which are, in turn, explored in the four
articles presented in this dissertation; namely: types of temporary housing,
and strategic planning, organisational design and Iong-term impacts for
temporary housing programmes and projects. Data collection occurred
during tield visits to Turkey and consisted of interviews, observations and
documents.
The approach to data analysis varied f rom article to article depending on the
issues explored and the methodological approach used for analysing the
different issues is reported in each article.
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CHAPTER 4: ARTICLES
This chapter is comprised of four articles, which correspond to four separate
subjects covered in the research: I) physical types of temporary housing, Il)
strategic planning for temporary housing, III) organisational design for
temporary housing, and IV) outcomes of temporary housing projects. Each
article has been published or accepted for publication; Article I, as a
conference paper and Articles Il, III and IV in refereed journals. Each of the
journals has given permission to reprint the papers here; these permissions
are found in Appendix C. To conform to the thesis requirements, the figures
throughout the thesis are numbered sequentially, however in the published
form of the papers, the figures are numbered separately for each paper. Also,
the references are listed only at the end of the thesis.
Article I: Physical types of temporary housing
Johnson, C. (2002). “What’s the big deal about temporary housing? Types of
temporary accommodation after disasters: An example cf the 1999 Turkish
earthquake.” In Proceedings from the International Emergency Management
$ociety (TIEMS) conference: Facing the Realities of the Third Millennium,
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada, May 74-77, 2002.
Article Il: Strategic planning
Johnson, C. (forthcoming). “Strategic planning for post-disaster temporary
housing.” (Accepted October, 2006 for publication in Disasters).
Article III: Organisational design
Johnson, C., Lizarralde, G., and Davidson, C.H. (2006). “A systems view of
temporary housing projects in post-disaster reconstruction.” Construction
Management and Economics 24(2): 376-378.
Article IV: Outcomes of temporary housing projects
Johnson, C. (2006) “Impacts of temporary prefabricated housing after
disasters: 1999 earthquakes in Turkey.” Habitat International (In press,
corrected proof anIme 05 June 2006 doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2006.03.002).
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Article I: Physïcal types of temporary housing
What’s the big deal about temporary housing? Types of temporary
accommodation after disasters: An example of the 1999 Turkish
earthquake1
ABSTRACT
In this paper the author describes fine types cf temporary accommodation
that are commonly used after disasters. This description includes: the
physical characteristics cf each type, its effect on family recovery, and its
function in the reconstruction continuum. Information is drawn from the
author’s field research in Turkey after the 1 999 earthquakes in the Marmara
and Bolu regions, as well as from other published case studies. Temporary
accommodation refers to Iodging provided for, or built by, the affected
population as a place to stay in the interim between the immediate relief
phase and the later reconstruction phase. It serves as a safe, private place
where the family can begin to recover and go about their daily activities
sooner, rather than later, after the disaster. This paper emphasizes how
different types of temporary accommodation can be the best-fit option,
depending on the particularities cf the specific disaster and the timeline for
permanent reconstruction.
INTRODUCTION: FILLING THE GAP
In 2001, 256 million people were affected by disasters, well above the
previous decade’s average cf 211 million people per year. While the number
cf deaths attributed to disasters has decreased in the Iast twenty years, the
number of people affected by disasters has increased quite substantially.
1 Published in Proceedings from the International Emergency Management Society (TIEMS)
conference: Facing the Realities of the Third Millennium, University of Waterloo, Waterloo,
Canada, May 74-1 7, 2002.
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Relief and reconstruction for these populations after disaster is an on-going
concern of many governments, non-governmental organisations (NGO5) and
international agencies. However, the Red Cross World Disaster Report
(2001) points out the need for research into managing the ‘gap’ in time that
exists between the relief period and the reconstruction: ‘There is gap: the
relief stops.. .often a year or more goes by between the disaster and [the start
of] reconstruction. People can’t wait that long.. .they begin rebuilding their
lives hours after disaster strikes. They aren’t interested in relief—they are
interested in recovering. That s when people need technical assistance to
reduce future risk” (IFRC, 2001). Technical assistance is a complex process
that includes, among others, tinancial aid or incentives, mobilization of
resources, social programs and physical construction.
One ot the key aspects to filling this gap is finding a suitable lodging solution
that allows the affected population to begin rebuilding their lives and to do so
quickly. There are many types of temporary accommodation that can be
implemented atter a disaster to fuI the housing gap between the immediate
relief phase and the results of the permanent reconstruction. Types of
temporary accommodation include, but are not limited to, tents, prefabricated
temporary housing, shelters in public facilities, homes of family or friends,
self-built shelters, or rented apartments. Usually several types of temporary
accommodation are used concurrently to fill the housing need of the entire
atfected population. In some cases, temporary accommodation can be used
as an effective housing solution not just to filI the gap, but can continue to be
used through more than one phase of the post-disaster rehabilitation process.
Each type of temporary accommodation has its own set of short-term and
long-term implications, and some types are more suitable than others,
depending on the particular disaster situation. Therefore, the decision to
implement a particular temporary accommodation strategy or strategies must
72
be based on knowledge of the short-term and Iong-term implications of each
and an understanding of the particular characteristics of the disaster situation.
After a disaster, familles are in need of a place to ive, a place to restart, a
place to take responsibility for what they have, a place to regain control over
their lives for their economic, physical and emotional well-being. If temporary
accommodation does not promote this process of reestablishment at the
household level, t can hinder the overall recovery of the population and of the
region as a whole. It is for this reason that temporary accommodation, and
the chosen type of accommodation, is of particular concern atter a disaster. In
tact, temporary accommodation is inevitably an integral part of a family’s
recovery process after a disaster, and the type and availability of temporary
accommodation can contribute to or hinder the recovery process.
The temporary accommodation used atter the devastating 1999 earthquakes
in Turkey illustrate the possible types that can be used after a disaster
(Johnson, 2000). This paper describes the types of temporary
accommodation used in Turkey and considers both the short-term and long
term implications of each type.
lncidentally, I would like to point out that one should not look at the question
of temporary accommodation without considering that the provision of aid
after disasters is a political process. International organisations, NGOs and
governments are subject to their political agenda and strategies, which
unfortunately can have the tendency to override humanitarian concerns.
Although it may often be the case that temporary accommodation decisions
are politically biased, in this paper I take a politically unbiased view of its
provision; specifically, that the decision as to the type of temporary
accommodation to provide after a disaster is or should be based on the best
fit solution and not on political agendas.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
This paper describes the types cf temporary accommodation commonly used
after a disaster, taking the Turkish example as a case in point.
To define where temporary accommodation lies on the reconstruction
continuum, in this paper I begin with an explanation of the stages cf post
disaster housing as they are defined by Quarantelli (1 995). This is followed by
a short description cf the 1999 earthquake disaster in Turkey. The next
section describes the types cf temporary accommodation used, firstly in
Turkey and seccndly, in other disasters. The last section draws conclusions
and highlights the mcst important points.
There are nine types cf temporary accommodation used after disasters, as
found in Turkey and elsewhere. While doing field research in Turkey, there
were f ive main types cf tempcrary accommodation I observed and reccrded.
These were: prefabricated temporary houses, wocden temporary houses,
paper temporary houses, winterised tents, and self-built shelters. There are
four types cf other tempcrary accommodation referred to in other case
studies, which are mobile homes, public facilities retrctitted as lodging, homes
cf family or friends, and rented apartments.
This paper describes the physical characteristics cf each type, its effect on
family reccvery, and its function in the reconstruction continuum. The
information presented here is derived partly frcm my field research in the
earthquake-affected region cf Turkey in June and July 2000, apprcximately
ten months after twc devastating earthquakes in the Marmara and Bclu
regions cf Turkey in 1999 (Jchnscn, 2000). Additional information is also
taken frcm cther published case studies on temporary accommodation from
74
various disasters in the United States; the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan;
the 1999 floods in Venezuela; and elsewhere.
DEFINITION 0F TERMS: STAGES 0F POST DISASTER HOUSING
In disaster research the terms “housing” and sheltering” are often used
interchangeably, with littie distinction between the terms. The vagueness
apparent in these terms must be clarified to precisely define the phenomena
cf housing after a disaster. Quarantelli (1995) situates the concept of ideal:
“In social science, the ideal does not refer to [what isJ desirable, but how the
phenomena would look like if t existed in a pure form. Thus, the [idealsJ we
advance are not intended to be exact descriptions cf social reality but as
ways of thinking about such realities.” Quarantelli (1995) then defines the
four stages cf housing after a disaster as:
1. Emergency sheltering
2. Temporary sheltering
3. Temporary housing
4. Permanent housing
Actual or potential populations seeking quarters outside cf their own
permanent homes for short periods utilize emergency sheltering. Emergency
shelters are typically used for a few hours or possibly for a one-night stay.
Ihis stage does flot require the arrangement cf food for the affected people
since the stay is so short. Temporary sheltering refers to the populations’
temporary displacement into other quarters with an expected short stay. This
could take the form cf a tent, a second home, a family member’s/friend’s
house, a motel, or a public facility where people will stay for more time than
just the height cf an emergency. There is no attempt to re-establish
household routines; however, there must be an arrangement for the provision
cf food. The distinction between housing and sheltering is made on the basis
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that housing involves the resumption of househoid responsibilities and
activities in the new living quarters, whereas during sheltering, normai daiiy
activities are put on hoid.
in addition to the four terms, as defined above by Quaranteili, in this paper I
aiso use the term temporary accommodation. The term temporary
accommodation is used to refer to the ail the different types of temporary
Iodging commoniy utilised after a disaster. It is important to distinguish
between temporary accommodation and temporary housing, as temporary
housing usuaily refers only to very specific types of temporary
accommodation i.e. dwelIings clustered in settiements and buiit by
organisations using industriaIised components and standardised designs. But
temporary accommodation can aiso take the form of tents, selt-buiit sheiters,
mobile homes, homes of famiiy or friends’ homes, or apartments, where the
famiIy wiIi resume their househoid responsibilities and activities in a location
that is intended to be tempo rary.
Permanent housing refers to the affected population returning to their
repaired or rebuiIt houses, or moving into new quarters in the community. In
most disaster situations in developed countries there is a sharp distinction
between temporary and permanent housing. However, in iess deveIoped
countries this distinction can be blurred: what s initiaIiy intended as
temporary housing can become permanent housing over the long-term,
particularIy of none or insufficient formai permanent housing is constructed.
TURKEY: THE 1999 EARTHQUAKES IN THE MARMARA AND BOLU
REGIONS
in the iatter half of 1 999, two devastating earthquakes shook the Marmara
and Bolu regions of Turkey, the industriai heartland ot the country to the east
of Istanbul. The first and larger earthquake on August 17th (M7.4) caused
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widespread damage to the towns of GôIcOk, Yalova and Adapazari as well as
the industrial town of Izmit (population 1 million) and eastern parts of Istanbul.
The second earthquake on November 12th (M7.2) largely affected the
mountainous towns of DCizce and Bolu, about 100 kilometres to the east of
Izmit (figure 12). It s estimated that, in total, 380,000 buildings were damaged
or had collapsed. A total of 120,000 dwellings were damaged beyond repair
leaving more than 250,000 people in need of housing. The combined death
toll from both earthquakes is recognized as being around 1 8,000.
The Turkish government instigated a three step accommodation strategy for
those affected by the earthquake, beginning with the provision of temporary
shelter, then temporary housing and later permanent housing. Tents were
provided as temporary shelter for earthquake survivors throughout the
affected areas immediately following both earthquakes. Since the winter after
the earthquake was quite severe, relief organizations distributed as many
winterised tents as possible. During the tirst winter, as many as 135,000
• Main Iowns hitby the August and November earthquakes
Figure 12 Towns in Turkey affected by the 1999 earthquakes (source: IFRC,
2000)
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people stayed in 109 tent camps established both inside and on the outskirts
of the cities and towns in the affected region. Many people were also living in
small self-provided tent camps set up near their destroyed homes or they
constructed self-made structures to serve as temporary lodging.
In October 1999 the Turkish Ministry of Housing announced plans to provide
approximately 47,000 prefabricated temporary houses to accommodate up to
151,000 people affected by the August earthquake. This plan was extended
after the November earthquake to include survivors in need of housing in the
newly affected areas. In August 2000, the first anniversary of the earthquake,
governments and NGOs had provided 42,000 prefabricated houses, housing
a total of 150,000 people. By then, the majority of the population was set up
in temporary housing, but approximately 30,000 people were stili living in
tents and 70,000 people had secured their own temporary accommodation.
TYPES 0F TEMPORARY ACCOMODATION
The following descriptions of the types of temporary accommodation often
used after disasters is based on what I observed in Turkey, as well as types
of accommodation documented by other researchers in their case studies of
other recent disasters. Based on my field research, several types of
temporary accommodation were provided, i.e. built, by governments, NGOs
and aid organisations for the affected population, though the families may
work with the agencies in the design process or the construction of the
temporary accommodation. Other types of temporary accommodation
necessitate that the users take a more active role in securing their own
lodging. However, governments, NGOs and aid organisations have an
organisational, managerial and provisional role to play in ail types of
temporary accommodation.
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Before beginning an examination of the nine types cf temporary
accommodation, I would like to remind the reader that in this paper, I make a
distinction between temporary accommodation and temporary housing. I use
temporary accommodation te refer te ail types cf temporary lodging after
disasters. Temporary housing specifically refers te heusing provided by
governments, NGOs and aid organisations that are usualiy constructed with
industrialised components and standardised designs and commonly grouped
together in settiements that include services and infrastructure.
Pretabricated, wooden and paper temporary houses
Temporary housing refers te accommodation provided by governments or
NGOs te house the affected population for the interim period between the
disaster and the reconstruction et permanent housing. This housing s
provided as soon as possible after the disaster—yet because of procurement,
planning, and construction delays temporary housing can take up te a year te
be built. The housing s built using industrialised cempenents and
standardised designs. Infrastructure—running water, sewage, electricity, and
roads—are included in the settlement and dwelling design. The houses are
greuped together in settlements that are serviced by public transportation
routes, local businesses, garbage collection services and community centres.
Large settlements are managed lecally, altheugh overseen by higher
management. Governments or NGOs own the land or it is leased by these
organisations f rom private landewners. The housing is then rented or leased
te the inhabitant either free et charge or for a fee. Families qualify for
temperary housing depending en the ameunt cf damage te their fermer home
and their possibilities cf obtaining other types of heusing. Temperary housing
is intended te serve as a place for the families te resume their heuseheld
responsibilities and activities for a duratien of two or more years after the
disaster. The lengevity et the heusing iargely depends en the quality et the
materials used and the quality of the infrastructure. Typical prefabricated
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metai or tibregiass houses, or quaiity wood or vinyl houses can endure
severai years while cardboard or low-quality wood houses may only iast two
or three years.
Ail villages, towns and cities in Turkey that were affected by the 1999
earthquakes participated, in collaboration with the federal government and
NGOs, in constructing temporary housing settiements. The settlements are
located both inside the urban areas and on the peripheries. They include
basic infrastructure for water, electricity and sewage. While smaller
settlements within the urban areas have as littie as ten houses, larger
settiements on the periphery contain up to 1400 units. Larger settiements
include amenities such as central squares, play areas, shops, cafés,
restaurants, community centres, daycares, medical units, and bus service.
Most of the temporary houses have an adequate plot space around them SO
that the families can make additions to the house as needed, plant a garden,
or generaily personalize their home.
I found three major types of temporary housing constructed in the earthquake
area: prefabricated, wood, and paper. Ail the units provided by the Turkish
federal government are prefabricated (figure 13). The prefabricated units vary
slightly depending on the manufacturer, however they are ail built on concrete
slab foundations with plumbing and electricity. The units vary in size from 25
m2 to 35 m2. Units are comprised of one large multipurpose room, a kitchen
and bathroom plus one or two bedrooms. Most of the units were
manufactured in Turkey, though some were imported from other countries.
Each unit was manufactured at a factory and brought to the site for assembly.
Although the systems are similar, they vary slightly in size, layout and type of
fixtures. In each building, there are two, three or four units back-to-back or
side-by side. Kitchens are supplied with a sink, fridge and stove. Bathrooms
include a toilet, sink, shower, and in many cases a washing machine.
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Some of the other units, such as those provided by various NGOs, are
constructed on-site with wood (figure 14). Each dwelling unit s either a
freestanding structure, or a two or four-unit building. The wood trame units
vary in size from 20 m2 to 30 m2. Each unit is outfitted with a kitchen area
and a bathroom.
Another settlement, of particular interest, is constructed using paper tubes
(f igurel 5). These paper tube houses were also used atter the 1995
earthquake in Kobe, Japan. Designed by Japanese architect Shigeru Ban,
Figure 13 Prefabricated temporary houses in Turkey2
Figure 14 Wooden temporary houses in Turkey
2 AIl photos includcd in ihis paper are from rny field research in Turkcy, referenced as Johnson (2000).
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these structures are one-room freestanding units without plumbing. The
buildings stand on a foundation of beer crates covered with plywood. The
walls are constructed solely of paper tubes lined up vertically and supported
laterally with steel rebar. The paper tubes act as outer walls and insulation;
the inside walls are covered in cardboard sheets. The roof structure is
constructed using a wood trame and paper tubes, then covered with canvas
sheeting. Some inhabitants have fastened tarpaulins to the outside on the
paper tube walls to protect the tubes f rom ram and snow. Makeshift kitchens
have been added or constructed inside the buildings by the inhabitants. Two
semi-public prefabricated bathroom units service the twenty-unit settlement.
It is apparent that these examples of temporary housing in Turkey positively
influence the interim recovery of the population. Each family in temporary
housing has a private place where family members can resume their
household responsibilities. The plot allows for additions to the house and
personalization of space. The temporary housing is located, for the most part,
in a convenient location—close to work, schools, transportation and
services—so the families are more easily able to resume their daily activities.
Figure 15 Papertemporary houses in Turkey
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The life expectancy ot the units depends on the type cf materials used in the
construction and this is reflected in the initial cost. The prefabricated units are
expected to endure several years with proper maintenance. The wood units
will endure Iess time and the quality of the building will decrease more rapidly.
Although the paper tube houses are expected to be inhabitable for up to tive
years, I suspect that their quality will deteriorate within two to three years. The
lite expectancy of the building should be relative to the amount of time they
are expected to be inhabited. Therefore, governments, NGOs and aid
organisations may choose the type—and hence cost expenditure—of
temporary housing based on the amount ot time they expect the houses to be
inhabited for.
It is ideal if the life expectancy ot the housing matches the length of tenure
available for the land the housing is built on. For the most part, the longer
lasting prefabricated units are located on government-owned land on the
periphery cl the city. The shorter-life wood units and paper units are located
within the city limits and are built on land leased from private landowners. As
one might expect, I found that the families living in the paper units made less
permanent-looking additions and spent less time and money on the
beautification and personalization of their property. The reason for this was
that they were likely to be forced to move to a new location in the near future.
Therefore, if the tenure at a certain location is intended to be for less time, for
example, because of land ownership reasons, the expenditure on temporary
housing at that location should be less than the expenditure at a location that
is available for a longer-term—such as government-owned land. This is true
both for governments, NGOs and aid organisations planning temporary
housing and for families inhabiting the housing.
The use cf temporary housing results in at least a three-stage housing
process after the disaster—temporary shelter, temporary housing and
permanent housing. It takes several months (and even up to a year) for the
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process of procurement, planning, and construction of temporary housïng, so
the population will need to reside in temporary shelter in the meantime. Once
living in the temporary housing, the population wiIl need a permanent housing
solution before they can vacate the temporary housing. From the perspective
of recovery, this three-stage strategy is beneficial because families have the
best housing solution possible throughout the various stages 0f the recovery
process. However, it is expensive. As the United Nations (1982) points out,
temporary housing amounts to rebuilding twice over: the construction of the
temporary housing plus the later construction of permanent housing.
Depending on the disaster-stricken country, the quality of the temporary
house may exceed or be equal to the quality 0f the pre-disaster housing. In
these cases, often the temporary housing becomes permanent housing
because there is insufficient money or resources to build enough permanent
housing for everyone. If this ‘permanency’ of temporary housing is foreseen
and planned for, it s not necessarily negative. However, the quality 0f the
house and the infrastructure, as weIl as the location and placement of
services must be planned trom the outset with the inevitable possibility of
permanency in mmd.
Also, temporary housing can delay the permanent reconstruction because the
process of temporary housing consumes the money, resources and time of
the organisations assigned to the local disaster-affected region. Yet, if too
much time passes before the reconstruction process s completed and people
are forced to ive in dilapidated temporary housing, this can negatively affect
their recovery process (United Nations, 1 982).
Wïnterised tents
Winterised tents, although typically thought of as temporary sheltering, can be
used over the longer term as temporary accommodation. Governments,
NGOs and aid organisations provide them for disaster situations where the
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climate dictates the need for more protection from the elements than just
regular relief tents. In Turkey, relief tents were provided immediately after the
earthquake. These were replaced a few months later by winterized tents,
which offered a warm shelter from the elements the first winter after the
earthquakes. In the spring, as temporary housing became available, the
majority of the winterised tent residents were moved into temporary housing.
However, during my field visit ten months after the earthquake, many
settiements of winterised tents still existed and were being inhabited by those
who had not yet secured temporary housing (figure 16).
Winterised tents are made with waterproof fabric and metal structure with a
floor and insulation. They usually have a few soft plastic windows and regular
framed door. The winterised tents in Turkey were provided by the Turkish
military, and therefore resembled military tents. This type of accommodation
does not include a kitchen or a bathroom, but they may be connected to
electricity. They are erected in settlements or distributed to families who may
erect them near their damaged home. In Turkey, most of the winterised tents
were constructed in settiement clusters, however some were distributed to
families who erected them on or near their property. Many of the families in
the settiements built a simple kitchen addition for home cooking (figure 17).
85
Semi-public prefabricated bathroom units were provided, and one bathroom
unit would serve several families.
r. rn
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Figure 17 Example of winterised tent additions
From the perspective ot recovery, the winterised tents in Turkey allowed the
families a moderately comfortable private space where they could resume
their daily activities. With the addition of a kitchen, the families could prepare
their own tood and no longer had to rely on aid organisations for meals. I
visited many families who were stiil living in the winterised tents during the
summer when I was there. Ventilation in the tents was not the best, sa
families spent much of their time outside under makeshift covered verandas
near the tent. The families who erected tents on or near their property, would
use their damaged home for living and cooking and would sleep in the tent,
where they felt it was secure from the potential danger of another earthquake.
In the reconstruction continuum, winterised tents can serve as what
Quarantelli (1995) refers ta as bath sheltering and housing. In Turkey,
winterised tents were erected ta serve only as temporary shelter befare the
temporary housing was built. If they have been stockpiled, they are relatively
quick to arrive and easy ta set up. Families can take part in erecting their
tent. If there s enough space around the tent ta build a simple kitchen and a
veranda, the winterised tent can serve as temporary housing. 0f course, the
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winterised tent will flot work as weII if it s to be a temporary housing solution
over the medium to long-term, like two to ten years. However, I observed that
these tents could suffice as temporary housing in a situation where the
permanent reconstruction takes place soon atter the disaster—within one to
two years. If permanent housing wiII be available quickly, the population can
stay in winterised tents, since it s less costly and resource-consuming than
temporary housing, yet they allow the families to shelter from the elements
and to have a private place to resume their daily activities.
User-built shelters
There are many examples of user-built shelters that serve as temporary
accommodation. Families erect user-built shelters using recycled materials or
materials distributed by NGO5 and aid organisations, such as wood, plastic
sheeting and corrugated metal sheets (figure 18). Usually there is no
infrastructure—electricity or running water—unless the tamily s able to
connect them somehow.
In Turkey, many families built shelters on their property or near their former
home (figure 19). The shelter serves mainly as a place for sleeping while
other household activities take place inside the damaged home. Families did
flot want to sleep in their damaged home because they feared another
Figure 18 User-built shelters in Turkey
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earthquake would corne at night and harm them when they were sleeping.
The first earthquake on August 1 7th occurred at night and many thousands of
people died because they were sleeping and therefore did flot feel the first
smaller tremors that occurred before the large one. Had the earthquake corne
during the day, many people would have feit the pre-shocks and they would
have left their home to a safet location. Because of this, families feit it was
safe to be in their home during waking hours, but preferred to sleep in the
self-built shelter, where they believed they were out of harm’s way.
User-built shelters are inexpensive from the perspective of provision because
governments, NGOs and aid organisations may only need to provide
materials. There is no cost or time associated with procurement, planning,
and construction. Farnilies must have land available near their former homes
to build the shelters. Because families are Iocated helter-skelter and are flot
organized in settlernents, t may be harder, however, to deliver other types of
aid, such as food and hygiene kits, medical and psychological support and
social programs.
Figure 19 User-built shelters (in foreground) near damaged apartment
buildings
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Like winterised tents, user-built shelters serve as temporary shefter and can
serve as temporary accommodation if the reconstruction process occurs soon
after the disaster. Leaving temporary shelter and accommodation up to
families allows organisations to dedicate more time and resources to
permanent reconstruction. But, if the reconstruction process lags, there is a
risk that the shelters may remain and develop into slums.
Mobile homes
The examples of mobile homes as temporary accommodation corne from
case studies of American disasters (Bolin 1982 and Bolin and Stanford 1991,
1990). The United States Federal Emergency Management Association
(FEMA) provides mobile homes or trailers as temporary housing if the
disaster is declared as a national emergency. Typically the families are
loaned the units for six months while they rebuild their permanent home,
however this may be extended if the situation warrants. After the ban period,
the units are reclaimed by FEMA, stored, and re-used for the next disaster.
The mobile home units include a kitchen, bathroom, common area and one to
three bedrooms. They are heated and have running water as long as they are
connected to an infrastructure system. In the case of the likelihood of high
winds, the units must be secured to the ground. If the recipients are
landowners, the mobile homes are placed on the familys property. If the
family does not have land, the units are placed on leased or government
owned land in settlement clusters or in existing trailer parks. FEMA provides
the unit, and it is the responsibility of the local government or family to secure
infrastructure for electricity and water.
From the perspective of recovery, the mobile homes allow a private place for
the family to resume their household responsibilities. If the unit is located on
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the family’s property, the family does flot suffer from any relocation
inconveniences, and they can oversee the reconstruction of their home.
On the reconstruction continuum, mobile homes serve the purpose of
temporary accommodation only. The mobile homes are quick to arrive and
install in the needed location. Depending on the locale ot the disaster in
relation to the storage location, the units can be made available within a
couple of weeks after the disaster. The provision of mobile homes does not
hinder the reconstruction process because they arrive as self-contained units;
they do not drain construction, management or planning resources in the
disaster-affected area. In the American example, there s little risk of mobile
homes becoming permanent, since FEMA has a strict policy of reclaiming the
units as soon as possible. FEMA’s strict reclamation policy pressures the
families ta find a permanent housing solution quickly. In past cases, it was
found that families wha had less money ta build their permanent home
inhabited the mobile units langer. If the family had ta rebuild their home
themselves or rely on km or friends ta help them, t generally took longer ta
rebuild than if the family was able ta hire cantractors ta rebuild their home.
Therefore, they would end up living in the temporary mobile home units
longer.
Public tacilities retrofitted as Iodging
In many disaster situations, public facilities, such as schools, cammunity
centres and hospitals are used as emergency and temporary shelter
immediately alter the disaster. Familles are given flaor space in a public
facility ta sleep and ta keep their belongings. Gavernments, NGOs and aid
organisations look after the management 0f the facilities as well as the
provision of food and ather aid. In some cases, familles with no other place ta
go will stay in the public tacility weU into the temporary accommodation
phase. That s, they will begin warking, gaing ta schaal and generally
90
resuming their daily activities while still residing in the public facility. Harada
(2000) documents the use of public facilities as lodging after the 1995
earthquake in Kobe, Japan.
Public facilities retrofitted as lodging can be effective as emergency or
temporary shelter; however, they have serious drawbacks as temporary
accommodation. Public facilities do not offer a great deal of privacy for the
families, even though as time passes, families will make adjustments to their
space, such as hanging curtains, to create more privacy (Harada, 2000).
Management often imposes curtews for the residents to maintain caim at
night. Since families do flot have a place to prepare meals, the management
organisation must provide meals for the residents. Meals are usually served
at specific times and people must be available to eat at those times. While
this may be tolerable behaviour for a short while during the temporary
sheltering stage, it can become a problem during the temporary
accommodation stage, since it does flot allow the families to regain control of
their daily lite. It has been tound that the longer people must rely on outside
aid, the more difficult it is for them to recover (Ellis and Barakat, 1996). Over
time, aftected families tend to become despondent if they do not have control
over basic things such as meals and the freedom to come and go as they
please. In extreme cases, such as after the 1999 tloods in Venezuela, this
can lead to violence and even to drug abuse (IFRC, 2001).
The benefit of using public facilities as temporary accommodation is that they
pressures governments, NGOs, aid organisations and tamilies to find a more
permanent housing solution quickly. The families will either pressure the
agencies to help them or they will take care ot the situation as best they can
themselves. It is, however, dangerous when people are left in public facilities
without prospects of finding other housing, or with no voice to influence those
agencies that can help them.
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Homes of family and friends
Littie formai documentation exists as to the use of famiiy or friends’ homes as
temporary accommodation. While we know that many families often stay with
other famiiy members or friends atter a disaster, t is difficuit to estimate how
many people do this and for how long. However, Bolin (1982), in a study on
long-term family recovery from disaster, finds that while people wilI otten stay
with friends or family for emergency and temporary sheltering, they prefer to
have their own dwelling during the temporary accommodation stage. He
interviewed people living in FEMA-provided mobile homes in the United
States and found that they were relieved to have the mobile home because it
meant that they didn’t have to impose on someone or depend on others for
their accommodation. While this may be true in the post-disaster situation in
America, this may not be true in other countries i.e. people may feel more
comfortable staying with family or friends than living in another type of
temporary accommodation. However, this is point is uncertain.
From the perspective of provision, staying with family or friends is certainly
inexpensive. It also allows governments, NGOs and aid organisations to
concentrate funds and resources toward reconstruction activities.
Rented apartments
If, after a disaster, there remains an undamaged stock of apartment housing
that is available, governments, NGOs and aid organisations may lease the
apartments and offer them to the families whose homes were damaged.
Usually tamilies will be given an allowance by these organisations to offset
the cost of the rentai while their damaged home is being rebuilt. This is an
ideal situation; families have a private place to reside while they recover and
it does not necessitate the construction of temporary accommodation.
Therefore, families and agencies can focus on reconstruction activities.
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CONCLUSIONS
Ta conclude, I wouid like to reiterate the important points covered in this
paper. These are: the ‘gap’ of time between relief and reconstruction; the raie
ot temporary housing in the post-disaster recovery process; the different
amounts of durabiiity 0f different types of temporary accommodation; the raie
of governments, NGOs and aid organisations in the process of temporary
accommodation; and the temporary accommodation types in Turkey.
After many disasters, there exists a ‘gap’ between the immediate reliet phase
and the iater reconstruction phase. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster,
relief aid is poured into the affected region ta help people cape with the crisis.
Later, post-disaster reconstruction programs help to rebuild the communities
and ultimately increase the level of development in the region. However, in
many cases, families affected by disaster do not receive proper support in the
interim between these twa phases; they eftectiveiy tau into the ‘gap’ between
relief and reconstruction. I iliustrate this point by using a quote f rom the Red
Cross World Disaster Report (1FRC, 2001),”There is a financial gap in
international aid. Relief tunds need to be spent within three months,
pressuring agencies to pursue short-term projects. Emergency aid has media
impact and quick, tangible resuits—therefore attracting funds rapidly. Later
on, longterm recovery projects bring measurable development and lucrative
contracts. But transitionai aid had less appeau, more complications and
therefore attracts less funding” (p.7).
Temporary accommodation is an integrai part of the recovery process. ut
gives families a safe and private place f rom which to resume their daily
activities and to sa quickly after the disaster. It is a place for families ta restart
their lives and uitimately benefit the recovery of their economic, physical and
emotional well being. If families do not have access ta adequate temporary
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accommodation—accommodation that allows them to resume their daily
activities—it may affect their recovery in the long-term and therefore the
recovery of the region as a whole.
There are at least nine different types ot temporary accommodation that are
commonly used alter disasters. Each type differs in physical form, in cost, in
ability to aid recovery, and in procurement, planning, and construction time.
Types of temporary accommodation will vary in their appropriateness
depending on the particular disaster’s characteristics.
Different types cf temporary accommodation have different levels cf
durability, i.e. some types wiil endure longer than others. It is ideal if the
durability of the temporary accommodation matches the amount cf time that it
is needed for. For example, if the temporary accommodation will only be
needed for two years because permanent housing will be available within that
two years, there is no need to build temporary housing that will endure five to
ten years. On other hand, if adequate numbers cf permanent housing wiil not
be completed until tive to ten years after the disaster, the temporary
accommodation must offer decent shelter until that time. Matching the
durability cf temporary accommodation te the amount of time it will be needed
helps to maximize the time and monetary resources cf governments, NGOs,
aid organisations, and the affected families.
Governments, NGOs and aid organisations have an organisational,
managerial and provisional role to play in ail types of temporary
accommodation. Some types cf temporary accommodation, like temporary
housing, winterised tents, mobile homes, and public facilities retrofitted as
lodging, are almost completely provided by governments, NGO5 or aid
organisations i.e. they are funded, planned and constructed by these
organisations for the affected population. However, the families may work
with the agencies in the design process or the construction cf the temporary
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accommodation. Other types of temporary accommodation, such as user-built
shelters or homes of family and friends are found or built by the families
themselves. Here, the familles take a more active role in securing their own
temporary accommodation. However, agencies can take a role in helping
families to build or find a place to stay. For user-built shelters, they can
provide families with construction materials and help them to learn safe
methods for construction.
The agencies in Turkey opted for a three-part housing strategy to house the
more than a quarter of a million people made homeless by the 1999
earthquake disaster. This strategy included temporary shelter in the form of
tents, temporary accommodation in the form of temporary houses and
winterised tents, and permanent reconstruction. During my field research in
Turkey, I found several types of temporary accommodation. Some, such as
prefabricated temporary houses, wood temporary houses, paper temporary
houses and winterised tents, were provided in settlements by the
government, NGOs and aid organisations for the affected population. Other
types of accommodation, such as self-built shelters, were constructed by the
familles next to or near their damaged home.
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Article Il: Strategic planning
Strategic planning for post-disaster temporary housing3
ABSTRACT
Temporary housing programmes suffer from excessively high cost, late
delivery, poor locations, improper unit designs and other inherent issues.
These issues can be attributed in part to a prevalence of ad-hoc tactical
planning for reconstruction undertaken by governments and NGOs in the
chaotic post-disaster environment. An analysis of the process and outcomes
from six case studies of temporary housing programs atter disasters in Turkey
and Colombia in 1999, Japan in 1995, Greece in 1986, Mexico in 1985, and
ltaly in 1976 yields information about common issues in temporary housing.
Based on an understanding of these common issues, this work proposes a
framework cf strategic planning for temporary housing that identifies
organizational designs and available resources for temporary housing before
the disaster, yet allows modifications to fit the specific post disaster situation.
INTRODUCTION
Many communities now have pre-disaster preparedness plans for the
emergency phase of post-disaster housing; however for the reconstruction
phase, even though organisations may have some pre-established recovery
plans, they tend toward ad-hoc tactical decision making in planning for
housing reconstruction. This is even truer for temporary housing where
decisions are made very quickly, within days after the disaster, and actions
Reprinted, with permission f rom the editor of Disasters, where the manuscript has been
accepted, October 2006, for publication in 2007.
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are initiated to house peopie in the interim before permanent reconstruction
can be completed. While it is not possible for organisations to account for ail
of the variables for a temporary housing programme before the disaster
occurs, strategic planning which identifies responsible organisations, links
between stakeholders and the resources available for temporary housing can
increase the likelihood of success of a programme, knowing that operative
decisions will have to be made quickly after the disaster.
Past research has tound that temporary housing programs suifer from
recurrent issues such as cultural or climatic inappropriateness, poor locations,
social problems within the camps, and delays due to procurement of shelters,
finding sites, and lack of organisational capacities (Bolin and Stanford, 1991;
UNDRO, 1982; Davis 1977). UNDRO (1982) states that accelerated
reconstruction of permanent housing is preferable to the use of temporary
housing. While this may be true, temporary housing programmes continue to
be instigated after every major disaster since affected families are in need of
a place to live and it can take many months, or even years, to build adequate
stocks of seismic resistant housing. Following this fact, this research
proceeds from the perspective that temporary housing appears to be a
necessary step in reconstruction, so we must determine how to improve its
application. Through empirical evidence from case studies of temporary
housing projects after earthquakes in Turkey, in Colombia, in Japan, in
Mexico, in ltaly and in Greece over the last 30 years, this research defines
the major issues in temporary housing, and proposes a model for strategic
planning of temporary housing.
As stated above, temporary housing occurs after major disasters the world
over and from this certain macro-patterns about planning for temporary
housing can be deduced, however these patterns must be understood in light
of the fact that housing in any country is a product of a country’s political
economy and the national context. While this study draws out similarities in
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the forms and functions of temporary housing across the cases presented,
there are 0f course strong differences in social and cultural customs across
countries, not to mention differences in: abilities to pay for housing, financing
systems, family composition, formai vs. informai means of housing
procurement, culture of building, participation in the housing process, among
other aspects. The purpose of this study is then to understand, in a general
sense, the macro-issues facing temporary housing, so that they can be
integrated into the planning process.
What is temporary housing?
During and after a disaster in which people’s homes are damaged or
destroyed, families must seek alternative housing until a permanent housing
solution can be found. Temporary housing can be considered both a stage in
the process of re-housing after a disaster, as well as a physical type of
housing stock used by families during the post-disaster period.
Quarantelli (1 995) offers a definition of the four distinct stages of housing that
may be employed after a disaster. In this definition, he makes the distinction
between sheltering and housing in the post-disaster scenario in which
sheltering denotes the activity of staying in a place during the height and
immediate aftermath of a disaster, where regular daily routines are
suspended, and housing denotes the return of normal daily activities such as
work, school, cooking at home, shopping, and the like. Based on this
distinction, the four stages are (1) emergency shelter— may take the form of a
public shelter, refuge at a friend’s house, or shelter under a plastic sheet, and
is generally employed for one night to a couple of days during the emergency;
since the stay s so short it does not usually imply the need for extensive
preparation of food or prolonged medical services (2) temporary shelter - may
be a tent or a public mass shelter used for a few weeks following the disaster,
and is also accompanied by the provision of food, water and medical
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treatment; (3) temporary housing is the return to the daily activities of home
life and the possible return to work and school, although familles will be living
in a temporary residence, hopefully awaiting some permanent solution
(temporary housing can take the form of a rented apartment, a prefabricated
home or a small shack, depending on the context); (4) permanent housing is
the return to the former home after its reconstruction or resettlement in a new
home where the family can plan to live on a permanent basis. Those whose
homes are affected by a disaster may or may not pass through aIl of these
stages, and many stages may be employed simultaneously for different
sectors of the affected population.
Temporary housing, no matter what form it takes, is the process by which
families can begin to recover and reintegrate a sense normalcy in their lives.
During the time a family stays in temporary housing, it s desired that family
members wiII also have the chance to plan for their future living
arrangements, i.e. permanent housing - whether this means rebuilding,
relocating, accessing government programmes or submitting insurance
daims. In this respect, a programme for temporary housing does not only
include a roof over one’s head, but it also must offer aspects that make it
possible to get back to real lite, such as housing in a location that has
reasonably convenient access to services and jobs or an affordable
transportation system, proximity to former dwelling if appropriate or desired,
maintenance of neighbourhood ties and support system, and guidance on
procedures and options for the permanent housing process.
Strategic planning for temporary housing
In temporary housing programmes it is unfortunately trequently the case that
ad-hoc tactical planning occurs atter the disaster rather than strategic
planning up-front before the disaster. Specifically, this means that
organisations are making decisions that respond to the immediate situation at
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hand—the need to get people housed as quickly as possible after the
disaster—and this may be at the expense of taking ptoper account of longer
term objectives such as the quaiity of life that temporary housing provides or
giving an appropriate level of priority to permanent reconstruction. For
temporary housing specifically, it is necessary to identify:
(1) Organisational strategy: Similar to any project in the building industry,
temporary housing is generally implemented by a temporary multi
organisation
—
a group of organisations with different mandates and
objectives that cornes together to complete the project or programme and
then dissipates once it is finished (Davidson, 1988). Various government
ministries, aid agencies, foreign and local NGOs, private contractors, private
manufacturers, landowners and community leaders may ail be involved in a
temporary housing project. The combination of the temporary multi
organisation, the chaotic (and sometimes corrupt) post-disaster situation, and
the prevalence of ad-hoc tactical planning, means that coordination between
organisations is almost inevitably less than optimal in temporary housing
projects.
(2) Resources for locating or building temporary housing: Having temporary
housing quickly available s of primary importance yet the successful
application of temporary housing must also satisfy other objectives such as
the families’ social needs, long term outcomes 0f the units and the sites, ail
viewed within the context 0f the overali reconstruction programme.
Since the actual need for temporary housing in the event of a disaster cannot
be determined beforehand, public resources needed for sheitering cannot be
locked into specific pre-planned programmes. Comerio (1998) also makes
this point, suggesting that it s necessary to have a variety 0f contingency
sheltering programmes in place, to be activated in stages, depending on the
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types of damage and the alternative housing available in the private market at
the time and place 0f the disaster
Figure 20 shows that — ideally — in a sequence of decision-making,
planning actions for post-disaster reconstruction begin before the
disaster. Though, as has frequently been the case, the wait for next
disaster’ paradigm will prevail, consequently delaying ail planning until
after the disaster. However, even if the decision is made to plan up
front without waiting for the disaster, the strategic plan requires
updating at the tactical level to adapt it to the specific needs caused by
the disaster (number of houses destroyed, weather conditions at that
moment, situations of the politics and economy). If no pre-disaster
strategic planning takes place then stopgap tactical planning will
inevitably happen after the disaster; however, in the chaos following
the disaster, decisions have to be made very quickly and often on the
basis of incomplete information.
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Figure 20 The decision-making sequence for strategic planning or tactical
planning for post-disaster reconstruction.
Research Objectives and Questions
The general objectives of this research are:
To explore the use of strategic planning in past temporary housing
Start
wait for next
disaster
will we make a strategic
plan in advance?
aspects
is the strategy
satisfactory?
keep strategy
on holU
disaster
was a strategic
plan made?
is the plan
satisfactory?
should the strategy
be adapted beca use of
the actual conditions?
procurement
accord ing to plan
projects
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• To examine, in a comparative overview, temporary housing projects in
order to draw out the main difficulties of the projects
• To define how difficulties may be overcome within a strategic planning
framework.
To complete these objectives, this research asks the following corresponding
questions:
1. How has strategic planning been implemented in past temporary housing
projects?
2. Based on an understanding of project organisation, process and
outcomes, what kinds of issues arise in temporary housing projects?
3. Based on the issues identified above, what needs to be addressed in a
strategic planning framework for temporary housing?
METHODS
General method
Using a qualitative approach, this research employs a holistic multiple case
study design based on the Case Study Method diagram put forth by Yin
(1994, p. 49). Empirical evidence from each of the case studies 0f temporary
housing programmes after disasters is individually analysed at the holistic
level of the programme. Cross-case conclusions are drawn from the
individual case reports. The cases provide both literai replications, i.e. they
identify similar patterns, and theoretical repiications, i.e. they identify
contrasting patterns but for predictable reasons. These findings are then used
to develop ideas for strategic planning of temporary housing.
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Case study selection
The selections cf the case studies are based on the following criteria:
• The cases are earthquake disasters. Temporary housing exists after many
types of disasters, including flocds and hurricanes; however one type cf
disaster was chosen for consistency, here, the consequences cf
earthquake disasters
• The disaster affected urbanised areas. Temporary housing may be
necessary in rural areas but the criteria may be different and therefore can
demand a different set cf issues and planning considerations
• The cases involved the construction of temporary housing units. Families
can be temporarily housed in existing apartments or units or with
extended families; however ail cf the cases chosen for this research
involved the construction cf temporary housing units
• The cases pro vide evidence permitting literai or theoreticai replications cf
patterns about strategic planning and varicus issues in temporary
housing.
Based on these criteria, six case studies of tempcrary housing have been
chosen for this paper. The primary case study, cf the 1999 Marmara
earthquakes in Turkey, is based on empiricai evidence collected by the
author between June 2000 and July 2004 during fieid visits to Turkey. The
information was collected during numercus interviews with parties ccncerned
with the tempcrary housing projects, these were: temporary housing
residents, citizens, local officiaIs, researchers and Ministry cf Public Wcrks
staff and also from pubiished reports. Data for the other case studies—
Armenia, Colombia in 1999; Kobe, Japan in 1995; Kalamata City, Greece in
1986; Mexico City, Mexico in 1985; and in Friuli, ltaly in 1976—have been
gathered from accounts of temporary housing programmes previously
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published by other authors, and have been purposefully re-analysed in light cf
the research questions posed in this paper.
Case study treatment
The cases are clearly much more complex that what is presented in these
short case studies, especially in terms of the social, political and economic
conditions in which the various temporary housing programme are situated,
however an effort has been made to bring eut the essential elements of the
temporary housing programme and present the data in a unified form for
comparative purposes. The references provided in the text effet can effet the
reader more contextual information. Each case report describes:
• The disaster and its context (summarized in Table I)
• The temporary housing programme and the overall reconstruction
including the organisations involved and the project process (summarized
in Table II)
• The outcomes cf the temporary housing projects.
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CASE RESULTS
Table I Synopsis of the earthquake, damages and the homeless situation for
each case study
Officiai government count was 76 000 housing units damaged, an investigative report by the
Tokyo Metropolitan Government estimated 100 000 (Aritake et al. 1986) and Newspaper
accounts from Mexico City News estimated 180 000 (taken from Comerio, 1998).
NGOs and charitable organisations contradicted officiai estimates (Mexico City News 19-23
September 1986, taken from Comerio, 1998).
6 From state statistics for year 2000 (www.die.gov.tr).
Date
ÉikekColombia Ji
l7Aug. &
12 Nov.
1999
25 Jan.
1999
l7Jan.
1995
13 Sept.;
15 Sept.
1986
17 Sept.
1985
06 May
1976; 15
Sept. 1976
Magnitude 7.4; 7.2 6.0 7.2 6.2, 5.4 8.1 6.4; 6.1
76 000 —HousingUnits 93618 6000 247000 2870Uninhabitable 180 000m 32000
30 000 -Homeless 300 000 ÷ n/a 316 000 n/a 2OO,OOO 70,000
3 million in
Total population district; 242.3 million 3 million in 3.5 million 42 000 in 500 000 in
ofaffected in region6 region in region city million in regiondistrict/city/region Mexico
City
Proportion of 1% - 6.6%13% n/a 9% nIa 14%homeless in district
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Varied fromTime for
settiement
construction 8 months 7 months 11 months n/a 8 monthsto
activities
settlement —
Woodl Prefab/
Type Mostly corrugated Prefab Prefab corrugated I Prefabprefab ton iron
Size 30m2 24m2 20-30m2 -25m2 20m2 ‘30m2
Average 4.6 4.6 2.8 3 10 niafamily size
Cost (US$) 5 000 nia 28 000 n/a n/a 5 000
National Regional
Lead Ministry of National Regional Reconstruc- and localPublic University (pretecture) Municipality tion
administra-organisation Works 0f Bogotâ government Commis
tion
sion
Number of
units built
Table II Synopsis cf the temporary housing project for each case study
40 621 6 000 48 300 2 870 22 000 21 000
Strategic For For
planning procure- None procure- None None None
ment ment
Turkey, 1999 earthquakes in the Marmara and Bolu regions
The disaster and its context
In the latter haif cf 1999, two large earthquakes stuck the eastern Marmara
and Bolu regions of Turkey, to the east cf Istanbul, killing over 18,000 people
and leaving over 300,000 people homeless. Especially in the first earthquake,
the affected areas were heavily populated and fast-growing industrial towns.
The widespread destruction and high death tolls were largely a result of
shoddy building construction in the 15 years previous to the earthquake,
when a lack cf supervision and accountability Iead te the use cf improper
materials and construction techniques for f ive- to eight-storey reinforced
concrete apartment buildings.
This is the average family size in the houses affected by the earthquake, flot the country
average.
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Temporary housing and overall reconstruction
b house the vast numbers of peopie made homeiess by the earthquakes,
the Government of Turkey responded with a three-step reconstruction
strategy: tents oftered by the miiitary and Kizilay (the Red Crescent),
prefabricated temporary housing built by the Government and NGOs, and
permanent housing bulit by the Government and through World Bank credits.
For the temporary housing phase, affected familles were either given rentai
subsidies by the government or the free use of a pretabricated temporary
housing unit. in totai 40 621 prefabricated temporary housing units were buiit
between Dec 1999 and June 2000 throughout the affected region by
government and NGOs in 136 settiements, with a 97.5% rate of occupancy
(Auditor Chief of the Turkish Repubiic, 2003). The overall programme was
managed by the Ministry of Public Works and Settiements (MPWS), a body
with a iong history of providing temporary housing after disasters in Turkey.
international NGO5 invoived in building temporary housing cooperated with
iocai NGO5 and municipaiities to undertake projects in the region with local
support. Various governmentai bodies, and in a few cases private owners,
otfered up avaiiabie iand for the temporary settiements; the relevant
government directorates installed infrastructure: transport, electricity and
water.
The choice to buiid temporary housing was, in part, based on the fact that
local manufacturers’ capacity was sufficient to suppiy the totai number of
units within a few months. The MPWS set the price at US$3,300 for a 30m2
prefabricated dupiex unit, totalling around US$5000 per unit inciusive of
infrastructure costs (Auditor Chief of the Turkish Repubiic, 2003). The
temporary housing units were purchased through a tender process from
private prefabricated buiiding manutacturers that aiready existed within
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Turkey. NGOs also bought units from Turkish manutacturers, although in
some cases they imported units from their home countries.
Choosing the locations for the temporary housing took longer than expected
and slowed down the construction. Since no areas had been pre-identified, it
took time to find adequate spaces; for those spaces not owned by the
government, contracts had to be negotiated with private landowners.
Outcomes of the project
While some temporary housing settlements were on small parcels of land
inside the cities, the majority were in large settlements of up to 2000 units on
the outskirts and resembied suburban style developments complete with
access roads, bus, garbage and postal services, markets, schools, clinics,
and daycare centres—in other words, ail the necessary services for a
tunctioning community.
Those who were homeowners previous to the earthquakes were re-housed in
permanent reconstructed dwellings about three years later and therefore left
the temporary houses in 2002. However, renters and new migrants remained
in the temporary units, only to be eventually forced out between 2003-2005
by the government cutting off ail services and dismantiing the settlements.
Many of the sites still remain polluted with residual infrastructure and
fou ndations.
Colombia, 1999 earthquake in Armenia coffee growing region
The disaster and its context
An earthquake on January 25th1, 1 999 in the east region of central Colombia
left more than 800 people dead and over 6000 houses damaged or destroyed
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in the cities of Armenia and Pereira and the surrounding rural areas of the
coffee growing industry.
Temporary housing and overail reconstruction
As found by Gonzalo Lizarralde during field research in Colombia in 2002 and
reported in Johnson, Lizarralde and Davidson (in press), shortly after the
disaster, the government appointed a new body, FOREC (Fondo para la
reconstruccion fisica y social del eje cafetero) mandated with managing
reconstruction resources and outsourcing projects. FOREC selected 32
NGOs to develop different reconstruction projects throughout the region.
lnitially, temporary housing was not included as one of FOREC’s projects,
nevertheless there was an intense proliferation 0f illegal spontaneous
settlements after the disaster, as families coped with the need for temporary
housing through self-help.
It was not until one year after the disaster that FOREC engaged National
University of Bogotà (NUB) and the Centre for Disaster Prevention to manage
the temporary housing phase. The NUB was charged with the task of
organising and consolidating the illegally-built spontaneous temporary
housing and with building new temporary housing units on vacant lots within
Armenia. For both the spontaneous and new settlements, the NUE spent
time and resources to negotiate contracts for renting the land, either with
private iandowners or in the case of publicly held land, with the government. lt
was decided that ail parcels of land (some of which were community
playgrounds) would have to be returned 3 years later to the original owner,
unoccupied and cleared of ail debris.
In total there were 6 000 temporary housing units managed by the NUE in
107 in spontaneous and planned settlements ranging from 15 to 150 units.
Most 0f the planned units were very basic structures, 24m2 each, made 0f
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wood with a mono-pitch corrugated iron roof, a door, one small window and
electricity. Most of the buildings contained four units and a lack cf cross-
ventilation coupled with the corrugated iron roofs made them very hot inside.
Communal kitchens and washrooms were located outside the units and
serviced several families. The beneliciaries provided free labour for the
construction (and deconstruction) 0f the units and infrastructure (roads,
drainage, septic tanks, electricity) although private contractors and sub
contactors oversaw their work.
Outcomes of the project
As part of the temporary housing programme, NUB worked with the families
to make certain that they had plans for permanent housing and helped them
to apply for government bans and subsidies. Despite NUB’s efforts to ensure
that families had permanent housing by the end of the temporary housing
programme and could therefore vacate the temporary housing after the three
years, and despite the very rudimentary conditions in the units, 21 of the
temporary housing settlements remained occupied over the long-term. These
settiements quickly became crime-ridden communities operating outside the
law and occupied by new migrants and those that could flot qualify for
permanent housing.
Japan, 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake in Kobe
The dîsaster and its context
On Jan 17th, 1995 a large earthquake affected Kobe City, a port city located
in the Hyogo prefecture, causing levels cf damage then unprecedented in a
modem city. Although there was extensive port and infrastructure damage,
housing represented over 95% 0f the total building damage and 50% of the
total value cf the damage. It was estimated that 400 000 housing units in 1 92
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000 residentiai buildings were damaged. Some modem concrete housing
suffered damage, but most 0f the housing damage was concentrated in the
densely popuiated city centre wards where vuinerable older wooden homes
were buiit with heavy tue roofs made for storm protection, and using post and
beam structures and mud waiis with littie laterai bracing. The demographic
composition of the aftected areas was the more vuinerable sector cf society:
elderly, students, working class and the poor (Comerio 1 998).
Temporary housing and overali reconstruction
For the months following the earthquake, the displaced lived in schools, parks
and public buildings that were serviced for temporary sheiter (Comerio,
1998).
Temporary housing was provided according to Japan’s Disaster Relief Law.
Building and supplying temporary housing was assigned to the governor of
the prefecture and financed by the national government. The governor was
able to apply existing strategies for the organizational process of temporary
housing, designs of units, projected costs, supply chain, and profile of
beneficiaries (Tomioka, 1997). Flexibiiity in this strategy ailowed for changes
in numbers, supply and organization to fit the specifically the Kobe situation.
In total, 48 300 temporary housing units were buiit by the prefecture, housing
100 000 people. Whiie it was originaiiy planned to build ail the settlements in
two months, t actually took seven months before ail the settlements were
finished and the temporary shelters could be closed. The need for such a
huge amount of prefabricated building materials was a challenge to the
Japanese market so some units were imported from international sources
and some were built using non-prefabricated products (Maki et al., 1995). The
houses were between 20-30m2 and of two types: 1-room plus kitchen units
and 2 room plus kitchen units. For elderly persons needing care, settlements
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were designed using a communal arrangement. The cost for a 29m2 unit was
US$28 5278. While it was originally planned to vary the size of the units to
offer larger dwellings for larger families, to economize on time t was decided
that only two types would be offered (Tomioka, 1997).
Finding locations for the temporary housing was particularly challenging.
Where possible, the temporary housing was set up in parks and schoolyards
within the city but 69% of the houses were located in the suburbs and on
Awajishima island, sometimes two hours away trom the city centre by bus or
train. This meant that many people were relocated to other cities on the
outskirts, which were far f rom medical and shopping facilities; Comerio (1998)
describes them as resembling refugee detention centers.
Priority placement in temporary housing went to the elderly, disabled and to
single parents; these groups accounted for 70% of the total population in the
settlements. In many instances these people had to separate f rom extended
family and services in order to receive the housing; later, cases of depression
and suicide among the temporary housing population were attributed to
loneliness following from the separation (Maki et aI, 1995).
Outcomes of the project
In Japan, by regulations, temporary housing is usually occupied for two years
after a disaster, however in this case the temporary housing programme was
extended to three years to meet the increased demand (Tomioka, 1997).
Even three years after the earthquake, 45% of the houses were stiil occupied
by affected people because of deficiencies in the supply of affordable
permanent housing (Hirayama, 2000).
B The cost was quoted by Tomioka (1997) as 2,867,000 yen, which in 1995 equalled US$28
527 (1USD = 100.5 Japanese yen).
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The temporary housing programme in Japan was btamed for subsequent
social and economic polarization (Hirayama, 2000). To qualify for temporary
housing a family had to be living in the shelters and similarly, to be
considered for government permanent housing, a family would have to be
living in temporary housing; otherwise they were excluded from public
programmes. The reconstruction of permanent housing followed a dualist
model where needy victims were placed ail together and weli-off families
were encouraged to obtain their own houses on the market.
Greece, 1986 earthquake in Kalamata Cïty
The disaster and its context
Kalamata City, population 41 911, is a small manufacturing and port city that
sustained heavy damage or collapse to 44% of its buildings after two
earthquakes on September 13th and 15th 1986 measuring 6.2 and 5.4
magnitude respectively.
Temporary housing and overail reconstruction
As reported by Miranda Dandoulaki (1992) in Disasters and the SmaII
Dwelling, due to the numbers of homeless and the threat of aftershocks, tents
were distributed to aIl of the population and t was decided by the City Cou ncil
a few weeks later to build temporary housing units to house people over the
coming winter. To meet the demand cf those people whose homes where
unsafe or uninhabitable 2,870 housing units were needed.
While t was expected that the temporary housing would be completed in four
months it actually took six months because cf inadequacies cf the pre
existing legislation for emergency situations, which hindered coordination and
delayed the identification cf suitable land for the housing. The Greek Ministry
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of Publlc Works completed the plans for the layout of sites and site
preparation was completed through a collaborative effort by the Ministry of
Public Works, the municipality and by private contractors. Time pressure and
lack of experience of the parties involved meant that many mistakes were
made, especially with regard to the drainage systems, which had to be
repaired once the sites were inhabited. Since Greek suppliers were unable to
meet the demand for prefabricated units contracts went out to international
suppliers who both supplied and constructed the units on-site; the
municipality was responsible for distribution 0f the units to the families as weIl
as managing the sites.
Once the units were distributed to families by the municipality, there were
many complaints about the lack of services and facilities in the settiements,
such as telephone and postal services, garbage collection, schools, nurseries
and community centres. Families had difficulties accessing the city or the
shops f rom the sites since many were badly located or outside of town.
Leaking units, faulty electrical systems and bad foundations were common
complaints among the residents and the municipality had to make significant
investments to upgrade the units and provide amenities in the settiements.
Outcomes of the project
During the second anniversary of the earthquakes, the Mayor of Kalamata
stated, “the existence of prefabricated units is the most severe political and
social problem of the city”. A deadline for the end of 1989 was set for the
occupants to abandon the units. Even though permanent housing had
already been constructed by then and families had moyeU into them, the
temporary housing was still being used by renters unable to afford post
earthquake rent increases in the permanent housing market, or as storage or
second homes by permanent housing dwellers. Some incentives were given
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by the municipality to entice people to leave the prefabricated units but this
process proved to be Iengthy, arduous and politically unpopular.
In addition to these social and political problems, there proved to be technical
problems with dismantiing the units. it was originally thought that the units
could be stored for future use, however, most cf the units needed repair, and
the difficulty and expense of finding spare parts for the imported designs, not
to mention the size of storage space required, made this unrealistic.
Mexïco, 1985 earthquake in Mexico City
The disaster and its context
On September 19th 1985, an extremely powerful earthquake caused severe
damage to modem constructions and sium dwellings in the historic centre of
Mexico City. Housing damage was mostly concentrated in a few high-rise
public housing developments built as part of a govemnment Iow-cost housing
programme in the 1960’s and in many dilapidated Iow-rise tenement
apartment buildings called viviendas. Working and middle class families had
occupied the viviendas for 20-30 years paying very Iow-rents for over
crowded units (average of 23m2 and 10 people) but well Iocated and
affordable (Comerio, 1998).
Temporary housing and overali reconstruction
Soon after the earthquake, a new body, the National Reconstruction
Commission (NRC), was formed and given a two-year mandate to complete
ail reconstruction works. This new body had considerable political power and
a large funding base from the World Bank. Dynes, Quarentelli and Wenger
(1990) hypothesized that the NRC was formed to avoid a potentially explosive
political situation if assistance was not given to the homeless. While the NRC
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oversaw four different reconstruction programmes which built or repaired 88
000 permanent housing units, a temporary housing programme was aiso
included. Nonetheless, countiess families were ieft eut of the formai
programmes and forced to reiy on community groups and self-help for
housing recovery.
The temporary housing programme consisted cf rentai assistance for 20 000
families as weii as the construction of 400 provisionai camps cf prefabricated
units, housing 22 000 families. The prefabricated units were very basic 20m2
boxes made cf corrugated iron sheets; kitchens and bathrooms were shared
by groups cf 20 families (Comerio 1998).
The interesting element in this case is that the units were ail iocated in the
affected communities next to the damaged buildings on smaii open spaces
and aiong rights cf way. This meant that families could maintain their social
ties and remain close te work; it aise helped them to have a voice in the
permanent reconstruction programme.
Outcomes of the project
As mentioned, the NRC managed both the temporary housing and the
permanent housing, which meant that these two programmes were cicseiy
integrated. Temporary housing was seen cniy as a means to house peopie
whiie reconstructing permanent housing, and famiiies knew from the outset
about their future pians for permanent housing (Bolton, 1997). So as flot to
detract from permanent reconstruction, the temporary dweilings were
rudimentary (very smaii, crowded, with oniy shared kitchens and bathrooms),
cheap, and were only intended for use over a very short period.
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Italy, 1976 earthquake in Friuli
The disaster and its context
In the province of Friuli, Itaiy, two major earthquakes in 1976 caused
extensive damage to a very large area, 4800 km2 of mountain and hill towns
cf the Friulian people. The earthquakes reduced to rubble many settlements
rich in cultural heritage that had been occupied for centuries.
Temporary housing and o verall reconstruction
Atter the f irst earthquake, which occurred on May 6th 1 976, Friulians adopted
the motto, “dalle tende aile case” meaning “straight from the tents into new
houses.” They wanted to skip the temporary housing phase and go straight
into reconstruction right away. However, after the second devastating
earthquake struck in September 1976 there were 70,000 people homeless
and they decided that a mass evacuation over the winter would be necessary
as well as temporary prefabricated housing to return to in the spring (Geipel
1982).
In total, 25,000 people evacuated during that tirst winter to tourist hotels and
apartments in the coastal towns along the Adriatic Sea. Since the tourist
industry was a major source cf income for the region, the hotels and
apartments had to be vacated before the beginning of the next tourist season
in mid-April 1977, this pushed the timeline for the construction of temporary
housing.
On April 3Oth, 1977, the programme was officially terminated; the prefabs had
ail been constructed within an 8-month period following the second
earthquake. In total 21,000 prefabricated units were built: 49% by the Italian
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Emergency Commissioner, 45% by the regional administration and 6% by
foreign governments and private relief organisations. Ail of the settiements
were provided with water, sewage and electricity and wherever possible
these were hooked up to existing infrastructure. There were 36 diverse
designs of prefabricated housing provided by as many manufacturers, ail of
which offered ditterent levels of comfort. The variations in quality caused
some resentment among the beneficiaries, as some familles received much
higher quaiity housing than others; the beneficiaries even refused some
houses because they were not suitable for the climatic conditions (Geipel,
1982). On average 12m2 of housing per person were provided and the total
cost of construction worked out to US $1750 per person (1978 dollars)
(Geipel, 1991).
The location of the settlements varied depending on the situation in the
particular commune and local representatives were responsible for
designating land. In most cases, “Baracopolis” settlements (as they were
locally named) were iocated just outside of the built up area in long rows of
houses. Some communes managed to push for the prefabs to be located
inside the communes or next to the damaged houses (Geipel, 1982).
It was found that the solution of grouping the prefabricated housing offered
the opportunity for the community to re-establish a certain level of cohesion
and for community invoivement in the town planning process for
reconstruction. One commune set up the prefabs around courtyard groupings
that corresponded to the pre-earthquake residential celis in the old towns and
representatives trom each of the courtyards were involved in town planning
for the reconstruction programme for the commune (Geipel 1982).
Outcomes of the project
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Just like in the Turkish and Greek cases, the temporary housing in Friuli, ltaly
was inhabited for much longer than was intended. Permanent private
reconstruction began about 1 .5 years after the disaster and lasted through to
1982, when almost ail of the families had repaired or rebuilt their houses thus
giving up the right to the temporary units. However, in June 1986, ten years
after the earthquakes, there were still 8 206 families or 13.3% of the area’s
total population living in temporary housing. Only 35% of the families living in
temporary housing had a legal title to be living there because they stili Iacked
a reconstructed or repaired final place to live, the remaining 65% were
effectively squatting (Geipel, 1991). The duration of use was flot only related
to the timeline for reconstruction but also to the tact that squatters, young
tamilies and elderly people used the temporary housing as more or less
permanent residences.
Socially, the temporary housing provided opportunities to many families over
the long-term, however it became a burden on the goverfiment and
communities that hosted these settiements. Geipel’s (1991) account of the
long-term consequences of the disaster states, “Care was flot taken to make
sure that once ready-built homes were provided, the occupancy ot prefabs
would be terminated. More efficient supervision or other suitable measures
should have been enacted in order to make leaving the huts more attractive”
(p 40-41).
FINDINGS
Any temporary housing programme or project s a reflection on the housing
needs at a particular point in time, given the availability of money, supplies
and manpower. The decisions of why and how to provide temporary housing,
as well as its overali etfect on recovery, reflect the particular social, economic
and political situation of the country in question. Nevertheless, a synthesis ot
the findings from the case studies offers the ability to draw some conclusions
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about issues with temporary housing projects and about strategic planning for
temporary housing. These conclusions are presented below as direct
answers to the research questions posed earlier.
Question 1: How has strategic planning been implemented in past
temporary housing projects?
Up-front strategic planning did occur both in Turkey and Japan, however not
in the other cases. The use of up-front strategic planning in Turkey and
Japan meant that the temporary houses were built relatively quickly and were
therefore successful in terms of timing, nonetheless, the projects stili suffered
from other issues.
In Turkey, the temporary housing programme drew heavily on pre-existing
organisational structures, policies and laws for post-disaster reconstruction.
Within the Ministry of Public Works and Settlements (MPWS) there is a
General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA), which s a division with
experience in post-disaster reconstruction including procurement and
production of temporary housing after previous disasters in Turkey.
The Japanese governrnent had done more systematic strategic planning than
in Turkey offering precise definitions of organisational design and numbers
even before the disaster. For example it was planned that the governor of the
prefecture would be in charge, financing would corne from the national
government, up to 30% of people who lost their homes could qualify, the size
of unit would be 26.4 m2 and the length of stay would be 2 years. Due to the
magnitude of the damage and the profile of the affected families, some of
these decisions had to be revisited after the disaster.
In Greece there was no strategic planning before the earthquakes and
therefore the temporary housing project was a resuit of post-earthquake
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tactical planning which tried to respond to the situation at hand. Existing
organisations with littie experience in emergencies, i.e. the Municipality of
Kalamata, the Ministry ot Public Works and private contractors were brought
together after the disaster to work as a temporary multi-organisation. While
these organisations were well positioned in the environment in terms of power
and resources, they had had littie collaborative experience, especially
working under such stressful conditions. The problems in this project arose
out of the need to make decisions quickly after the disaster; however few
plans or expertise were available to falI back on which delayed the projects
significantly.
In Italy, as Alexander (1986) points out, the policy for disaster planning relied
on extraordinary measures after a disaster rather than up-front preparedness
planning. The lack of strategic planning meant that appropriate building
specifications and preset procurement methods had not been determined.
Many ot the prefabs coming trom international suppliers did not meet the
necessary standards for the cold climate in the mountainous Friuli region.
For example, the Emergency Commissioner purchased 37,000 m2 of
prefabricated housing from a Canadian company, Atco, which were not well
suited to the environment and subsequently required more investment to
instail new roofs and heating equipment. Also, since procurement methods
had flot been identified, representatives from prefab companies tried to exert
influence over commune governments to buy their product. Geipel (1982)
writes, “it must be taken into account that the hasty assignment of major
responsibilities in more or less chaotic conditions, subjects the integrity of
decision-makers to a severe test of sturdiness. Prosecutions in the summer of
1977 showed that flot aIl of them could resist the temptations ot corruption.”
(p.1 19).
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Research Question 2: Derived from an understanding of project
organisation, process and outcomes, what kinds of issues arise in
temporary housing projects?
Based on the findings from the case studies, it is possible to identify a few
common issues in temporary housing projects. These issues are described
as general objectives for planning temporary housing and are listed under the
following headings: (1) Timing, (2) Cost, (3) Overall reconstruction, (4) Unit
Design, (5) Location, (6) Services, (7) Social networks, (8) Institutional
support, (9) Long-term uses and outcomes.
7. Timing - having temporary housing available quickly
Ihe most important aspect of any temporary housing programme is that it be
available for the affected families as soon as possible so that they can return
to their daily activities and begin the recovery process. Often a greater
expenditure is needed, i.e. procuring housing units internationally, or trade
offs have to be made regarding choices of locations to ensure that the
temporary housing is available in a timely fashion.
Ihe case studies show that irrespective of the total number of units built in
each project, t took between six and eleven months to complete the projects.
lnterestingly enough, neither the timely supply cf building materials nor the
construction of units or infrastructure was found to be problematic in any of
the cases.
Finding suitable locations proved to be the main hindrance in the rapid
provision of temporary housing. In every single case, the identification of a
suitable location and securing leases for these locations (either with
government or private landowners) slowed down the t0VÎSOfl of temporary
housing.
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2. Cost - relative to country standards and cost of permanent housing
The cost ot temporary housing is an important issue because 1) the cost
varies greatly from country to country and 2) temporary housing is expensive
in relation to its lifespan. However, the reuse, sale or recycling ot units fit
economically, technically or politically possible) may reduce overall lite-cycle
costs.
If we compare temporary housing units with similar specifications in Turkey
and in Japan, we see that in Japan each unit costs US$28 000 each while in
Turkey, US$5 000. This underlines the problem of importing temporary
housing units f rom industrialised countries to developing countries. While it is
fine for Japan to acquire units anywhere on the market, for countries with
weaker economies the costs of importing units from industrialised countries is
too high; however sometimes these units will be given as donations.
Generally temporary housing is exceedingly expensive both in relation to its
lifespan (probably a few years) and in relation to the cost of a permanent
house. For example, in Friuli, Italy, the construction and demolition of the
temporary housing worked out to US$560 per 1m2 of housing, which as
reported by Geipel (1991) is only slightly less than the Italy’s average cost per
m2 for permanent living space.
Costs for temporary housing can also be recouped though the sale of units,
reuse of units or by recycling the materials (see below, 9. Long-term uses and
outcomes)
3. The overali reconstruction strategy — consideration of ail stages of
reconstruction
124
Temporary housing is usually only one phase cf the overail reconstruction
programme, which wili probably aise inciude tents or mass shelters and
permanent housing. Any reconstruction programme has a iimited amount of
financiai, human and machinery resources and if temporary housing
consumes disproportionate amounts cf resources, it may negatively affect the
abiiity te carry out other parts cf the reconstruction programme.
Maki et ai (1995) contest that in Japan proportionaily large investments made
in temporary housing were at the expense cf government investments in
permanent housing. It was expected that market forces would soive the
permanent housing supply, se whiie a public housing scheme was planned
shortly after the earthquake, the government made no solid financial
commitment toward it even though they were spending millions on temporary
housing. A few years later, the poor people from the inner city who could net
afford market rates for permanent housing were accommodated in permanent
public housing, but only in inconvenient locations on the outskirts cf the city.
Likewise, in Turkey, heavy investments were made in temporary housing
(estimated at US$225 million) and many were fearful that this would
negatively impact the reconstruction cf permanent housing (resuits et social
survey by Dr. Ayfer Bartu and reported in Annex 13 cf World Bank, 1999). An
extensive permanent housing programme did exist for which construction
began one-year after the earthquakes (a few menths after ail the temporary
housing was completed). However the government had to seek tunding
through bans f rom the World Bank and other international lenders to finance
the permanent housing projects.
These cases in Japan and in Turkey can be contrasted te the reconstruction
programmes in Mexico and in Cobombia that offered very basic and
inexpensive temporary housing and placed most cf the resources on
permanent housing. Figure 21 shows that in Mexico and in Colombia clearly
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the major objective was ta salve the problem of permanent housing,
demonstrated by how these programmes got underway immediately after the
disaster. Temporary housing was only proposed as a stopgap ta shelter
families while works for permanent reconstruction were in progress.
month year
1 23456789101112 2 3
Turkey
Colombia
Japan
Greece
Mexico
Italy
activities for temporary housing
•
activities for permanent housing
lactivities for both temporary and permanent housing
Figure 21 Timeline for temporary and permanent housing activities, for each
case study shows how in Colombia and Mexico activities for permanent
housing began right away after the disaster.
4. Unit Design - adequate level of comfort for the local conditions
A temporary house is meant ta provide safety from the elements and tire and
provide at least a minimum 0f sanitary conditions, but the level of comtort it
provides must match local living standards. The exact meaning 0f the term
“adequate” must be defined locally since what is deemed an adequate
temporary house depends on climate and local living conditions af the
affected population. In some disaster areas, a basic wooden structure with
shared kitchen facilities and an outdoor bathroom s tolerable whereas in
another disaster situation temporary housing would flot be adequate without
insulation, hot running water and closed bedraoms.
In Colombia and Mexico infrastructure and unit construction costs were
comparatively less than the other cases since they used basic materials
126
(corrugated iron and wood), and communal kitchens and bathrooms.
Meanwhile in Japan, Turkey, Greece and ltaly the temporary houses were
comparatively high-quality manufactured units with in-unit kitchens and
bath room s.
While it is flot within the scope of this research to judge whether the basic
dwellings in Colombia and Mexico were adequate compared to local living
standards or, on the other hand, that it was necessary to provide such
comparative luxury in the other cases (criticisms about the unit designs
appear in every case), the point must be made that the quality of the
temporary units has to be linked to local living standards.
5. Location - provides convenient access to jobs and social networks
As suggested above (see, 1 .Timing), finding suitable locations for temporary
housing is problematic. While it is preferable to have temporary housing
located in or very near the disaster-affected areas, the case studies show that
it proves difficult to find enough vacant government land. Agreements can
also be made with private landowners, but this otten takes time. For the
agencies involved it is often quicker and less complicated to build temporary
housing in periphery areas. However, this means that agencies need to
provide extra services, and for families, the locations are flot convenient for
work or income-generating activities and cause social isolation. A frequent
and inexpensive bus service is necessary if a periphery location for temporary
housing is chosen.
In Mexico and in some of the projects in ltaly, the communities were able to
take a larger role in the reconstruction activities because the temporary
housing was located in or near the affected areas where rebuilding was
taking place (Comerio, 1998; Geipel, 1982).
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6. Services - is accessible to, or provides, the necessary services and
amenities
The provision ot extra services (schools, medical clinics, public transit, shops,
cafés, religious buildings, post office, etc.) for those living in temporary
housing wilI be necessary if the housing is located at a distance from existing
city services, If temporary housing is in the city, families can use existing
services, assuming that they were not too badly damaged in the disaster.
In Turkey and in Japan, the vast majority of the temporary housing was
Iocated outside the cities, making it necessary to also provide services. For
example in Turkey, the settiements resembled new suburbs, complete with
mosques, community centres, shops and coffee shops — which added to the
overall cost of the project.
7. Social Networks - the occupants can maintain pre-disaster social ties
or can develop new agreeable ones
Another reason for having temporary housing in or very close to the disaster
affected areas is that families can benefit from the supportive atmosphere of
their social ties, which is an important factor in recovery. As was exemplified
in the Japanese case, if families must move out of the area for temporary
housing it s preferable that they have some choice about the community they
move to, and especially for the elderly, it may be necessary to have social
spaces and provide organized activities to meet others.
8. Institutional support - helping familles secure permanent housing
Bolin (1982) in an American study found that families which lack a clear and
feasible plan for getting back into permanent housing will have a harder time
recovering psychologically from the disaster. In the Colombian case the NUB
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heiped families secure permanent housing by navigating them through
government ban programmes or organizing them into community groups ta
secure permanent housing. in Mexico, it was found that families were more
toierant cf living in the basic temporary housing because they knew about
their options for permanent housing (Bolton, 1997).
9. Long-term uses/outcomes of units — consideration of what wiII
happen to temporary houses
There are twa points ta make regarding the issues with temporary housing in
the long term. First cf ail, temporary housing is aiways inhabited for longer
than anticipated; secondly, the units or materials trom the units, once
vacated, can be reused for another purpose. These points are examined
bebow.
in ail cf the cases presented here, the temporary housing was inhabited for
longer than anticipated because of the iack of affordable housing availabie in
the earthquake-affected areas. Even once permanent housing is
reconstructed, temporary housing remains in use because of one or a
combination cf the folbowing reasons:
(a) Permanent housing is not avaibable for ail sectars cf society; renters
cannat afford the increase in market rents after the disaster and do not
qualify for permanent-housing subsidies usuaiiy aimed at
hcmeowners. Therefore they try ta rernain in ternporary housing.
(b) New migrants corne ta the area and take up residence in the
tempcrary housing because cf the relative affordabiiity cf this housing
(sometimes free).
(c) The avaiiability of temparary housing aiicws the mcdernization cf
famiiy life. Young families or eideriy people reside in the temporary
housing, giving them the opportunity ta ive apart fram the rest af the
family.
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These realities point to the tact that the long-term use ot temporary housing
offers many positive opportunities for the community, especially when
affordable housing is in short supply. However, it was found that in Colombia,
for example, that there were negative social consequences cf this, as the
remaining temporary housing settiements were laden with crime. In Greece,
Turkey and ltaly, the long-term use of temporary housing was expensive for
the government who had to subsidize administrative and operating costs of
the facilities over an extended period cf time.
In ail ot the cases also, the temporary housing units, or materials from the
units (wood, corrugated iron) could be reused, stored or recycled. In Turkey,
the units were either refurbished and stored for later use or sold by the
government at approximately us$1 200 each to businesses, institutions and
familles for reuse as houses, sheds, dormitories or other facilities. In
Greece, the government was planning to store the units, but they found that
the cost for this was prohibitive. In Colombia, the materials from the units
could have been recycled had there been policies in effect that allowed the
users to own them after the project was finished. What is important to note
here s that the temporary housing unit or materials were useful for a second
lite’; however some type cf organisational strategy was needed to facilitate
this.
Research Question 3: Based on above identîfied difficulties, what needs
to be addressed when planning for temporary housing?
Combining the decision-making sequence outiined in Figure 20 and the
common issues described above, Figure 22 proposes planning factors that
can be integrated into a strategic planning framework for temporary housing.
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will we make a strategic
plan in advance?
organisalional vuinerable local overail design & long-lerm
design populalions condilions econsiruclion materials Iocalions services uses &
consider
oulcomes the factors
develop
procurement strategy
is the strategy
satisfactory?
keep strategy
on hold
disaster
was a strategic
plan made?
should the strategy
be adapted because of
the actual conditions?
procurement
according to plan
Based on Figure 22, if it is decided to make a strategic plan in advance of the
disaster, strategic planning wilI need to take into account:
a. Organisational design: appointing an organisation that is responsible
for the overail reconstruction strategy and defining the temporary multi
organisation involved in the reconstruction programme and the
methods used to form it (e.g. procurement policies).
b. Identifying the vuinerable populations: it is often renters or people
living in marginal areas that will be the most in need of temporary
housing.
c. Understanding local socia) economic and climatic conditions to
understand what sort of housing is the most appropriate considering
the situation.
wait for next
1yes
is the plan
satisfactory?
Figure 22 The decision making sequence adapted specifically for planning
temporary housing.
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d. Developing the overali reconstruction strategy: temporary housing is
only a part of the overali reconstruction programme.
e. Design and materials: Defining, as much as possible, designs and
suppliers that uses locally available materials or units that can be
supplied in a quick and cost-effective manner.
f. Choosing suitable locations as close as possible to the affected
communities and easily accessible.
g. ldentifying services that will need to be a part of the project and
identifying the organisation that will provide them.
h. Planning for long-term uses and outcomes of the temporary houses.
A plan for whether the units will be rented, sold, or dismantled and
stored; what kind of site clean up will be needed, when this will be
likely to happen and who will be responsible for it.
Once this strategy is completed, it can be kept on hold. If (or when) a
disaster does occur, the strategic plan must be up-dated at the tactical
level to correspond to the particular disaster situation. If the “wait for
next disaster” scenario prevails, these same factors will need to be
addressed, however there will be little time allocated to accumulate
information about them; consequently the quality of decisions will be
prejudiced.
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Article III: Organïsatïonal design
A Systems View ot Temporary Housing Projects in Post-Disaster
Reconstruction9
ABSTRACT
Naturai cataclysms (earthquakes, hurricanes etc.) become naturai disasters
when they coïncide with vuinerabilities; unfortunateiy, informai settiements in
deveioping countries are only too often highly vuinerabie — a reaiity ampiy
and unhappiiy contirmed by available statistics. in this context, reconstruction
projects are sandwiched between the short-term necessity to act promptiy
and the iong-term requirements of sustainable community development — a
situation that s currentiy refiected in alternative and conflicting paradigms at
the policy Ievei.
Adopting a case-study approach, we explore the use of temporary housing
within two post-disaster environments, where the impact of different
organizationai designs Ieads to fundamentaliy different solutions to the short
term housing probiem.
Our research adopts a dynamic systems approach, associating strategic
organizationai team design with the deveiopment of tacticai technicai
proposais. Two case studies from Turkey and Colombia show that a coherent
approach to the sequentiai stages of providing immediate shelter, temporary
housing and permanent reconstruction is not aiways obtained. The research
Reprinted, with permission from Routiedge, from Construction Management and
Economics, vol. 24, No. 2, by Cassidy Johnson, Gonzalo Lizarralde and Colin H. Davidson,
pp. 367-378, 2006.
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resuits emphasize that the performance of reconstruction projects is directly
linked to the design and management of the project team.
INTRODUCTION
It is only too weII known that — each year — thousands of people are killed and
many times more made homeless because of natural disasters10. Each year,
the toli gets greater, and each year the developing countries are hardest hit.
Populations
- already vulnerable
- are penalized and their scarce resources
are Iost. Housing represents the greatest material losses; in earthquakes,
they collapse, floods sweep them away and in lava flows they are smothered
- always leaving behind families who are bereaved and in immediate need of
shelter and relief. In this context, the concept of disaster is necessarily
associated with the concept of vulnerability (Blakie et al., 1994), since
impoverished populations in developing countries shelter themselves as best
they can — without recourse to formaI processes of land acquisition and
formalized construction — often making do instead with self-built shacks put
together on risk-prone land. Over a period of years (provided expropriation
does not occur) these shacks will be constantly improved in a kind of ‘endless
project’, and wiIl not only provide shelter but also meet the occupants’
functional and cultural requirements satisfactorily (Kellett, 1992; Turner,
1 976). But they are still vulnerable to natural disasters (Cuny, 1 983).
For many areas of the developing world, this reality is frightening. A natural
disaster wilI certainly strike in the near future; the problem is that nobody
knows exactly when. Logically, it can be expected that
— at least in principle -
precautions and remedies will be planned for and systemic decisions be
made concerning what to do ‘next time’. However, in reality, up-front planning
° Over the Iast century, 15 million people were killed or suffered serious injuries and 700
million had their houses destroyed by earthquakes (Hewitt, 1997). 7300 natural disasters
struck Latin America and the Caribbean regions. In 1999 alone, disasters led to 705 000
deaths and losses amounting to over us$1 00 thousand million.
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is otten totally absent or, at best, insufficient, and post-disaster decisions are
improvised in a rush and in a situation of almost total chaos (Johnson, 2002).
Figure 23 shows the planning mechanisms linked to a disaster situation; it
shows that either most decisions are made in advance ot the catastrophe or
that they will have to be made afterwards (if indeed possible), with additional
precious time being wasted instead of “getting on with the job”.
The objective ot this research s to explain how different organizational and
technical systems are implemented in post-disaster housing projects. We
wait [or next catastrophe
strt
can we make a strategc
plan n advancc?
should the strategy
bi adapted becaus
o[the actual con
ditions?
rnpiementation
Figure 23 Strategic planning prior to a natural disaster — or flot. Source:
adapted from Johnson (2002).
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demonstrate how the use cf different systems leads te different types cf
prejects and aise to different types cf crganizaticnal structures and their
ability te plan fer the next disaster. Specifically, we examine the difficult
administrative and technical cheice cf whether, and hcw, te adept a pelicy cf
temporary heusing.
Post-dïsaster housing: the options
The decisien te use, er net te use, tempcrary heusing has te fit inte the
breader centext cf sustainable develepment strategies in the pest-disaster
centext. In this breader ccntext, twe schccls cf theught cempete: sheuld there
be reliance en assisted self-help et sheuld imperted selutiens be adepted?
Often, these twe appreaches are seen as itrecencilable extremes (UNDRO,
1982); the pessibility that thete might be intermediate appreaches is rarely
envisaged. Hewevet, ene fact remains: speed is essential in the relief stage;
recevery sheuld net be delayed and prempt permanent recenstructien
cbvieusly s desirable.
There are feur stages cf heusing in the recevety precess (Quarantelli, 1995):
• lmmediate relief (within heurs),
• Immediate shelter (within a day er twe),
• Temperary heusing (pteferably within weeks),
• Permanent heusing recenstructien (prebably within a few years).
Fer relief, the Red Cress/Red Crescent, with the help cf the Army, usually
prevides shelters — in the ferm cf tents er plastic sheeting. The affected
pepulatien s prctected but cannet yet resume daily life and se cannet stay
leng in these shelters, particularly if the climatic cenditiens are hestile. At the
same time, recenstructien takes time; infrastructures have te be repaired and
debris cleared away. Material and human reseurces have te be mebilized,
and administrative and technical decisiens made; years may elapse befere
daily life can resume with nermality. Censequently, there is a time gap that
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needs to be bridged over, and temporary housing seems to be the obvious
answer.
This ‘answer’, however, immediately taises a set ot difficult questions, calling
for informed decision-making regarding ta) what kinds of temporary housing?
(b) Where should it be obtained from and how paid for? (c) Where should it
be put? (d) How long s it supposed to last? (e) What happens afterwards?
If
— and this is flot often the case in developing countries — there s a stock ot
vacant buildings, then they can be used for immediate post-disaster shelter
and possibly for temporary housing (Gilbert, 2001; UNDRO, 1982, Davis
1978). More often, though, special units have to be provided.
Temporary housing; the issues
An analysis of the reconstruction cases reported by UNDRO (1982) suggests
that temporary housing typically falis into one or other of two scenarios. In
one scenario, investment of effort and resources is kept to a minimum and
the permanent reconstruction process is emphasized instead. Minimum-cost
prefabricated houses are provided and located on available land, used by the
disaster victims (notwithstanding their functional limitations) and Iorcibly
removed
— despite the probably prevailing housing shortage. In the other
scenario state-of-the-art (often industrialized and prefabricated) temporary
units are provided, yielding satisfactory medium-term accommodation. As the
units are durable, they usually allow long-term occupation. Either way,
temporary housing has to be organized, procured, delivered, set up,
connected (to some form of — or substitute for — infrastructure), used and
possibly taken down.
A synthesis of other published research on post-disaster housing and
temporary housing (Aysan and Davis, 1992; Bolin, 1982; Bolin and Stanford,
1991; Comerio, 1998; Dandoulaki, 1992; Ellis and Barakat, 1996; Harada,
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2000) spells out a few key questions that must be raised. According to these
authors, tempo rary housing has to be:
• Organized in strategic terms
— what hierarchy cf public or private
departments or agencies are to be mobilized, and how are
responsibilities and risks shared?
• Procured - with what financing and within what administrative and
public accountability constraints and controls?
• Delivered
- to what locations, including how these locations are cleared
and made ready to receive the houses?
• Set up by whom — with what level cf participation by the future
inhabitants?
• Connected to ‘hard’ infrastructure (water, drainage
... ) and to ‘soft’
infrastructure (postal and bus services, markets ... )?
• Used by disaster victims
— including their selection (by some —
hopefully
- objective procedures)?
• Taken down - which raises the question cf when and what happens to
the erstwhile occupants?
The systems approach
The systems approach allows a comprehensive and cross-disciplinary view of
the many apparently separate facets of a complex process such as post
disaster reconstruction. lnstead of considering the many elements cf the
complexity independently, we focus our attention on the important
relationships between them, and between them and their environment11. This
implies thinking about the elements of the system in an analytical way
(decomposing the whole into its parts) as well as in a synthetic manner
(thinking about how those elements work together)
‘ See, for example, the definitions proposed by Hall (1962).
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in the systems approach, the reconstruction process is recognized for its two
main sub-systems: (j) organizationai and (ii) technical; their interdependence
is (or shouid be) essentiai in the environment of chaos following a disaster.
The organizationaI subsystem inciudes eiements regarding “who is to do
what”, for exampie:
• selection of participants and design 0f interfaces between them,
• sources of financing, and definition 0f authorization and control
mechanisms,
• relationships with the beneficiaries and definition 0f their levels of
participation,
• procurement and management policies, and their impiementation,
• decisions about the knowledge to be brought in and how t is to be
preserved for future projects.
The technical process has to respect the habituai phases 0f project initiation,
preparation, construction and hand-over, within the constraints of iimited
resources (and iimited time) and with the invoivement 0f a great variety of
participants, often with divergent objectives12.
The technicai sub-system inciudes eiements regarding “how” to consume the
resources, for example:
• seiection 0f materials and construction methods
• selection of labour force
• type 0f temporary housing to be buiit (detached units? Communal
spaces? etc.)
• ‘hard’ products to be inciuded (shelters, kitchens, latrines, etc)
and ‘soft’ services to be provided (medical and psychoiogicai aid,
empioyment opportunities, security, etc.).
12 In the management jargon, the team of participants s called a “temporary multi
organization”, drawn together from an environment which s called a “multi-industry”.
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RESEARCH METHODS
Applying the systems approach to the case of post-disaster temporary
housing, we conducted an empirical qualitative study based on three main
research questions:
1. How does the organizational sub-system impact on the technical one
and vice versa? (Including: what organizational structures and
technologies were used in the case studies?)
2. How does the temporary housing project influence the environment?
(Including: did it siphon resources away from permanent
reconstruction? For how long were the units occupied? What are the
social and technical impacts of the temporary units if they were located
on cheap land outside city limits - therefore away from infrastructure
services and sources of income and employment?)
3. How does the environment impact the temporary housing project?
(Including: the impacts of the socio-political context, the community,
etc.)
To answer these questions, a database of case-histories was prepared,
including some projects reported in the literature13 and others visited to yield
information tirst-hand14. Two case studies were finally selected for detailed
analysis: 1) the 1999 earthquakes in Western Turkey and 2) 1999
earthquakes in Armenia, Colombia. These two cases were chosen because
they have different organizational and technical approaches yet both included
13 Published case histories of post-disaster housing projects include Mexico City earthquake,
Mexico 1985 (Comerio, 1998); Kobe, Japan earthquake 1995 (Harada, 2000; Tomioka 1997);
Kalamata city, Greece earthquake 1986 (Dandoulaki, 1992); Skopje, Macedonia earthquake
1963 (Ladinski, 1997); Iranian earthquakes in 1997 (Ghafory-Ashtiany, 1999); earthquake in
Friuli, Italy 1976 (Geipel, 1991); various disasters in the United States (Comerio; 1998; Bolin,
1982; Bolin and Stanford, 1991).
“ Disaster affected areas visited included: Honduras, which was affected by Hurricane Mitch
in 1998 and visited in 2002; El Salvador, which was affected by an earthquake in January
2001 and visited in July 2002; Colombia, which was affected by an earthquake in 1999 and
visited in 2002; Turkey which was affected by two earthquakes in 1999 and visited in 2000;
and the Saguenay region of Quebec, Canada which was affected by flash f loods in 1996 and
visited in 2003.
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a major component of urban temporary housing. They concern two cities that
are somewhat similar (in terms of their populations and economies) affected
by major earthquakes. The chosen cases are now old enough to be able to
assess their medium term consequences, yet not so old that the strategic and
tactical decision processes have been forgotten.
A series of interviews were conducted with officers of the organizations
responsible for the projects. In Turkey, interviews were conducted in Juiy
2000 just atter the temporary housing was built, and again in November 2003
and in June 2004. In Colombia, ail interviews with officers responsible for the
project took place in July 2002. The information was triangulated with data
obtained from officiai reports and from the media. Both projects were visited
and open interviews with some local residents and occupants of the units
were aiso conducted, so that the information coming from the field study and
the opinions and comments from residents could then compared with officiai
reports and with the information provided by the officers of the participating
organizations. Finally, and in accordance with the case study qualitative
research methods proposed by Robert Yin (2003), the patterns found in the
case studies were compared with the patterns found in previous research - in
order to be able to suggest some analyticai generalizations.
TWO CASES
Case 1: atter the 1999 earthquakes in Western Turkey
In the latter haif of 1999, two devastating earthquakes shook the Marmara
and Bolu regions of Turkey, the industrial heartiand of the country to the east
of Istanbul, leaving 18 373 people dead, 311 693 housing units and 46 538
business premises damaged and coilapsed. Damage was estimated at US$ 4
to 7 thousand million or around 3% of the Gross National Product.
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The reconstruction program
The current Turkish Disaster Law guarantees the repiacement of damaged
residences at only nominai cost to the occupants. Thus, after the Marmara
and Bolu earthquakes, the Turkish government bore the burden of developing
and coordinating a massive reconstruction program.
A three step housing strategy was impiemented: 1) about 80 000 tents were
provided by the Turkish military, the Red Crescent and others immediateiy
after the earthquakes; 2) one year of monthly rentai aiiowance was provided
for 107 000 affected famiiies, and three to six months following the
earthquake, 41 988 prefabricated temporary housing units were built by
government and private organizations; and 3) beginning a year after the
earthquakes, permanent housing was financed by the World Bank, European
Deveiopment Bank, foreign governments and private Non-Governmentai
Organisations (NGOs).
The temporary housing project
initiaiiy there was much debate in the media and among civil society over the
construction of temporary housing units in the earthquake area. Even before
construction started, the project was criticized for siphoning resources from
permanent reconstruction, thus extending the reconstruction timeiine and
therefore inhibiting recovery. Some thought that the provision of temporary
units would absolve the government of its responsibiiity to reconstruct
permanent housing. Surveys conducted with the affected population a short
time after the earthquakes showed that people with iimited resources who
were living in the tent camps wanted any sort of housing that the government
wouid give them and their attitude was to maximize the benefits received. The
World Bank (1999), in a bid against the prefabricated units, outiined a
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scheme for temporary housing combining the use of rentai subsidies,
retrofitting public buildings and repairing lightly damaged buildings that would
circumvent the need for temporary construction. However, the Ministry of
Public Works & Settlements (MPWS) and its Generai Directorate of Disaster
Affairs (GDDA) announced a calI for construction tenders for prefabricated
temporary units Iess than one month after the first earthquake.
legend: visible head responsible of the project
direct responsible of the project
unit working on the project
underlined unit created for the project
L] unit flot intergrated in the pro]ect
Figure 24 Organizational design of the temporary housing project in Turkey.
Figure 24 shows that, in keeping with the general tendency in disaster
management in Turkey, the administration cf the temporary housing project
was highly centralized. Major decisions regarding procurement and
construction were made in offices in Ankara, by the MPWS and the GDDA.
Construction of the units was undertaken by private construction companies
MPWS
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and managed by the provincial authorities of the MPWS. The state
companies responsible for road works and electricity managed the
infrastructure. Land acquisition, also handled by the provincial authorities of
the MPWS, proved to be difficuit: the completion of the housing project was
delayed by 4 months because cf problems in finding suitable land and also
improper coordination concerning the installation cf infrastructure. This
meant that many familles had to stay in tents over the first winter (see Figure
25).
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Figure 25 Schedule of the main activities of housing reconstruction in Turkey
After completion, the temporary housing has been openly criticized for its lack
of participatory methods, because it failed to include the local authorities or
civil society in its decision-making processes. The affected population who
moved into the temporary units had been living in tents since the earthquake
and were provided with the unit allotted to them once t was completed -
having had littie or nothing to do with the project up to then.
Outputs
The MPWS set the price at US$3,300 for a 30m2 prefabricated duplex unit,
totalling around US$5000 per unit inclusive of infrastructure costs. They built
31 339 units in 53 temporary settiements throughout the earthquake region in
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addition ta another 10 649 units funded through the private sector and
partially managed by the MPWS. The total expenditures for the government
funded project was US$122 million (World Bank, 1999) and came in part from
the Disasters Fund and in part from other government budgets.
Each side-by-side housing unit was constructed using insulated prefabricated
panels on slab foundations with corrugated iran roofing and included a
kitchen and a bathroom with running water, electricity and electric heating.
The units were placed in settlements of 100 ta 1000 units, mostly on the
outskirts of urban areas (Figure 26), which also included roads, community
centres, bus service, garbage collection, postal services and commerce.
Outcomes
On the one hand, the temporary housing program provided safe and
comfortable, but small, housing for people in need; t reduced dependency on
government of the people previously living in winterised tents (the inclusion of
bathrooms and kitchen in the units provided privacy for families), and the
housing program was linked to other social programs - food aid, health care
packages, mental health counselling, etc. Furthermore, the program
contributed ta political popularity; the government was seen as “doing
something for the people” (Jalali, 2002).
Figure 26 Views of the temporary housing settlement built in the outskirts of
the cities of Adapazari and lzmit.
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However, the approach adopted for locating the temporary housing generally
outside city limits lead to an enlargement cf the areas requiring municipal
services, and to the dispiacement cf people to new suburbs and to new
villages and towns — even though urban locations would have been preferred
by the beneficiaries.
Ihis enlargement cf the areas requiring municipal service was flot just a
temporary phenomenon; five years after the earthquake the majcrity cf the
housing units were stiil standing, many cf them occupied as rentai housing.
This was unintentional when the prcject was developed and became
problematic from a political point cf view as pulling them down fcrcibly would
be “political suicide”.
However, since average rentai prices for an apartment unit had more than
doubled since the earthquake, the temporary housing provided a needed
source cf safe, affordabie medium-term lodging for families who were
squeezed eut cf the rentai market.
Case 2; atter the 1999 earthquake in Armenia, Colombia
On January 25, 1999, an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.0 on the Richter
scale struck the east region cf central Colombia. The regional cities cf
Armenia and Pereira were affected. The disaster left over $00 people dead,
1,856 rural houses destrcyed and 4,552 houses partially damaged. Losses in
the productive sector were estimated ta be 4.2% cf the regicnal Gross
Dcmestic Product.
The reconstruction program
Just after the disaster, the Colombian presidency fcrmulated a reccnstruction
program that included the creation cf a new bcdy called FOREC (Fonda para
la reconstruccion fisica y social del eje cafetero), which had the exclusive
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mandate cf managing the resources available for reconstruction and for
outsourcing individual projects. The FOREC tund (that amounted to US$720
million) was created with a ban from the World Bank (equivalent to 40% of
the fund), a ban from the Inter-American Devebopment Bank (equivalent to
10% cf the fund), private donations (1%) and resources from the National
Budget and new taxes (‘50%). To carry out the projects, FOREC Iaunched a
calI for proposais that resulted in the selection cf thirty-two NGOs, each one
of them responsible for reconstructing a village, or a sector cf a major city.
The temporary housing project
A project cf temporary housing was flot initially considered by FOREC.
lnstead, a few weeks after the disaster, a series cf individual interventions in
the area cf permanent reconstruction started to be developed by FOREC
through the selected NGOs. However, early on, it was observed that there
was an important increase in the number cf spontaneous shelters and
shacks. The concern was that people, as a way to meet the demand for
shelter, were forming instant siums on ill-adapted sites.
lnitially, NGOs and the municipalities looked after the temporary settlements
in a rather disorganized and decentralized manner. Illegal occupation cf
vacant lots and public spaces in the city of Armenia became a serious
concern for FOREC; finally t was decided
— one year after the disaster - to
consolidate the management cf temporary settiements into a single project
with the double mandate (i) te devebop and organize the spontaneous
temporary shelters and (ii) to build new temporary units.
The management of the more than 6,000 temporary housing units required
was assigned te the pubiicly-owned National University of Bogota (NUB). For
the University, the disaster was an ideal “laboratory” for the application cf the
research conducted by its Centre for Disaster Prevention; the Centres
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multidisciplinary configuration provided the NUB with the human and
knowledge resources it needed.
Iwo main types of temporary housing appeared in Armenia as a solution for
people who could not stay with relatives while waiting for the construction of
permanent housing:
• Spontaneous user-made temporary shelters: built on invaded
public or private land; these squatter settiements appeared as a
survival response to the pressures caused by the disaster,
particularly in the lowest economic sectors of the society.
• Temporary shelters in planned settiements built and managed by
the NUB and located on vacant lots in the city. The construction of
planned settiements was at first delayed by the difficulties of finding
available land. Speculation on the price of land leading to long
processes of negotiation, slowed down the construction of these
settiements.
Organizational design
FOREC conducted the procurement strategy at the scale of the overali
reconstruction program. The temporary housing project, in which the NUB
was the project developer, was part of that large program. Funded by
FOREC, the NUB established a project team that included in-house
researchers and professors, hired professionals and hired construction
workers and contractors, and the beneficiaries.
Figure 27 shows that within this project team, the beneficiaries played an
important role as they helped in the construction of the temporary units. In the
case of the spontaneous temporary units, the NUB acted as an intermediary
between the residents that invaded the land and the land owners (whether
the land was public or private). When the illegally occupied land belonged to
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private owners, the NUB established contracts for renting the land and
compensating the owners. In cases where the land was publicly owned, the
NUB established agreements in recognition of the occupation of public space.
In both cases, the arrangements (private rentai contracts or public usage
agreements) included the dates three years later when the land had to be
returned and the conditions in which it had to be handed back to the owners -
“unoccupied and cleared”.
Figure 27 Organizational design 0f the temporary housing reconstruction
project in Colombia.
Construction workers helped in the building activities and instructed the
beneficiaries how to build the units. Professionals helped in the delivery of
complementary services such as psychological and medical aid. During the
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construction and the maintenance of the units, other sub-contractors were
hired for security, cleaning, construction of infrastructure, etc.
Outputs
A total of 107 planned and spontaneous temporary settiements were
dispersed throughout the city, ranging from 15 to 150 units. During the period
of emergency, a continuous census of residents and a study 0f family needs
and priorities were also conducted.
For the construction of the planned settiements, a simple 24m2 unit was built
in wood with a monopitch roof made of corrugated iron. Coupled back to back
with another unit and built in rows, each unit had three party walls and only
one 1m2 window
- facing the street (Figure 28). The units had an unreliable
electricity service; communal kitchen and communal washrooms were
provided for each group, within a poorly developed landscape.
Free labour provided by the beneficiaries was used for the construction of the
units, the construction of basic temporary infrastructure (access roads,
drainage systems, septic tanks, electricity, etc), the consolidation of the
spontaneous shelters and, later, the dismantling of the units.
Consolidating the spontaneous user-made temporary shelters represented
extra challenges for the project. In fact, the illegal status of the “squatters”
required legal and political intervention to stop the evictions, which had been
started by the authorities (including the police), and negotiation with the
owners of the occupied lots. The consolidation also included building up a
database with complete information about each family and with pictures of the
settlements. The database correlated information about the residents with
information about schools, health centres and the permanent housing
projects.
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A number of soft services (like medical assistance, security, education in
disaster prevention, etc.) were offered to residents through a team that
included over 80 specialists. These services were, as might be expected, vital
for the resumption of domestic and social activities.
The transfer to permanent housing included a follow-up cf each family to
ensure that they took advantage of the subsidies and bans offered for
permanent housing. This strategy also required the dismantling ot temporary
settlements and returning the lots to their original appearance (see Figure
29). However, the dismantling of the units had an unexpected negative
outcome for the project. Large quantities of wood and corrugated sheets had
to be transported and stocked in rented warehouses. Even though many
residents wanted to keep the materials they were given, they could not be
given them because administratively they stilb belonged to the govern ment.
‘:‘
;9r —
..
=
Figure 28 Views of one of the temporary housing projects in Cobombia
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Figure 29 Schedule of the main activities of the housing reconstruction
project in Colombia
Despite the fact that the units were rudimentary, dismantiing the settlements
was one of the most difficult challenges for the NUB. lndeed, had the units
been more comfortable, instead of having 500 units permanently inhabited,
there would have been 5000. This suggests that temporary housing must be
targeted to last long enough for people to resume daily activities but not be
comfortable enough to become permanent.
Outcomes
Twenty-one settlements were not totally dismantled. They quickly became
urban ghettos, concentrating a population that was outside the economic and
legal systems of the city. They were occupied by families that did not or could
not apply for the permanent housing subsidies offered (e.g. families that
migrated to Armenia after the disaster) or by elderly people that preferred to
go on living in small communities of relatives and friends rather than being
relocated.
According to the officers of the NUB, other secondary effects 0f the project
include intra- and inter-family conflicts and sex-related crimes, which can be
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attributed to the overcrowded conditions in the units and the corresponding
loss cf privacy. Even though residents cf the units participated in the
construction activities (construction of the units and cf the infrastructure),
officers of the NUB daim that community members lacked interest in keeping
the settiements clean and tidy and that many residents failed to participate in
maintenance.
Though the materials used for the construction were inexpensive, easily
accessible and easy to instali for unskilled labour, it also resulted in many
units being pulled down by vandals and thieves. In Armenia’s yearlong
tropical weather, the metallic roofs performed badly, indeed, the houses were
nicknamed “microwave ovens”. Due to the risk cf easily spreading f ire among
the wooden units, communal kitchens were built outside the units;
nonetheless, the tendency of residents to cook on small gas ranges inside the
units was a constant and difficuit-to-control risk.
The creation of FOREC as a central organization to direct the disaster
recovery program facilitated the initiation of the project. This organization,
with a clear mandate and independent cf political pressures, was appropriate
for the transparent management of resources and avoiding corruption.
However, the fact that FOREC’s and the NUB’s contracts ended in 2002, and
that the remaining settlements were managed by the municipality of Armenia,
presented other difficulties: (i) the know-how and experience gained in the
reconstruction was lost at the end of the contracts and (ii) having been
excluded from major decision making (te avoid political influences and
corruption), the municipalities and regional authorities did not learn much
from the reconstruction experience, leaving them with the same
organizational vulnerabilities that existed before the disaster.
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RESEARCH FINDINGS
In the published case histories (see footnote 13), we found that organizations
were generally mobilized in apparently aU hoc arrangements, leading to the
formation ot heterogeneous ‘teams’ of NGOs, government departments, the
army and, sometimes, the survivors. Worse, these ‘teams’ often competed for
rare resources. On the technical level, rivai schools of thought propose the
“self-help-only” strategy or the “import-ready-made-solutions-at-any-cost”
approach. The former see in self-help a means for introducing sustainable
self-sufficient development into the affected communities
— regardiess of the
time it takes. The latter set a priority in solving the immediate
shelter I housing problem, leaving the community development aspect for
later.
The case studies show the differing impacts (i) of centralized decision-making
(Turkey) and of interdisciplinary decision-making accompanied by partial self
help (Colombia), and (ii) of organizational permanence (Turkey) and limited
time participation (Colombia). In Turkey, the reliance on prefabricated
temporary housing went almost unquestioned, leading to the provision of
quite well-equipped houses located on fringe sites; the settlements required
major supporting investments in services — both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’
— and tended
to be used long after the reconstruction programs were well under way. In
Colombia, a combination of squatter shelters (subsequently improved) and
minimum prefabricated shacks on central sites (playing fields, parks and the
like) served for a relatively short period of time, followed by the social
upheavals caused by demolition.
The sequence of shelters and housing offered to the survivors 0f the
disasters is shown in Figure 30.
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Figure 30 Residents that were hcmecwners follcwed different housing steps
in each cf the projects. Above: the Turkish case, belcw: the Colombian case.
However, the cases are also instructive for their organizational designs. In the
Turkish example, the structure cf the participating organizations was simple,
with clear unes cf authcrity and equally clear exclusions (nctably cf the
beneficiaries). In the Cclombian prcject, the crganizaticnal structure was
more ccmplex, with the beneficiaries playing a more significant rcle.
The case histories clearly show the importance cf understanding the
crganizaticnal design cf the prcgram and cf the project teams. In cther wcrds,
technical design - hcwever talented - is net sufficient. The key question
remains: who undertakes this crganizaticnal design and when? Figure 23
suggests its impcrtance but begs the questicn cf where the impetus comes
from. That depends en the socic-political envircnment.
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Article IV: Outcomes ot temporary housing projects
Impacts of prefabricated temporary housïng atter disasters: 1999
earthquakes in Turkey15
ABSTRACT
Temporary housing is a crucial but controversial part of disaster
recovery; disaster affected families who have Iost their homes need a
private and secure place to restart their daily activities as soon as
possible after the disaster, yet temporary housing programmes tend to
be overly expensive, too late and responsible for undesirable long-term
impacts on the urban environment. The purpose 0f this research is to
recognize exactly what problems exist with temporary housing in the
long-term and to identify, using the systems approach, the origin of
these problems within the project process for temporary housing.
Using the Logical Framework Approach to highlight the projects’
outcomes, the investigation focuses on the case study of the
temporary housing programme for the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey and
on four temporary housing projects in Dùzce, one disaster-affected
town. In the long-term, unwanted effects can be reduced through
proper facilities management, reuse of the units, and by the initial
application of unit designs that are easy to dismantle. Incorporating
plans upfront, thus dealing with these problems by anticipation, can
minimize negative long-term impacts.
15 Reprinted, with permission from Elsevier, f rom Habitat International, by Cassidy Johnson,
article in press, online 05 June 2006, doi:1 0.101 6/j.habitatint.2006.03.002.
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INTRODUCTION
Temporary housing, especially that supplied by governments and
international agencies, has been criticized for being unnecessary, too
expensive, too late, too long-lasting and drawing resources away from
permanent reconstruction (Bolin, 1990; Bolin and Stanford, 1991; Dandoulaki,
1992; Davis, 1978; Geipel, 1991; Gilbert, 2001; Quarantelli, 1982; UNDRO,
1982). However, judging by the frequency 0f use after recent large-scale
disasters16, the supply of temporary housing units can be essential for quick
recovery of the population and to allow time for safe rebuilding. ldeally, after a
disaster, temporary housing would be immediately available, offering a level
of comfort consistent with the prevailing standard ot living, at a cost
proportional to intended length of use and easily eradicated or transtormed
once it is no longer needed; but in reality temporary housing is overly
expensive and in the long-term, temporary housing sites can become an
environmental blight and a hotbed of social dysfunctions.
After some disasters, familles may be temporarily housed in existing but
vacant housing or they may be able to shelter themselves. But, many
disasters situations create a housing crisis that warrants the authorities to
supply temporary housing units. To be successful in terms of recovery, cost
eftectiveness and environmental concerns, temporary housing programmes
must address factors existing in the larger environment, such as local living
standards, local industries, local politics and permanent reconstruction
programmes, and then plan the individual projects that make up the
programmes accordingly.
16 In Thailand (2004); Bam, Iran (2003); Izmit, Turkcy, (1999); Armenia, Colombia (1999); Kobe,
Japan (1995); florida, Uniicd States (1992); Lorna Pricla, California, United Slates (1989); Kalamaia,
Grecce (1986); Mexico City, Mexico (1985); Friuli, Italy (1976); Lice, Turkcy (1975); Managua,
Nicaragua (1972); Skopje, Macedonia (1963).
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Using the case study of the temporary housing programme after the 1999
earthquakes in Turkey, this research looks at four temporary housing projects
to identify the Iong-term impacts of the temporary housing programme and to
identify the relationships between these impacts and the larger environment,
i.e. post-disaster recovery, and the political, economic and social
environments. The objective of this research is to highlight factors that affect
temporary housing projects in the hopes that the information it yields will lead
to more efficient projects in the future.
Temporary housing as part ot a system
In order to make some sense of the complexity of factors affecting a
programme of temporary housing, we must consider the programme as both
a system in itself and as a part of larger systems. As proposed by Hall (1962)
a system is a group of elements with relations between them, and relations
between them and their environment. The environment of a system s a) ail
the elements outside the system that affect the system when they are
changed and b) affected by a change in the system. A temporary housing
programme is a system, which contains many projects as well as its own
organisational and technical sub-systems (figure 31). In the environment
outside the system of the temporary housing programme are many larger
systems, such as the reconstruction programme17, the programme for overall
disaster recovery, and the country’s economic and political systems. Each of
these larger systems has an impact on the temporary housing programme,
and likewise the temporary housing programme could likely have an impact
on the larger systems.
For more information and research about reconstruction programmes see the i-Rcc websiic:
www.grif. umontrcal .caJpages/irechomepage. html
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Detïnitions and problematic of temporary housing
Quarantelli (1995) describes four distinct stages of housing that are used
atter disasters: (1) emergency shelter - used for the height of the emergency,
this may be a public shelter, refuge at friend’s house, or shelter under a
plastic sheet; (2) temporary shelter - used for the few weeks following the
disaster, this may be a tent or a public mass shelter, and also s accompanied
by the provision of food, water and medical treatment; (3) temporary housing
allows for—in a temporary location—a return to normal daily activities, i.e.
work, school, cooking at home, shopping etc.; this can take the form cf a
rented apartment or a prefabricated home, among other options; (4)
permanent housing - return to the former home after its reconstruction or
settlement in a new permanent home. Those whose homes are affected by a
disaster may or may flot pass through ail of these stages, and many stages
may be employed simultaneously by different sectors of the affected
population. If permanent housing is available quickly enough, people may
pass from temporary shelter directly to permanent housing.
Figure 31 Temporary housing system in its immediate and broader
environments
159
Temporary housing can de defined as a) an object, i.e. the physicai structure
people inhabit after a disaster; b) a part cf a process cf re-housing after a
disaster, just as Turner (1972) defines housing not as a product but as a
process; c) is a place that serves the tunction to shelter peopie during the
period from the disaster until they have a permanent place to live. The
difference between temporary housing and housing s that in the former, the
duration cf tenure is estabiished in advance whereas in the latter tenure is
usuaily for an indeterminate period. In temporary housing, people are only
planning te stay there until they can find permanent housing; either the
conditions cf the temporary house wili be found te be less comfortable than
the conditions cf a permanent house for a given family or the temporary
house will oniy be made available to that family for a predetermined period cf
time.
Temporary housing can take on different physical forms and in terms cf
resource expenditure the simplest type cf temporary housing is rented
apartments. In the situation where there s a suppiy cf vacant apartments
avaiiable in the disaster area, famiiies otten receive rentai subsidies from the
government. For exampie, after a tlood in the Saguenay region cf Quebec,
Canada, there was enough vacant rentai housing avaiiabie te temporariiy
absorb those familles whose homes were damaged. Also, if possible, many
peopie wili go and stay with relatives ciose-by. if these two options are net
sufficient, some type cf temporary housing must be constructed or supplied
either through the informai sector by the familles themseives or through the
formai sector, such as by government, NGOs or aid agencies. it is this latter
category cf temporary housing suppiied and ccnstructed through the formai
sector that s the concern cf this research.
Many researchers have said that in the developing country context,
specificaily in tropical countries, temporary housing suppiied by the formai
sector is often net necessary and shcuid be skipped aitogether in faveur cf
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accelerated permanent reconstruction. In these situations, housing is often
not the most important need, and other tactors such as jobs and access to
land may be more vital to recovery (UNDRO, 1982). However, if a disaster
occurs that causes a housing crisis in an industrialised nation where
standards of living are generally higher and people are not accustomed to
providing their own housing, temporary housing cannot be avoided without
negative repercussions on society and on its recovery. For example, Comerio
(1998) points out that during the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 in the
United States, housing damage was largely concentrated in multi-family Iow
income districts and the lack of affordable temporary rentai accommodation in
the affected areas significantly increased the proportion of homeless people
living on the streets. Also, temporary housing will play a more crucial rob
after disasters that occur in places where there may be climatic risks. In ail
cases, for the temporary housing programme to succeed—no matter how
basic or compiex—the technology must be appropriate compared to living
standards in the country in question.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This research employs qualitative case study methodology, adapted from Yin
(2003), using a single case study of the programme for temporary housing
after the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey. Embedded within this case study are
four temporary housing projects in Dizce, one of the Turkish cities affected
by the earthquake. In this context, and as defined by the International Labour
Office (ILO), “a programme is composed of several projects that are linked to
the achievement of higher objectives” (ILO, 1996, p.26). A project is defined
as a unique operation that has a start, a finish, a limited duration and a
defined objective (Davidson, 1998). The projects were seiected for their
differences in terms of size, location, type of unit, and donor organisation, so
as to observe their individual outcomes and to observe patterns across the
projects. The findings from this Turkish case study are then complimented by
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findings fram other published case studies about temporary housing to
propose analytic generalizations.
Data collection occurred over three separate field trips ta the disaster-affected
areas of Turkey in June 2000, November 2003 and tram May ta August 2004.
For the overail temporary hausing programme, the data were collected using
interviews with key personnel within the Ministry of Public Works who were
responsibie for the temporary housing programme and with researchers
warking on disaster management in Turkey; tram reports by the World Bank
and other development agencies; and tram internai gavernmental evaluation
reports. Data were coliected at the project level thraugh interviews with local
project managers, municipal officiais, community leaders, and tram former
and current residents as weii as through direct site observations.
The Logical Framework Appraach, or Iogframe s usually employed ta
describe the process by which prajects are produced, including the cause
eftect time sequence between the projects’ stages. However, here this
research constructs the logframe fram the “top-dawn”—laoking f irst at the
long-term impacts af the project, then the short-term results and finaliy tracing
back ta the project pracesses (outputs and inputs). Narmally in project
planning or project monitoring, the logframe traces steps tram the “bottom
up”—beginning at the inputs stage and going up the iadder ta where the
project is completed and the final resuits are apparent at the impacts stage.
Far evaluation, there are some problems with using the lagtrame in this way
because t daes not allow the evaluatar ta became cognizant of unexpected
resu Its or impacts (for a discussion of this see Gasper, 2000). Ta avaid these
prablems with evaluatian, a variant approach is used, which warks best tram
the top-down (figure 32).
162
LOGfRAME FOR PROJECT LOGFRAME FOR
PLAM’ING OR MONITORING PROJECT EVALUATION
Internalfactors t 1 Externalfactors(withio the p ‘‘e the projeot)
11111)iIL’tS
I ong—fenil ellecls ni’ hie
project. Corresponds b
projeet objectives
eiivironinenlal iniluences,
Resuits
Immediate elïecls of lite
producis or scivices
delivered. Corresponds 10
prolect objectives
Outputs
‘lite producls or services
delivercd
Inptits
‘lite resonroes thal go juIn
bite project
Objevti es
‘Flic slatcd goals ni tue
project at bite outset
Figure 32 The standard logframe method used for project planning and
monitoring (left) and the “reverse” iogframe method adapted for the project
evaluations (right).
The long-term impacts of the projects were assessed in the summer of 2004,
approximately 4.5 years after the projects were buiit. This included
accounting for the physical state ot the houses and the site; determining who
was living there; expiaining dismantiing procedures; and assessing the
projects’ impacts on the housing market and development in the selected
region. The short-term resuits, i.e. the effects of the projects when they were
first built, were established from prior field visits in 2000, as welI as from
interview data in 2003 and 2004. The projects’ process (inputs and outputs)
was reconstituted using information from project documents and interviews.
The next step was to understand whether the final impacts of the project were
related to the system of the project (internai factors) or to systems outside the
project (external factors). To do this, the impacts of the project were traced
back to see if they resulted from one or more of the inputs/outputs/results
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levels or from lactors outside of the project. The results cf these methods are
reported below in the case reports.
CASE REPORTS
Programme for temporary housing
At the time cf the earthquake (table III), the then-current Disasters Law
stipulated that the govern ment was responsible for providing a home for each
tamily affected by the earthquake18 (GOIkan, 2001). The government was
certain that some of type of permanent housing reconstruction would be
needed and an appeal was Iaunched to the World Bank to secure funds for
this project. In the meantime, the government decided to implement a
programme for tempcrary housing to house the people who were living in
tents and tent camps in the affected areas. For those families who cculd find
an apartment to rent, the government gave rentai allowances for two years.
For the test cf the families, the gcvernment built prefabricated temporary
housing on vacant land in and around the cities.
Table III Eatthquake data
Earthquake date 12 Novembet 199917 August 1999 03:02 18:57
Magnitude M7.4 M7.2
Tcwns heavily lzmit, GôlcOk, Yalova, Dùzce Bolu
affected Adapazati, eastern Istanbul
Housing Damage 31 1 693 housing units affected (1 13 382 light
damage,
104 693 medium damage, 93 618 heavy
damage/collapsed)
Househclds 1 out cf 3homeless
18 As of Septembcr 2000 ihis is no longer truc. Each homcowner must now join thc mandatory
insurance schcmc of ihe Turkïsh Catastrophic Insurance Pool (TCIP) and urban dwellers no longcr
qualify for automatic assistance afler a disaster.
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The decision to buiid the prefabricated units was made based on an
assessment of the situation: there were between 180,000 and 240,000
people living in tents and winter was fast approaching. Furthermore, due to
the proportion of buildings damaged and the tight rentai market even before
the disaster, there were few possibilities for finding suitable rentai
accommodation in the area. Economicaily, the affected region was home to
key manufacturing industries and therefore was of strategic importance to the
countrys economy. Also, the existence of a developed and influential
prefabricated building industry in Turkey meant that companies couid supply
the prefabricated buildings in a timely manner whereas permanent housing
couid take many months. Moreover—politically—the provision of temporary
housing cast the government in a popular light for its effort to make necessary
investments in the devastated area.
lnitially there was much debate in the media and among civil society over the
construction of temporary housing units in the earthquake area (Cam, 2000).
Even before construction started, the project was criticized for siphoning
resources away from permanent reconstruction, thus extending the
reconstruction timeline and therefore nhibiting recovery. Some thought that
the provision of temporary units wouid absolve the government of its
responsibility to construct permanent housing. Surveys conducted with the
affected population a short time after the earthquakes showed that people
with limited resources who were living in the tent camps wanted any sort of
housing that the government would give them and their attitude was to
maximize the benefits received. The World Bank (1999), in a bid against the
prefabricated units, outlined a scheme for temporary housing combining the
use of rentai subsidies, retrofitting public buildings and repairing lightly
damaged buildings that would circumvent the need for temporary
construction. However, the Ministry of Public Works & Settlements (MPWS)
and its General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA) announced a cail for
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construction tenders for prefabricated temporary units Iess than one month
atter the f irst earthquake.
The temporary housing programme was managed by the MPWS, which
collaborated with local governments and related government ministries for
land supply and infrastructure installations. The programme was decided
upon in the few weeks following the tirst earthquake and, as mentioned, a cali
for tenders was put out within a month. The MPWS set the price at US$3,300
for a 30m2 prefabricated duplex unit, totalling around US$5000 per unit
inclusive of infrastructure costs. In total 40 621 temporary housing units were
built throughout the affected region in 1 36 settlements between Dec 1 999 and
June 2000 with a 97.5% rate of occupancy. Dut of the total, 31 339 were built
by the MPWS in 53 settlements; NGOs and foreign governments built 9 282
units in 84 settlements through funds or in-kind donations.
For the projects built by the MPWS, site selection was a collaborative effort
between the MPWS and the local governments. The Ministry of
Transportation and the State Electric and State Water companies undertook
the work to supply the utilities and prepare the land. Prefabricated building
manufacturers in the private sector supplied and constructed the units.
The projects that were built by the NGOs were organized differently
depending on the specific project; however in most cases, land with the entire
infrastructure installed was supplied to the NGOs by the MPWS using the
same system as described above. For the NGO projects, the units
themselves were imported from the donor country, purchased from local
manufacturers, or built using local materials and labour, depending on the
specifications of the project. In total, the government expenditure for the
temporary housing programme was US$122 million not including donations
from the NGO5 (World Bank, 1999).
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Where possible, the projects occupied vacant government land in and close
to the cities. The settlements ranged f rom 20 units to 2000 units and
contained different types of services depending on the size and the proximity
to other services. The majority of the large developments were on the
outskirts of the cities and because of the distance included schools, clinics,
daycare centres and aIl the necessary services for a functioning community.
Beginning about two years after the earthquakes, permanent houses were
ready for those families who were homeowners before the earthquakes and
had lost their dwelling. The World Bank and the MPWS built new settlements
of three to f ive storey apartment blocks on parcels ot land on the hills
surrounding the cities. Homeowners who qualified for the programme were
given low-interest bans and took up residence in the new settiements,
vacating the temporary housing. Families who rented apartments before the
earthquake were left with few options as the majority of the rentai stock had
been destroyed in the earthquake driving up prices for the remaining units.
Many of them stayed behind in temporary housing or have become invoived
in small NGO housing projects.
Projects for temporary housing in Diizce
DCizce s a province with a population over 300 000 located approximately
half way between Istanbul and Ankara in the mountainous region of Bolu.
Economically, DCizce is mostly dependant on forestry, hazeinut farming and
small manufacturing. The city proper serves as an economic centre for the
many small villages dotted in the surrounding mountains. Between 1 980 and
1998 unplanned housing developments proliferated to meet the demand of in
migrants attracted to the growth of industry. Both 1999 earthquakes affected
D(zce, although the second earthquake did the most damage in the area. In
total, 980 people were killed and over 29,0000 houses were destroyed or
badly damaged.
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For this study, four temporary housing projects in Dûzce were chosen, two
that were buiit by the government—Kiremit Ocagi and Gûmûspinar—and two
that were buiit by NGOs—Fidaniik and UMCOR. The information presented in
the project reports beiow was coiiected over a period of fieid visits between
2000 and 2004, the last of which was in August 2004. Therefore, the
observations about the conditions of the temporary housing projects were
current as of the ]ast fieid visit in August 2004. For each case the project
process and outcomes were documented; the resuits of this are presented as
iogf rame diagrams and photos in the following figures.
Project 7: Government, Kiremit Ocagi
After Dûzce sustained some damage in the first earthquake, the MPWS
pianned to buiid a 200-unit settiement, Kiremit Ocagi, to house those whose
homes were damaged (figure 33). The settiement was iocated on a parcel of
government-owned vacant land within the city, next to the river. After the
second earthquake, the demand for temporary houses greatiy expanded and
the authorities changed the settiement plans to maximize the density, building
a total of 330 units. The houses were 36m2 duplex units built with
prefabricated pressed board panels on a concrete siab foundation and
inciuded piumbing and electricity. Since the settiement was within walking
distance of services in town no school, medical centre nor mosque were
provided but there were some community services such as a smail market, a
cafeteria, Iaundry facilities, an embroidery workshop and a playground.
This settlement has been continuousiy occupied since it was constructed and,
at the time data collection, ail the units were stili occupied. A small part of the
settiement (approx. 30 houses) is iocated on the other side of the river and is
occupied by the local gypsy population. The main part of the settlement is
occupied by families affected by the disaster who either do not have homes to
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return to or are afraid of returning to their homes for fear cf another
earthquake. Few alterations have been made to the units, except for
vegetable and flower gardens instalied outside the units. The community
leader, the muhtar, who s hired by the local governor’s office, s very active in
maintaining the community and ensuring tenants are paying rent; his
involvement has ensured the settiement has not been dismantied. Aithough it
wiIl be difficuit to evict ail these tenants, especially the gypsy population, the
muhtar indicated that it is Iikely that the settiement wiii be dismantled in the
future.
A. Project 1: government B.
Kiremit Oçagi
Project Objectives
L -provide housing as soon as
\possible
Internai [actera Â Extemai factors
(within the project) (outside the project)
Impacts
(as et August 2004)
.
4—*-100% of housing is stiil occupied 4—)
-Good quality mostly by affected families who -Muhtar is
units meant more rentera and by gypsies advocate for
poopie stiil keaping the
wantto live
1
*ctsoit
Resuits I open longer
-Location in
-200 families housed by Nov 1999J
town centre
-4—). and 130 by March 2000 -4—)
ix attractive
-return to daily activities
for residents
-living in city near services
il 11
f-)
Figure 33 Kiremit Ocagi temporary housing project; A. Logframe diagram; B.
Housing units and gardens; C. A small market in the settlement.
i
c.
Outputs
-330 housing units, each 36m2
-2 units per building
-concrete slab foundation
-prefabricated panels of pressed
board
-plumbing, electricity
-built on public land in city
-market, cafeteria, laundry.
internet, playground, embroidery
workshop
I nputslActivities
-US$3,300!unit for building
-US$1000/unit for infrastructure
-units supplied bythe Ministry
-buift by privato contractor
-land supphed by municipahty
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Project 2: Government, Gmûspinar
Gûmûspinar, built in response to the second earthquake, is a large settlement
0f 1 194 units Iocated on government-owned land about 5 km from the city
(figure 34). This was one cf two large settlements outside cf the city that
housed familles from D]zce and also from the surrounding countryside. The
Ministry cf Transportation owned the land and before the earthquake it was
designated to become an airstrip. Preparation of the site included grading,
raising the building plots, laying gravel and constructing roads and curbs.
Duplex units of 30m2, prefabricated panels with corrugated metal exterior
walls were built on concrete slab foundations and included electricity and
water. Since the settlement was outside cf the city the services included a
school, a mosque, and medical clinic, coffee shop, laundry, Internet café and
community centre as well as bus, postal and garbage collection services.
For the first two years the settlement was completely cccupied; however,
many of the tenants have now moyeU into permanent housing leaving only
20% cf the units occupied and the settlement in a state of disrepair. Even
familles affected by the earthquake who were not homecwners were able to
vacate this settlement 3 to 4 years after the earthquake for self-help
permanent housing projects that were sponsored by NGOs. About 600 units
have been dismantled, mcst cf which have been solU to familles for about
$1 1 00 each-leaving the foundations, toilet fixtures and garbage strewn about
the site. 0f the 150 families who remain in the units, most were not directly
affected by the earthquakes, but have taken up residence there because 0f
cheap (or f ree) accommodations, despite the desclate environmental quality
and distance from the city.
The gcvernment plans to force out the remaining familles by cutting off water,
electricity supply and garbage collection services and then dismantle the test
of the site. Units that cannot be scld will either be recycled for future disasters
Internai factors
(within the proje
-No plans te
redevelop site
meant that site
was loft
vacant and
polluted with
infrastructure
4.ackof
affordable
housing in the
ares meant
that some
rentera wanted
te continue to
ive on-site
even though
no services
more pro ded4
Project 2: qovernment
Gùmùspinar
r Project Objectives “\
-provide housing as sonnas possible
\upport_prefab building industry
Impacts
(as 0f Auguat 2004)
-housing b 80% vacant
-600 have sinon dismantlod ond soIt
-150 families net directly affectot by
disestor occupy housing
-site pollution to due slab foundations, roado
ont other infrastructure
Inputs/Activities
-US$3,300lunit for building
-US$1000/unit for intrastracture
-units suppliet by private prefabricating
company
-built by private contrector
External factors
(eutoide the project)
-Use of slab
block
foundation
added to site
pollution
-Use of
government
owned land
meant that
site dit net
need te bu
cleaned up
-Site outslde
of cfty was net
desirable
for long-terra
occupation by
renters
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or junked, depending on their physical state. In GCimCispinar, like in iralik,
the other large settlement outside the city, and other settlements in the
disaster area, it is probable that the concrete slab foundations and the
underground infrastructure wilI remain on the site long after dismantiing has
occurred. Since these settlements are on government owned land and there
are no immediate plans for redevelopment, the sites remain in a sorry state
long after the temporary housing s gone.
A. B.
I 4’
Resuits
-1194 families housed by March 2000
-retum to daily activitieS
-suburb-like development with many services]
4
H
(H
H
Outputs
-1194 housing units, each 30ni2
-2 unds per building
-concrete slab foundation
:Pretabecated panels, corrugated aluminum
exterior
-plumbing, electricity
-bout on govornment land 5 km outside city
-paved modo, bus service
-community hall, market, clinic, coffee shop,
laundry, barber shop. internet, school
- -
Figure 34 Gûmûspinar temporary housing project; A. Logframe diagram; B.
The project in 2003; C. Project in 2004 with the slab foundations Ieft on the
site of the dismantled houses.
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Project 3: NGO, Fidanhik
Two days after the second earthquake in Dùzce, the Turkish NGO
consortium, Afete Karsi Sivil Koordinasyon - Civil Coordination Against
Disasters (ASK) Iaunched an Internet appeal to raise funds to build a
temporary housing settlement in DCizce (figure 35). This appeal was
answered by an NGO, Action by Churches Together (ACT) Netherlands,
which offered to sponsor the project. The MPWS and the municipality oltered
a government-owned site within the city for the project and included the
installation ot infrastructure. ASK in cooperation with ACT Netherlands found
a local builder to supply and build the units; in total 352 units, 23m2 each with
four units per building were built of wood on pile foundations. Each unit was
one room with a kitchen area and a small bathroom with running water. The
settlement, although located close to the city, also included laundry facilities,
a library, a youth centre, a daycare and a coffee shop built by the NGO5 and
managed by the residents. In the early stages, the whole settlement was run
by the community themselves, however, Iater the management was
transferred to the governor’s office.
Fidanlik was completely dismantled in July 2004 after several of the units
succumbed to tire. Prior to dismantling, a few families were camping-out in
the units but were forced to leave when the government cut off the water and
electricity. The wood material was recycled into wood chips and the rest of
the land and debris was cleared except for the underground infrastructure.
Redevelopment ot this land is likely considering its location near the city; prior
to its use as a site for temporary housing, this area was used as a plant
nursery by the state.
InternaI factors
(within the project)
-Flammable
materials used
ror coristwction
oere net sote
for Iong-term
inhabitation
Pile foundatio
cas eusy te
rnmovn and
thtss reduced
site pollution
Euternal fectors
ioutside the promet)
H
-Management
0f tire project
mas eventually
taken over by
government
Se NGO5 no
longer dictatelo
the outcome of
the project
Inhabitants
niera asked te
cave and
materials mcm
recycted but
not soit
A.
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Project 3: NGO
Fidanhik
4 Project Objectives
f -provide housing as sono os passible
-use local building resources
\ -Promote locol economic devclopment
Impacts
(asofAugust2004)
-housing as bonn 100% dismantled
-wood rnatenal mas recyclnd
-some site pollution but no foundatiens te
clean up
Resuits
-352 families housed by Feb 2000
-return te daily activities
- -living in urban setting
-sorne small enterprises unit jobs in
seUlement for management, laundry, library
Outputs
-352 housing units. each 23m2
-4 units per building
construction built on wood piles
-plumbing, electricity
-community centre. cotfee shop, laundry,
library, daycare, ptayground, youth house
H
InputslActivities
-US$1000”unft for building
-US$500ionit for infrastructure
-managed by NGO coal,tion
-buildings supptiod ont built by local company
-rnunicipat land
Figure 35 Fidanhik temporary housing project; A. Logframe diagram; B.
Housing unit, photo taken in June 2000 a few months after it was built; C. The
site after dismantiing in July 2004 has very little pollution.
Project 4: NGO, UMCOR
UMCOR (United Methodist Committee on Relief) funded a temporary housing
project that was coordinated by a local NGO, Human Settlements Association
(HSA) (figure 36). The project got underway later than most ot the temporary
housing and it was completed in May/June 2000, about 10 months after the
earthquake. The government offered a site for the project outside of the city,
but this was rejected by the NGOs who then went ahead and negotiated
contracts for several privately-owned plots inside the city. As a trade for the
use of the land, the NGO offered eight finished housing units to the
landowner. Like the other projects, the infrastructure was stili provided by the
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state. In total, 192 housing units cf 25m2 were built in 8-unit buildings. The
buildings were prefabricated panels built on steel frames and metal piles.
Dut of the total number, 136 units were stili located on the site as of August
2004. The families living in the units were paying rent and many of them were
young families who were living with their parents prior to and after the
earthquake. The availability cf this atfordable housing has allowed them move
out on their own. Some of the tenants have removed one cf the dividing walls
and occupy two units, totalling 50m2.
One of the specific objectives of the units’ design was that the units could be
moved and reused. The lease for the land is terminated in JuIy 2005, which is
five years after the date of construction, so ail the units must be moved or
dismantled by that date. in Juiy 2004, 7 buildings (or 56 units) had been
dismantied and moyeU to new sites in the area for use as schools, community
centres and medicai ciinics. The buildings were donated to the new owners,
but the cost of moving each building and reinstalling it was estimated to be
about $5000 per building.
Project 4: NGO
UMCOR
f Project Objectives
-provide housing as soon as possible
-reusable building system
\-inner_city location
External factors
(outside the project)
Impacts
(as 0f August 2004)
-136 nfts stili occupied mostly by young
families. Some famiSes occupy 2 units and 4-)
remove the walls
-56 units (7 buildings) dismantled,
reconstructed in new locations as new
fuctions: school, community centre, civic
buildings, etc.
-ail units te ho dismantled by spring 2005
when base for land oxeires
lnputslActivities
-4_ -US$3,O3OIunit for building
—____——‘ -US$500/unit for infrastructure
-managed by UMCORHSA NGOs
-built by prrate company: TRESAN
-pnavtely ownod land, contract signed forS
years
DISCUSSION
A.
Internai factors
(within tire project)
B.
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-Reuse was
achelveabbe
partly
because design
was intended for
this
-Private land
ownership meant
units must be
removed and
land cleaned by
ond 0f lease
-For muse 10 bu
possible, fhere
must be
marketthat is
willing to pay
moving costs
for the units C.
Results
-392 families houxed in ]uly 2000
-relurn to daily activities
-living in urban setting
Outputs
—)‘-l92 housing units, each 25m2
-8 units per building
-prefabricated panels built on sIed frame
and metal piles
-plumbing, ebectricity
-no services
Figure 36 UMCOR temporary housing project; A. Logframe diagram; B. The
housing units; C. The units reused as a school
Based on the data collected, and the process of tiltering the data through the
“reversed” logframes, the project reports point to general issues about the
long-term impacts of temporary housing: the outcomes of the units in the
long-term, resultant site pollution, matching design to local resources, and
noteworthy diflerences between government and NGO sponsored projects.
The following discussion synthesizes these issues and adds remarks from
other case studies where similar temporary housing programmes were
implemented atter disasters.
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Outcomes of the temporary housing units in the Iong-term
In each of the projects, the physicai structure of the temporary houses was
stiil functional long after their intended use. After two to three years, the
majority of the temporary units were vacant because the “homeowner”
familles had moyeU into permanent housing, leaving mostiy the “renting”
familles and new in-migrants living in the temporary housing. The intention ot
the programme was ta house peopie until permanent housing stocks could be
rebuilt, but at this point in time, many of the temporary housing units were still
usable. The quandary is that ta make the house comfortabie enough ta be
acceptable as a temporaty house often means supplying a structure that is
durable well beyond the short time period that it is needed as temporary
housing.
This then raises the following question, what can be done with the temporary
houses once they are no longer needed for temporary housing? Based on the
Turkish case study and results from other case studies, there seem ta be
basically five options: long-term use, dismantiing and storage, sale, demolish,
and reuse.
Long-term use of temporary housing is a theme that runs through many case
studies and it is often considered by the authorities ta be problematic. In
Colombia after the earthquake in 1999, the authorities did not manage ta
evict ail the settlers and the situation in the remaining temporary housing
settlements is one of social dysfunction and extremely high crime rates
(Lizarraide and Johnson, 2003). In Japan, afterthe 1995 earthquake in Kobe,
the population that was ieft behind in the temporary housing were generaily
the eideriy and poor families who could not afford ta purchase permanent
housing. There was a probiem with high suicide rates in these communities
attributed ta ioneiiness and despair from being cut off from their alU
communities (Comerio, 1998; Tomioka, 1997). Temporary housing in ltaiy
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after the Friuli earthquake in 1976 and in Greece alter the Kalamata
earthquake in 1 986 remained over the Iong-term because residents persisted
in using the units as storage and second homes even once they had
permanent housing (Dandoulaki, 1 992;Geipel, 1 991).
In Turkey, as we saw in the case reports, housing s stifl in short supply in the
earthquake-affected area, especially for renters who were left out of the
permanent housing programme. Theretore, there s stili a strong demand for
long-term use of temporary housing, especially those of good quality that are
weIl Iocated within the city centre. WhiIe there s a strong potential for long
term use by renters, the authorities have not been in favour of this because of
the management problems it entails, i.e. collecting rents, maintaining units,
sites and land leases, and because the infrastructure is not made to Iast
beyond five years. Also, the government is flot enthusiastic about sponsoring
new migrants who are squatting in the houses without paying rent. With a few
exceptions, the government has been successtul in forcing people to vacate
the temporary housing, avoiding long-term use ot the units beyond five years,
however structurally sound they may still be.
Long-term options for temporary housing programmes also include
dismantiing units and storing them for use in future disasters. In Turkey, the
MPWS has a large storage and restoration facility in Ankara for temporary
housing; many of the container-type units were brought there for
refurbishment and reuse in the next disaster or to be donated for earthquakes
in other countries. In the United States, temporary housing provided by the
government is in the form of trailer homes that are recuperated after use,
refurbished and stored for the next disaster. However, the cost ot
refurbishment and storage is flot always economical since transport,
returbishment and storage may cost as much as a new unit. For example in
Greece, after the Kalamata earthquake, one of the justifications for the use of
temporary housing was that after its first use it could be stored for future
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uses; however the poor condition of the houses after the f irst use and the
costs of storage made this prohibitive (Dandoulaki, 1992).
Authorities also seil the units or parts once they are no longer needed, thus
recovering some of the cost. In Turkey, many of the government owned units
were sold to families, businesses and institutions for approximately US$1200
each, thus recouping one third cf the $3300 initial unit cost.
Even when units are demollshed, the parts and materials can be sold or
donated. The NGO who sponsored the Fidanlik project was planning to seil
the materials f rom the demolished units and use the funds for a community
project. However upon demolition, this did not happen because the
government had taken over management of the settiement and also the final
condition of the units had littie value. When the temporary houses were
demolished in Colombia after the 1999 earthquake, there was unfortunately
no policy mechanism for donating or selling the materials, so the authorities
had to dispose of them (Lizarralde and Johnson, 2003).
Reuse of the units for other community functions was undertaken in the
UMCOR project where the units were donated to schools, community centres
and hospitals for their “second lifespan”. At the outset cf the project,
UMCOR’s objective was to design a unit that would be easy to dismantie and
reuse. However, at the reuse stage there were also new costs because, while
the building is I ree of charge for the new owner, it must be dismantled,
transported and reassembled in the new location. For example in DCizce, the
cost to move one 200m2 building (8 units) to a nearby community for use as a
sports centre was US$8000, which included transport and labour, installation
of electricity and water, and a new roof. It follows that for reuse to be a
feasible option, a market must exist that is willing to pay for the costs of the
new installation.
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Site pollution
in Turkey, even once the houses were removed from the site, the land
remained iittered with the infrastructure, concrete siab foundations and other
debris. Land under private ownership, for which the government had signed
lease contracts, had te be cleared and restored to its former condition.
However, since the majority cf the settiements were on government owned
land there was no obligation to restore the original condition cf the site and
therefore most sites were left peiiuted. Observations indicated that cencrete
slab foundations were the worst poliutants, and settiements that did net use
this type et toundation but instead used pile foundations were generaiiy iess
poiluted. In Colombia after the 1999 earthquake, temporary housing units
made et wood with pile foundations were built in public parks and playing
fields. Since stipulation in the lease meant that land had te be vacated within
three years, the programme was successfui in cleaning up the sites and
remeving ail the infrastructure and debris (Lizarraide and Johnson, 2003).
Matching design to local resources
The entire temporary heusing programme in Turkey used factory-made
prefabricated panels and compenents that were bought lecally frem local
manufacturers. This decision allowed the government to previde much
needed temperary housing and aIse te support the prefabricating industries in
Turkey. In fact, it was said that the decision te previde tempo rary heusing was
in part a response te a request frem the prefabricating industry. Japan, which
aIse has a pretabricated heusing industry, has used similar tactics te deveiep
rapidly available temperary housing drawing en local industries. Hewever
after the Kebe earthquake, se many heuses were needed that they had te
purchase some units frem international suppliers (Maki, et aI., 1995). Weed
heuses have been used in seme cases aise drawing on the reseurces
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available in the particular region, such as in Colombia and in parts of Turkey.
Whatever the type of temporary housing, most importantly, t must be rapidly
available and then secondly, draw on local resources and industries. In
Greece after the Kalamata earthquakes, for example, the prefabricated
temporary houses were purchased internationally and delays in the delivery
meant that temporary housing was not available until after it was no longer
needed (Dandoulaki, 1992).
Dïfterences between government and NGO sponsored projects
The temporary housing projects in Turkey also reveal some differences
between NGO sponsored projects and those that were sponsored by the
government. In general, NGO projects were smaller in terms of the number ot
units, ranging from 20 to 350 units whereas the government projects were up
to 2000 units per settlement. In the NGO projects, the house designs, the
materials and the quality varied from project to project, depending on the
specifications set by the organisation. While most units had a kitchen and
bathroom, some projects were more rudimentary and did flot include these
facilities; meanwhile, other projects otfered more deluxe accommodations
with closed bedrooms and washing machines. These differences resulted in
some large variations in comfort from one project to another. Designs in the
government projects were more or Iess the same, since the prefabricating
suppliers responded to a calI for tenders in which design specifications were
pre-established by the government. Government projects were built on
government-owned land whereas the NGO projects were built both on
privately owned land and on government-owned land.
There also appeared to be differences in the objectives of the NGO and
government projects. The government projects aimed to build a large number
of units in as short amount of time as possible—and they were very
successful in achieving this goal. Generally it seems that the NGO projects
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placed more importance on sensitivity to local needs, such as using local
resources, creating incorne opportunities for the dwellers, reuse of buildings
for cornmunity purposes, and placing maintenance responsibility in the hands
of the people rather than the authorities.
CONCLUSION
As this research has tried to dernonstrate, the factors that affect the
temporary housing programme corne both f rom the systern of temporary
housing and also f rom larger systems outside the temporary housing. For
example, the temporary housing programme forms only a part of the total
programme for recovery, so its organisational and technological designs must
fit with, and contribute to, the recovery programme as a whole. Furthermore,
the type of temporary housing supplied, i.e. prefabricated units, or self built
units, will depend on larger economic and political factors in the country and
even internationally. A summary of these factors is presented below:
• Rapidly available: Most importantly, temporary housing must be rapidly
available for the affected population. For this to happen, the financial and
organisational resources must be in place before the disaster occurs to
swiftly instigate the temporary housing programme, and a supply of units
must be available.
• Draw on local suppliers andior local resources: the temporary housing
programme can promote national or local manufacturers and suppliers as
well as the economy by using dornestically produced products, services
and labour.
• Meet local living standards in terms of comfort, services and
location: Living standards in one disaster-affected area are different from
the living standards in another; therefore the design, services and
locations used for the temporary housing should reflect local living
standards rather than living standards of the donor country.
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Designing for Hie length of time temporary housing is needed or an
efficient long-term plan for the unïts: In Turkey, as in many other
cases, the units were made to last much longer than they were needed as
temporary housing. At the same time, renters were in need of housing, yet
they because of the management structure they were not allowed to stay
in the temporary housing. This created a mismatch 0f resources.
The Iength of time temporary housing is needed wiIl depend upon the
timing of the permanent reconstruction programme and must reflect who
is included in this programme. Either units can be inexpensive and
designed to be durable only for a short period 0f time, or a programme of
reuse can be planned.
• Easy to remove and non-polluting: Land leases for temporary housing
projects can stipulate that the sites must be cleaned and returned to their
original condition before the end of the lease. Infrastructure, units and
foundations that are simple to remove will Iikely leave the site less Iittered.
If the above mentioned factors can be addressed at the outset 0f the
programme, then the negative impacts associated with temporary housing,
i.e. too late, too expensive, too long-lasting can certainly be reduced to the
point where temporary housing becomes an efficient and practical way to
house people quickly and temporarily after a disaster.
The case reports and the discussion highlight the Iong-term outcomes 0f
temporary housing and point to factors that need to be addressed in the initial
planning of temporary housing programmes. In the Turkish case, the disaster
affected people welcomed the use 0f prefabricated temporary housing, and it
could be argued that it was necessary to implement this programme to aid
recovery quickly enough. Despite the relative success 0f the programme in
the short-term, assessed in terms of the timely supply of units and the very
high occupancy rates, the negative Iong-term outcomes addressed in this
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research might flot have been problematic had they been addressed at the
outset ot the programme.
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CHAPIER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION
The following discussion synthesizes the research findings. Two kinds of
information are presented here: 1) points that have already been expressed
elsewhere in the text, for which it is necessary to restate their importance in
the overail findings of the research and 2) new points that were not presented
in the articles because they have emerged during the general synthesis. If a
point has already been expressed in one of the articles, a reference will be
provided, indicating its location.
Section 5.1 defines thirteen points of synthesis and section 5.2 offers
recommendations for each stage of the temporary housing project lifecycle.
5.1 Synthesis of the findings
This research is set apart from most studies in reconstruction in that it
recognises temporary housing as a process in its own right, differentiated
from other parts of housing recovery, and therefore subject to its own
constraints and issues. It s these constraints and issues, specific to the
system of temporary housing, which constitute the main findings of this
research:
1.
Temporary housing is both a physical product and a stage of housing
recovery atter a disaster. Due to a Jack of strategic planning, the
process of pro viding temporary housing has been fraught with
problems. A systems view of temporary housing is necessary to
understand how to make improvements.
Temporary housing is both a product, that s, an actual inventory of housing
stock provided to house affected families temporarily after a disaster, and a
stage of recovery where families to get back to their daily life in a dwelling
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that serves them until they have a permanent place to live (see Article IV,
Introduction). The former part of this definition, that is, the physical product cf
temporary housing, s the main focus of this research. Decisions that are
made regarding the physical form of temporary housing units and
communities, and how they are planned for and managed have an impact flot
only on the affected populations recovery, but also on the long-term overall
reconstruction and on urban development patterns.
Many problems in previous temporary housing projects have come about
because of the need to make quick decisions following the disaster and the
consequent lack 0f time to create a well thought out plan. Problems include:
too many houses built, houses flot suitable for climate and/or culture, houses
extremety inconveniently located, or bouses unexpectedly becoming
permanent. Overali this means that resources are being wasted, or familles
are going without adequate housing.
This research puts forth that pre-disaster strategic planning, which utilizes the
systems view, is required to improve the application of temporary housing.
Untangling the diverse problems of temporary housing calls for a systems
perspective, which sees temporary housing as part of a larger system cf post
disaster reconstruction and also part 0f the overall disaster recovery (see
Article IV, Introduction). These systems are in turn embedded in larger
systems such as local economic, political and social systems, in local
precedents for building, and even in international systems 0f aid, foreign
lending and donations. On the more specific side cf project management
however, strategic planning for temporary housing also encompasses the
following sub-systems:
• An orQanisational system: a programme for temporary housing is born out
cf a complex array cf organisational systems that must work together in a
185
chaotic post-disaster environment to produce a coherent and efficient
plan;
• A technical system: a choice cf building type and design, and urban
design that meets ail the necessary climatic, cultural and time
requirements;
• A systemic process: matching the type cf technical solution required with
the numbers cf houses needed, finding adequate locations, procuring and
distributing houses, managing the settiements and dismantiing the
houses.
2.
Temporary housing programmes are strongly influenced by country
specific precedents in building and, more broadly, organisational
culture.
The international cross-case nature cf this research has shown that
procurement strategies for temporary housing in different countries are
strongly related te that countrys habituaI organisation cf building projects, te
the technical training and expertise that already exists, to local ideologicai
traditions and te existing industries.
For example, in Turkey, the ministry responsible for temporary housing (and
reconstruction), aIse administers public housing projects (called mass
housing in Turkey). Therefore many existing arrangements for permanent
infrastructure construction and project management could be drawn on for the
temporary housing projects. The entire programme was highly centralised in
the government and, as had been the precedent set in past disasters, there
was a high level cf expectation that the government take responsibility for
procuring new houses. We can compare this te the temporary housing
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project in Colombia, in which the reconstruction was decentralised and
handled by locally based NGOs and by the people—a decentralisation done
ta avoid corruption at the government level. It reflects the culture of building in
which the responsibility for housing lies more on community-level
procurement rather than centralised government procurement.
3.
Political goals and motivations are likely to shape decisions regarding
temporary housing.
This research has shown that many cf the decisions made regarding
temporary housing, i.e. whether ta provide it, who supplies it, who it will be
provided ta, where it will be located, how fast it will be available and for how
long, are decisions that, in many cases, are made to achieve some political
goals, whether implicit or explicit. Table IV shows the organisations that
influenced the initial decision about providing temporary housing.
Table IV Organisations influencing decisions about temporary housing
programmes, by case study
- CD
U)
0) 0 0) Ø)
- ce N-
ORGANISATIONS INFLUENCING DECISIONS
- g g .
ABOUT TEMPORARY HOUSING - Q g
PROGRAMMES
-
Affected Community
Community-based Organisations
NGOs & Aid Organisations
—
Municipal & Regional Authorities
— —
—&- .- —
Central Government*
Building Industry
Land Owners
Banks & Lending Institutions
*most otten a special body created within the government for
relief & reconstruction i::i strong influence
lesser influence
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Most frequently t is the government, either the central government or the
municipal or regional authorities, which are responsible for decisions
regarding the temporary housing programmes. The central government wiIl
often appoint a temporary body responsible for the reconstruction and relief
efforts, if it does not already exist permanently. However, these bodies, both
central and regional/local have been known to sway their decision ta favaur a
certain group. In Turkey, it appears that the prefabricated building industry
had an impact on the decision to construct prefabricated temporary housing
units. In Mexico fallowing the 1985 earthquake, Comeria (1998) pointed out
that the decision ta have temporary housing units built conveniently alongside
the damaged buildings was politically motivated because the affected
population had a large voting power that could upset the government if they
were not provided with decent solutions. In Colombia, ta avoid corruption, this
central gavernment body delegated responsibilities ta locally based NGOs,
which were believed ta be less corrupt. In ltaly, it appeared that many of the
decisians regarding the temporary hausing programme had been carrupt
(Geipel, 1982).
4.
Temporary housing is provided after a disaster for the purpose of:
aiding family recovery, allowing time for sustainable redevelopment,
maintaining economic functioning in a region, and public health.
The main reasons for praviding temparary housing are:
1) Humanitarian-related: Offering families decent housing ta help them
recover and ta allaw them time ta figure out how they are going ta
rebuild their homes or gain access ta permanent housing adapted ta
their needs.
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2) Development-related: Allowing proper time to get systems in place that
wilI promote safe rebuilding in the area. This may include:
• Taking time to plan the location of reconstructed houses and
ensure compatibility with the overali programme for
reconstruction;
• Using participatory methods for planning the reconstruction and
future developments in the area. lt is considered the best
practice for achieving sustainable development; however to
reach a consensus through participatory methods often takes
time;
• Creating a new urban or regional plan for reconstruction and
future development that will make the area sater from future
disasters;
• Updating building practices and land supply mechanisms so
that new buildings are more likely to conform to building codes.
This entails passing new policies or adopting new codes,
implementing new practices (including code enforcement) and
developing information management systems and educating
building industry professionals (and the general population)
about disaster resistant technologies, methods and procedures.
3) Economic: Maintaining the population in a given area, or encouraging
the return of a population that fled elsewhere after the disaster, to
promote economic regeneration or to sustain the existing economy in
the region. If people leave a disaster-affected area the economy will
collapse; a good example of this is New Orleans after hurricane
Katrina. The city could not function again until the residents came back
to ive there—but in order to do this they need safe housing.
4) Public health-related: To control disease outbreaks and other
sicknesses and to facilitate the provision of other social services.
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5.
The physical type of temporary housing chosen will depend upon:
a vailability of existing undamaged housing, country-specific precedents
in building, climate, living standards in the disaster area, willingness to
invest, politics (interest in supporting certain groups), supply of
building materials and the length of time temporary housing will be
needed.
As explained in Article I and in the discussion et Article II, temporary housing
can take on many different physical forms or types, which vary by the level cf
comfort provided, by the procurement method, by the time it takes, and by the
intensity cf investment. Organisations responsible for temporary housing
have te make choices about what type et temporary housing te invest in; this
decision must weigh in many factors, such as:
• Availability cf existinç undamaged housinci: if apartments or other housing
options exist there is no need to build special temporary housing units
• Country-stecific precedents in building: normal procurement methods and
building typologies
• Climate: the design needs to consider local climatic conditions and other
risks
Living standards in the disaster area: types of buildings families will be
willing to ive in, including local vernacular characteristics
• Willingness te invest: keeping in mmd temporary housing is only one
phase cf reconstruction, how much the govern ment, NGOs or families are
willing to, or able te invest.
• Politics: interest in supporting certain groups
• Supply et building materials: from where can materials be procured, how
long it will take and how much it will cost.
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• Lencjth of time temporary housinQ will be needed: if ternporary housing is
only toreseen to be needed for six rnonths, it will require a different
solution that ternporary housing needed for two years, f ive years, or more.
While each of these factors can play a role in the decision, the weight given to
each factor will depend on the given disaster situation.
As is shown in table V, sorne types of ternporary housing require less
investrnent than others. However, the level of investment in temporary
housing seerns to be only one small part ot the decision-making process
when t cornes to type, with the other above-rnentioned factors playing a far
greater role.
Table V Different types cf ternporary housing, the arnount ot investment
required and the tendency for t to be grouped in settiernents or dispersed
throughout the cornrnunity
Types of Temporary housïng
. . Dispersed Groupetechnical solution Settiement Settiemen
minimum
staying with relatives/host familyinvestment
user-built shelters
rented apartments
—
public buildings as shelter
..*
tents
basic house of wood, corrugated sheets*
shipping container unit*
deluxe prefabricated unit**
maximum
mobile homeinvestment
... —
*
may include private kitchen & bathroom
** inciudes private kitchen and bathroom
Temporary housing can either be placed in grouped settlements or dispersed
unit-by-unit throughout the disaster-affected area. ‘Grouped’ rneans that
191
temporary housing units are located in collective centres, communities or
camp settiements, where houses are grouped together, sometimes sharing
common services. Temporary housing can also be ‘dispersed’, meaning that
the houses are flot placed in communities but are distributed or scattered
around, usually on separate plots of land. The latter often means that the
houses are placed on the land owned by the atfected familles, next to their
damaged houses. As depicted in table 5 by the continuum on the right ot the
table, different types ot temporary housing are more IikeIy to be grouped or
more llkelyto be dispersed.
6.
Vie single largest issue in procuring temporary housing is finding
suitable, available sites on which to place the units—an aspect which is
rarely part of strategic planning.
This research has shown (see discussion in Article Il), that procurement of
the temporary housing units in a timely fashion is flot a major problem in
temporary housing. In tact, this aspect has generally been successfully
carried out—the units are ordered and can be delivered with a reasonable
delay 0f a few weeks to a few months. In some cases, there has been pre
disaster strategic planning for how to acquire the units, yet even if there was
a lack of strategic planning, stopgap tactical planning seems to have been
adequate enough.
Establishing possible locations for temporary housing s something that has
flot been common in disaster preparedness planning. However, interest in
this aspect of planning has taken hold during the course of this research and
a few recent examples do now exist, see Bologna (2006) for work in ltaly and
Ozcevik and co-workers (2003) for work in Istanbul, Turkey.
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7.
The location of temporary housing in relation to (I) the familles’ former
house, or (ii) established infrastructure and services, can have a huge
impact on the success of the project. Trade-offs must be made to have
the temporary housing available as soon as possible yet in locations
that will be conducive to recovery.
Temporary housing can be placed on different kinds cf sites (see table VI),
which vary in their proximity to established urban areas and in their
ownership.
Table VI Possible kinds cf sites for temporary housing, by case study
U)
o
cc
SITES FOR TEMPORARY
HOUSING/IMPLICATIONS
-
— cc —
D o -E c u u
—
- o x >
- - ‘-
— — ==
near damaged house on tamily’s own land
— —
parks/squares in urban area
— — — — — —
vacant public land in urban area — — — —
private leased sites in urban area
along roadways
—
public land, outskirts of city —
— —
private leased land, outskirts of city = = =
Each cf these sites has different implications for the temporary housing
programme, some are positive and some are negative—as shown in table
VII. Constructing houses on several small plots cf land within the city,
especially if negotiations are required to secure the land, may take more time
than building on one large plot cf land outside the city. Nevertheless,
tempcrary housing that is placed on the families’ own land, or in the city near
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their destroyed dwellings will be more convenient for the familles, whereas
housing far away from their pre-disaster location can be socially devastating
and isolating, especially for elderly people.
Table VII Possible sites for temporary housing and their implications
SITES FOR TEMPORARY
HO USI NG/IM PLI CATIONS
near damaged house on familys own land
public parks/squares in urban area
private leased sites in urban area
along roadways
public land, outskirts cf city
ptivate leased land, outskirts cf city
8.
Land tenure for temporary housing sites, meaning how long the units
can legally stay on the land, will impact the outcome 0f the project.
Houses built on land that is leased, especially from a private ownei will
be less likely to become permanent.
Housing that is on private land, or in public areas such as parks, squares and
rights-of-way will have very definite end dates when the houses must be
removed and the land returned to normal. In the Colombian case, playing
fields used for temporary housing were returned to their former use atter the
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lease expired in three years. In Turkey, as was discussed in Article IV,
temporary housing that was built on the private sites had to be removed and
the sites had to be cleared and returned to their original state after f ive years.
This was in sharp contrast to temporary housing built on public lands, on
which, in some cases, the temporary housing remained almost indelinitely,
while in other cases the sites remained polluted, littered with infrastructure
and other debris.
Having a definite end date for a project means temporary housing is less
likely to become a permanent blight on the environment. However, familles
who are genuinely in need ot housing will lose housing that they most likely
desperately need.
9.
On the whole, the affected population is flot invited to participate in
formai temporary housing projects. This is even more pronounced in
government-led projects versus NGO-ied projects. Having familles as
key-decision makers in the process of housing recovery is of great
importance. However it seems that the necessity to build temporary
housing quickly outweighs this importance in the majority of projects.
Table VIII Iists the organisations involved in temporary housing and how they
are implicated in the seven stages of the lifecycle, in each ot the six case
studies.
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Table VIII Organisations taking part in temporary housing for each case
study, by life cycle stage
strategîc programme project
ORGANISATIONS P1aing* planning planning
design construction f operation dismantiing
tAKING PART IN
tEMPORARY
HOU SING /LIFE o
CYCLE STAGE
Aflected Familles
NGOs & Aid Agencies
MunicipJRegion. Goy.
Central Government
Building lndustry
Municipal Services
Land Owners
Lending Institutions
General Contractors
Trades people
Designers/Planners
III’’
This table shows how the municipal and regional government are the most
heavily implicated in temporary housing throughout the projects’ lifecycles.
However, different organisations play a part in different stages; an
examination of the lifecycle stage brings out the following points:
• Strategic planning is absent in most of the programmes and if it does
occur it is either the central or regional governments that are involved.
• Programme planning: Government and lending institutions do
programme planning, except in Colombia where the responsible NGO
handled it. In Italy, the affected population had a small role in the
temporary housing at this stage.
• Project planning: a wide variety of participants are involved in planning
individual temporary housing projects. The cases present no clear
pattern of organisations involved except tor the municipal/regional
governments and the municipal service providers.
Design: Designers, planners as well as governments and the building
industry are involved in this stage. While a normal housing project
would most likely have affected families implicated now, only in the
o
o
o
o
n
E
o
o
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Colombian project did affected families participate, and this is only
because they were supplying their own self-built shacks.
• Construction: This stage brings in a variety 0f participants that have
littie involvement in the other stages, such as trades people and
general contractors. Also heavily involved in this stage are the building
industry and municipal services providers.
• Operation: the municipal/regional governments as well as NGO5 and
affected families are involved. In some cases, people who are living on
site are employed to manage the day-to-day operations and services.
• Dismantiing: Almost solely managed by the local government who
hires general contractors to complete the work.
Throughout aIl of the temporary housing projects there is a serious lack ot
community participation. Affected tamilies are absent from the decision
process, or are in tact only sporadically involved in any of the stages cf
temporary housing. This can be contrasted with the average low-cost housing
project in developing countries, which wilI typically implicate families in the
stages cf project planning, design, construction and operation. Their
implication may only be at a very cursory level, such as giving their opinion on
a number of set alternatives, or they can be implicated in real decision
making roles (see Arnstein, 1969; Choguill 1996; and Davidson et al. 2006 for
more about the roles 0f communities in building housing projects).
A likely reason for this lack ot participation is that temporary housing projects
must be completed very quickly and participatory methods take more time to
implement than top-down non-participatory methods. In order to provide
temporary housing as quickly as possible, governments and NGOs take on
the decision-making roles as if by necessity.
While there s certainly a lack cf user participation in formaI temporary
housing projects, tamilies are often implicated in building their own temporary
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housing - a factor that is not emphasized in the case studies in this research.
In any disaster situation, there are many families that supply their own
temporary housing; however littie data exists about the extent of this because
they are not part of any formai project and their houses are dispersed
throughout the affected area. For example in Turkey it was observed that
many families had buiit their own temporary housing on their land, or on open
land adjacent to their apartment building.
70.
Temporary housing is best integrated with the other stages of housing
recovery and other recovery systems, sa as ta maximise the efficiency
of the use of resources and to offer a coherent and transparent recovery
strategy for the families. Closely associating the management af these
stages and other recovery systems is a key ta good projects.
One way to look at the organisational design of temporary housing is to
measure the extent to which temporary housing programmes are integrated
into an overali approach to achieving housing recovery or separate from other
elements of the disaster recovery and reconstruction planning, decision
making and financing. Bolton (1997) argues that temporary housing
programmes that are integrated are less disruptive to families because they
have a clearer picture of their stake in long-term housing solutions and also
the affected families can take a more active role in planning their temporary
and permanent housing. Furthermore, Bolton (1997) points out that an
integrated programme minimises the resources spent on temporary housing
so that they can be focussed on permanent housing, while stili making sure
families are adequately housed as quickly as possible.
For example, after the Mexico earthquake, there was a highly integrated
programme where one organisation was responsible for temporary and for
permanent housing. Temporary housing consisted of very basic shelters
erected near the permanent housing sites so families’ living patterns were not
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disrupted and they could take part in the decision-making process for the
permanent housing. This can be contrasted with Japan where large
investments were made in the temporary housing, which was Iocated far
away from the damaged buildings. Families did not have a clear picture cf
their future housing opportunities and in the end many did not benefit from
receiving permanent housing. In figure 37, each cf the case studies is plotted
on a continuum showing the extent to which the interim and permanent
housing solutions are either more or Iess separated among different
programmes and decision-making entities or more or less integrated in terms
of decision-making and cf implementation.
INTEGRATED SEPARATE
MANAGEMENT 0F HOUSING STAGES ARE
HOUSING STAGES MNsJAGED SEPARATELY
ARE INTEGRATED
TOGETHER
Figure 37 Continuum showing extent to which temporary housing
programmes are integrated into or separated from disaster recovery
7 7
One of the major difficulties with temporary housing is perhaps simply
its name “temporary” since temporary housing has a tendency to
become permanent. Familles who were renting prior to the disaster are
more likely stay on in temporary housing than familles who were
homeowners.
In urban areas, where there was a shortage cf housing stock before the
disaster, exacerbated by the loss cf housing and shortage cf resources to
both replace and increase the housing stock, it is common that the temporary
housing could become permanent.
Mexico
1985
Italy
1976
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Families who were homeowners before the disaster seem to fate better in
replacing their home than do families who wete renting before the disaster.
Money to replace losses, such as insurance, government grants, or even
finished houses are available to homeowners to help them recover. At worst,
the family can rebuild with their own resources, on their own land. However, it
is renters, typically, that lack permanent housing solutions after a disaster,
since Iess housing is available and rents generally increase, especially at the
low end of the scale. For example, in Turkey, the ave rage price for renting an
apartment in lzmit more that doubled after the earthquake. It is for this reason
that renters tried to remain in temporary housing for as long as possible (note
that some NGOs launched permanent housing projects aimed at renters).
This is flot to say that renters were the only type of people remaining in
temporary housing, because, as was established in Article IV, there was a
range of different familles staying in temporary housing, some of whom were
flot even impacted by the disaster.
12.
Temporary housing can stili be usefui as an alternative contribution to
the medium-term availabie housing stock, especialiy for renters.
However, planning for Iong-term use or other outcomes, such as saie or
reuse as another function, needs to be organised and designed for from
the outset of the project.
The outcomes of the temporary housing, in each of the four major case
studies, are plotted in Table IX. Outcomes labelled with numbers 1 through 4,
where the houses continue to be used on site, were flot intended at the outset
of the programme. Outcomes labelled 5 through 8 show what happened to
the temporary units once they were removed f rom the site; in most cases,
these were the intended outcomes for the temporary housing. Outcome 9 did
flot occur in any of the formaI temporary housing case studies, however t
200
was observed in some housing initiatives by individual owners (see point 13
below).
Table IX Outcomes of the temporary housing units in each 0f the case
studies
o
o, —
g) O) (Og - cg
0 O)
OUTCOME 0F THE TEMPORARY HOUSING UNITS/CASE STUDY
> Q) —
G) U
O
.
I.-Q(
1 tentai units for those who do not have permanent housing — —
2 housing fot extended family members
—
g 3 squatter housing for those not affected by disaster — —
4 storage for family’s belongings
—
— — —
5 saie of unit to private ownets
— —
6 dismanthng, (refurbishment), storage cf parts or whoie building — — —
—
7 export to other disaster areas
—
—
8 reuse for public (i.e. sporting club, school)
—
—
f f 9 integrate parts into permanent housing — — — —
In planning for the management of temporary housing over the long term, the
options for are:
Temporary housinçi remains on the site and continues to be used as
housinçi. This requires a management that can rent the houses and
maintain the site.
Temporary housing is moyeU to another site and used as housing or
for community use such as a sport centre or school. This requires:
• Resources to move the units, likely a new owner or local
government that can pay to have the units moved and
reconstructed on the new site. Some modifications and
renovations to the units may also be required.
• Designs that will facilitate dismantling and reconstructing. This
needs to be incorporated into the initial design of the unit.
Materials or units can be sold or donated to those who can use them.
Although this sounds like a basic idea, it requires policies that allow
families to access to the materials, which has not aiways been the
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case. it is less costly than storing them and more sustainable than
disposing of the mate riais.
• Integrating the temporary housing into permanent housing through
renovation. Little evidence of this exists on a project scale, however it
was found that in Turkey individuai homeowners do take advantage of
this option.
• Dismantie, refurbish and store the units. it was found in the case
studies that this option is the most likely to have been planned for,
however t is more feasibie for sturdy container-style units than for
pretabricated buildings. Refurbishing and storing the units can be very
expensive unless particular facilities exist for this purpose, particularly
if building manufacturers can perform the refurbishment, if the
government does flot have the facilities.
13.
individual homeowners were successfui in using a temporary house,
placed on their own property, as a ‘core house’ which ta build their
permanent house around. This could be a sustainable practice ta be
foliowed in formai temporary housing projects.
it was observed in Turkey that some affected families used their temporary
house as a core house. One example was where a container was the initial
temporary house placed on the private land of the affected family. The family,
who did not want to move to the permanent housing developments because
they feared living in apartment blocks, slowly began to build their new house
around the container (figure 38). A second example is a famiiy that had two
paper houses side-by-side. Since the paper house settlement was built on
their brother’s land they were able to remain on the land. They started to
consolidate the two houses by building a kitchen in the middle of the space
between the two houses and have since added on a bath room (figure 39).
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5.2 Recommendations for Project Stages
This research has touched flot only on aspects that can be considered to be
strategic planning, but aspects to be addressed at each stage of a temporary
housing programme. To summarise these findings, the following section
offers recommendations stage by stage: pre-disaster strategic planning,
programme planning, project planning, design, construction, operation,
dismantling. These recommendations (presented in the form of table X) are
flot meant to be an exhaustive list but focuses on recommendations specific
to planning for temporary housing settiements.
L
Figure 38 a shipping container modified to be a temporary house becomes a
permanent house for a family of four. Side view of the house (left) and front
view of the house and the family (right).
Figure 39 Two paper temporary houses are consolidated into one dwelling
with the addition ot a kitchen and bathroom in the middle. Outside view ot the
house (left) and inside view of the kitchen built between to the two paper
houses (right).
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Table X: Recommendations for planning temporary housing settlements
Create a ‘plan 0f changes,’ a flexible strategic plan forStrategic planning temporary housinci that can be adapted to fit the specific
(pre-disaster) disaster situation. This may include several different
scenarios for temporary housing programmes that can
be drawn on in the event of a disaster, i.e. type of
disaster, extent of damage, locus of damage and time of
year.
ldentify a lead organisation and other organisations that
are capable 0f contributing to a temporary housing
programme, including their specific expertise and
possible roles. This can include the central government
and its ministries, regional government, local
government, service and infrastructure providers,
building suppliers, consultants, NGOs, community
groups and religious groups. Ascertain which people, or
which positions, in these organisations that will act as
the contact.
• Using risk mapping to determine vulnerable areas,
detine where temporary housing may be needed. Within
this region, define sites that would be suitable for
temporary housing, keeping in mmd proximity to
devastated areas and relation to existing infrastructure.
Approach landowners, or managers of publicly held
land, to make arrangements for possible use of the land.
• Develop basic specifications for the design of temporary
housing units and layout of sites taking into account
local conditions such as: climate and risks, building
traditions, family size, way of life and culture.
• ldentify sources of funding for a temporary housing
programme or other relief activities. This must also
include funding for operating and dismantling the units.
• A careful estimation 0f real numbers and an
Programme understanding of what people want or need for
planning (post- temporary housing 5 of central importance to defining
an adequate temporary housing programme. While this
disaster) may be extremely difficult in the chaotic situation during
or right after the disaster, spending resources on this will
mean money saved in the long run.
• Integration of temporary housing within the overail plan
for housing recovery. The plan for temporary housing
needs f0 be made at the same time as, at minimum, a
general sketch for permanent reconstruction, or overall
housing recovery. The affected population should have
a role in planning and decision-making.
• Set realistic target dates for the delivery of temporary
housing and make sure that everyone, including the
beneficiaries, is aware 0f the calendar.
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• if possible, decentralise pro ject planning to localProject planning communities, municipal governments or locally based
NGOs who can adapt the project to meet the specific
local needs.
• Choose the best possible sites that will satisfy ail the
constraints 0f time, investment and convenience. Utilise
existing plans for locations of temporary housing and
start as eariy as possible because this process can take
time.
• Detine necessary services and possible providers ot
those services with a focus on what local communities
and residents can offer.
• Plan for the outcome of the temporary housing. Decide
how long the temporary housing will stay on site (this
might need to be somewhat flexible) and decide what
will can become of the temporary housing after its initiai
use, i.e. rentai housing, community use, stored for next
disaster, sold. Also plan to clean up the temporary
housing sites.
• Where possible, work with families to inform design ofDesign units and iayout of settiements
• Design units with their outcome in mmd, for example if
they are going to be reused it is best if the spaces are
flexible in size and it can be dismantied and
reassembled again.
• Plan for the layout of sites, including groupings,
orientation, open space, meeting or community faciiities.
• Draw on existing organisational arrangements forConstruction infrastructure construction, if possible
• Engage local firms or local communities, where
possible, for housing construction
• Promote operation of settiement by affected population,Operation can be a source of income and a source of pride.
• Promote gardens and play areas.
• Pay attention to additions and modifications to the
houses. it might be necessary to have some policies on
which types of additions are aiiowed.
• Use time in temporary housing to have people plan
collectiveiy about permanent housing. Communities of
temporary housing residents, properly organised, may
hold power to influence permanent housing
programmes.
u Units left empty wiii soon by occupied by squatters. if
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renting s pianned for the units, then t must be
managed. if units are to be dismantled, they shouid be
taken down right away.
• Reuse the units if possible as rentai housing, communityDismantiing buildings or seil them (or the parts) privately.
• It will most likeiy be necessary to offer other housing
options for people who are stiii occupying the temporary
units.
• Sites must be cieaned up and left unpolluted once
dismantiing occurs, because it is unlikeiy to happen
later.
5.3 Conclusions
This research has examined the process of temporary housing, viewing it as
an integrai yet separate part of the process of post-disaster reconstruction.
Appiying the systems view toward the probiem has reveaied the compiexity of
administering temporary housing projects and has shown the limitations of
the ad-hoc tacticai planning that prevails in most projects.
What is needed in the chaotic post-disaster situation is a plan that aids in the
implementation of conveniently located units that serve the purpose of
sheltering disaster-affected families until they have a permanent place to live.
This research has shown that if strategic planning for temporary housing
projects —up-front before the disaster—is integrated into disaster planning, it
can greatly reduce wasted resources and help in offering the best possible
solutions for housing recovery. Strategic planning can tackle the full spectrum
of the programme before the disaster occurs and can take into account the
necessarily related aspects of organisational design, technical design and
planning as well as arranging for the most efficient processes to be
mobilised—within such a framework—to attain the desired outcomes.
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APPEN DIX A: Temporary housing settiements visited in
Turkey
NAME? TOWN SIZE* SUPPLIER DATE PHOTO
DESCRIPTION VISITED
xiv
G0m0pinar Dûzce large Government
Wood house
settiement
Jul 2000, Nov
2003 & Jun
Aug 2004
Kayanali small University
Paper house
settiement
Jul 2000
KayanaIi small NGO Jul 2000 &
Nov 2003
Green wood Kayanali small NGO Jul 2000
house
settiement
Danish village KayanaIi small NGO Jul 2000
*Small=Iess than 100 units; medium 100-1000 units; large more than 1000 units
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APPEN DIX B: Photographs of temporary housrng
Views of DLizce town centre
L:“
xvi
Building using traditional seismically safe construction method ot wood
trame construction (with significant lateral support) and brick intili
Temporary unit used as doctor’s office In DLizce (photo taken 4 years after
earthquakes)
! t -
UMCOR temporary housing units reused as school
II!
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Permanent housing developments
Beyciler Evieri housing project
Govern ment developments
UMCOR project
Sites Ieft polluted alter temporary housing is dismantled
xviii
Temporary housing Iocated on the hill surrounding the city
xix
Some services in temporary housing projects
Paper tube houses viewed after 4 years
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Interior vïews of temporary housing units
:
Interior of Winterised tent
Views of varïous temporary housïng settiements
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